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ABSTRACT  
 
 This dissertation puts forth an account of moral responsibility. The central claim 
defended is that an agent's responsibility supervenes on the agent's mental states 
at the time of the action. I call the mental states that determine responsibility the 
agent's quality of will (QOW). QOW is taken to concern the agent's action, 
understood from an internal perspective, along with the agent's motivations, her 
actual beliefs about the action, and the beliefs she ought to have had about the 
action. This approach to responsibility has a number of surprising implications. 
First, blameworthiness can come apart from wrongness, and praiseworthiness 
from rightness. This is because responsibility is an internal notion and rightness 
and wrongness are external notions. Furthermore, agents can only be responsible 
for their QOW. It follows that agents cannot be responsible for the consequences 
of their actions. I further argue that one's QOW is determined by what one cares 
about. And the fact that we react to the QOW of others with morally reactive 
emotions, such as resentment and gratitude, shows that we care about QOW. The 
reactive attitudes can therefore be understood as ways in which we care about 
what others care about. Responsibility can be assessed by comparing one's actual 
QOW to the QOW one ought to have had. 
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PREFACE  
Rather than writing a traditional dissertation that begins with a literature review 
and steadily progresses to a final culminating conclusion I have chosen to tackle 
the unwieldy topic of moral responsibility with the tactics of guerilla warfare. 
Responsibility is well suited to this approach for it is a large and messy beast. A 
systematic and comprehensive treatment of the topic is, in my opinion, bound to 
distort and oversimplify. What follows is a collection of essays that attempt to 
make progress on this topic by taking stabs at it from a variety of angles. To 
stretch the warfare analogy a bit further (too far?), the weaponry employed 
throughout is the idea that rather than being about free will responsibility is about 
quality of will. 
 Using a different analogy, the picture of responsibility that I have 
attempted to develop owes much more to the impressionism of Monet than to the 
realism of Vermeer. Viewed close up there are certainly questions left 
unanswered and details to be filled in, but I think that when we step back this 
account better captures most fundamentally what responsibility is about. There is, 
of course, much more work to be done, but I hope to have laid the foundation 
upon which more fruitful research can build. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about moral responsibility. This is not a new topic. People 
have pondered the nature of responsibility for well over two thousand years. What 
is new, or at least newer, is the approach to the topic taken here. Theorizing about 
the nature of responsibility has been primarily guided by concerns about the truth 
and implications of causal determinism. Determinism can be described as the 
thesis that a complete description of the universe at a time together with the laws 
of nature entails every future truth. Many have wondered whether free will is 
compatible with the world being determined in this way. And it is generally 
supposed that responsibility requires free will.  
Theorists have often begun their theorizing about responsibility with a 
conviction about the compatibility of free will with determinism. The theories that 
arise, then, are tailor made to buttress this conviction. The methodological 
assumption shared by both sides of the debate is that the compatibility or 
incompatibility of responsibility with determinism is a desideratum of the theory. 
Given this, it is no wonder that this debate seems to inevitably lead to, what John 
Martin Fischer has called, a dialectical stalemate. 
 This is not how responsibility is treated here. Though this is a dissertation 
about responsibility this is not a dissertation about free will. The reader will notice 
that, aside from a few footnotes and a remark here and there, the compatibility 
question is rarely mentioned. (Though in the interest of full disclosure I should 
note that my sympathies lie with the compatibilist). This is because of my belief 
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that an answer to the compatibility question should not be an antecedent 
desideratum of the account. For before we can begin to think about that question, 
we must know what responsibility is about. It is on this front that I think many 
theorists have gone wrong and on which I hope to make some progress.  
 The common theme running through this collection of essays is that 
responsibility is about quality of will.  This is, I believe, the lesson that should be 
taken from, perhaps, the two most influential philosophers working on 
responsibility in the 20th century: Strawson and Frankfurt. Both Strawson’s 
“Freedom and Resentment” and Frankfurt’s “Alternate Possibilities and Moral 
Responsibility” invite us to question, in different ways, the conviction that 
responsibility is about free will. Once we are free of this preoccupation a new 
picture of responsibility emerges, one that is embedded within a social fabric and 
whose richness accurately reflects the complexity of our moral lives. The essays 
that follow begin to explore and develop this way of thinking about responsibility.  
 The first chapter begins with a discussion of Strawson and sets out the 
methodology employed in this collection. The second chapter begins to develop 
my conception of quality of will and shows the very close connection between 
Strawson and Frankfurt. The third chapter argues that the only appropriate target 
of responsibility is quality of will. Chapter 4 examines the relationship between 
blameworthiness and wrongness. I argue that rather than requiring wrongness in 
fact, blameworthiness requires that one ought to have believed one’s action to be 
wrong. Chapters 5 and 6 defend quality of will accounts against what are often 
thought to be the most challenging objections. Chapter 5 address the “tracing 
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cases” by applying some of the points developed in the third chapter. Chapter 6 
addresses objections involving brain manipulation by distinguishing between 
responsibility at the time of action and responsibility at some time after. Chapter 7 
applies the distinction made in the previous chapter to issues surrounding the 
notion of collective responsibility. The collection ends with Chapter 8 which 
seeks to understand holding responsible on the model of speech acts. In many 
ways, it is a return to the methodological questions that were taken up in the first 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BEING RESPONSIBLE AND HOLDING RESPONSIBLE 
“Only by attending to this range of attitudes can we recover from the facts as we 
know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, when, speaking the 
language of morals, we speak of desert, responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and 
justice.”  
     -P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”1 
 
Readers of P.F. Strawson’s justly influential “Freedom and Resentment” have 
taken the above passage, and others like it, to be expressing this idea: 
Being responsible is to be understood in terms of holding responsible. 
I here want to distinguish between three different ways that we can understand 
this idea. First, we can understand this to be making a strong conceptual claim 
about the conditions of responsibility. Call this the strong conceptual reading 
(SCR): 
 (SCR) To be responsible just is to be a prone target of the reactive 
 attitudes. 
According to (SCR) to be responsible is simply the propensity to be treated as 
such. On this view there are no independent conditions that warrant such 
treatment. On this view, we might say, being responsible is conceptually 
exhausted by holding responsible. This view can be distinguished from a weaker 
                                                 
1
 Strawson (1962), reprinted in Watson (1982, p. 78). All references to “Freedom 
and Resentment” will be from Watson (1982). 
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conceptual relation between being responsible and holding responsible. Call this 
the weak conceptual reading (WCR): 
 (WCR) To be responsible just is to be an appropriate target of the reactive 
 attitudes. 
According to this view being responsible is a matter of being appropriately held 
responsible. WCR, like SCR, links being responsible conceptually with holding 
responsible. But unlike SCR, WCR does not hold that being responsible is fully 
explained by mere holding responsible. Rather, there must also be reference to the 
appropriateness of holding responsible. On this view there are conditions of being 
responsible but they do make essential reference to holding responsible. Finally, 
we can understand the claim as making an epistemic rather than conceptual point. 
Call this the epistemic reading (ER): 
 (ER) Inquiry into the nature of responsibility should proceed via the stance 
 of holding responsible. 
(ER) makes a methodological rather than conceptual claim about responsibility. It 
says that theorizing about responsibility should begin by reflecting on what it is 
like to hold responsible. And it is consistent with both (SCR) and (WCR) though 
it entails neither. In what follows I discuss the implications of these three 
interpretations of the way in which holding responsible is prior to being 
responsible. I argue that while many have attributed to Strawson the conceptual 
readings, his real insight is (ER). 
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Strawson’s Account 
“Freedom and Resentment” begins theorizing about moral responsibility from an 
angle that had not been traditionally taken. For Strawson, inquiry into the nature 
of responsibility cannot occur in a social vacuum. Rather, it must be placed within 
the context of our web of social practices and relationships. At the heart of these 
practices and relationships lie the reactive attitudes.  He begins by focusing on, 
what he calls, the participant reactive attitudes. These are the emotional reactions 
we feel in response to the attitudes of another directed towards us in action. For 
example, one’s reaction to being pushed by another will be very different 
depending on the attitudes expressed by that act of pushing. It is one thing if the 
pushing expressed indifference towards one’s well being, and quite another if it 
expressed concern about the oncoming bus in one’s path. These are to be 
distinguished from mere moral condemnation or approval, in that the latter but not 
the former, lend themselves to “a certain detachment from the actions or agents 
which are their objects” (Strawson, 1962, p. 62). The reactive attitudes are 
reactions to the intentions and actions of others, and they are significant because 
of the great importance we place on the actions and intentions of others. In 
general, we demand a certain amount of good will in others, and that amount 
depends on the relationship we stand to that person. When we recognize that an 
individual has met or exceeded this demand for good will, we will feel things like 
gratitude, and when we recognize that that demand has not been met, we may feel 
resentment.  
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 Strawson identifies a class of reactive attitudes that are reactions to the 
quality of will of another that is expressed at a third party. These are vicarious 
analogues to the participant attitudes. The third person version of resentment is 
indignation, and it is this third person nature that gives these attitudes the title of 
moral. We feel indignation when we believe that an agent has not met the demand 
for goodwill in his dealings with another. This is not to say that the moral 
reactions are essentially vicarious, or third person in nature. One can feel 
indignation when it is oneself that is wronged, and so one can feel that she herself 
has been the victim of a moral transgression. The point is that they are essentially 
capable of being vicarious, not that they essentially are vicarious. It is the fact that 
these attitudes generalize that makes them moral. Like the personal reactive 
attitudes, which are an expression of a demand that others treat us with good will, 
these attitudes represent a generalized form of that demand. Strawson then 
identifies a third class of reactive attitudes, the self-reactive attitudes. These are 
reactions to one’s own quality of will such as guilt and shame. He argues that the 
three classes are “humanly connected” (Strawson, 1962, p. 72) in that they come 
as a package deal for normal adult human beings. For Strawson, the stance of 
holding responsible, which consists in the reactive attitudes, has special relevance 
to being responsible. Holding responsible is, in a particular way, prior to being 
responsible. But which way, exactly, is a matter of contention. 
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Interpreting Strawson to be Making the Strong Conceptual Claim 
According to (SCR) to be responsible is simply to be held responsible. Gary 
Watson (1987) seems to interpret Strawson as holding (SCR):  
    As his title suggests, Strawson’s focus is on such attitudes and responses as   
    gratitude and resentment, indignation, approbation, guilt, shame, (some kinds  
    of) pride, hurt feeling, (asking and giving) forgiveness, and (some kinds of)  
    love. All traditional theories of moral responsibility acknowledge connections  
    between these attitudes and holding one another responsible. What is original to  
    Strawson is the way in which they are linked. Whereas traditional views have  
    taken these attitudes to be secondary to seeing others as responsible, to be  
    practical corollaries or emotional side effects of some independently  
    comprehensible belief in responsibility, Strawson’s radical claim is that these  
    “reactive attitudes” (as he calls them) are constitutive of moral responsibility;  
    to regard oneself or another as responsible just is the proneness to react to them  
    in these kinds of ways under certain conditions. There is no more basic belief  
    which provides the justification or rationale for these reactions (Watson, 1987,  
    pp. 256-257, italics mine). 
 
And later: 
    In Strawson’s view, there is no such independent notion of responsibility that   
    explains the propriety of the reactive attitudes. The explanatory priority is the  
    other way around: It is not that we hold people responsible because they are  
    responsible; rather, the idea (our idea) that we are responsible is to be  
    understood by the practice, which itself is not a matter of holding some  
    propositions to be true, but of expressing our concerns and demands about our  
    treatment of one another (258)…These nonpropositional responses are  
    constitutive of the practice of holding responsible” (Watson, 1987, p. 261). 
 
 Watson interprets Strawson to be a noncognitivist about our practice of 
holding responsible. Insofar as the reactive attitudes have no propositional 
content, they permit no justification. As such, our search for some “independently 
comprehensible belief in responsibility” is misguided. The best we can do, 
according to this interpretation, is simply to observe the practice to see what 
contexts elicit these attitudes. The susceptibility to the reactive attitudes fully 
explains being responsible. No judgment that one is responsible grounds, or 
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explains, or justifies the reactive attitudes. Rather, having the reactive attitude 
explains the judgment that one is responsible.2 
 On the face of it, (SCR) is implausible. The degree of relativism and moral 
infallibilism that it implies will be too much for most of us. Furthermore, I don’t 
believe that this is an appropriate interpretation of Strawson. This is because the 
reactive attitudes, by Strawson’s own lights, do have propositional content. They 
are about the moral quality of will expressed by an agent in her action.3  
 
Interpreting Strawson to be Making the Weak Conceptual Claim 
R. Jay Wallace (1994) develops a subtle and insightful Strawsonian account in his 
Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. “If we wish to make sense of the idea 
that there are facts about what it is to be a responsible agent, it is best not to 
picture such facts as conceptually prior to and independent of our practice of 
holding people responsible” (Wallace, 1994, p. 1). Rather, he claims that our 
understanding of responsibility should be given a normative interpretation. 
According to this the “conditions of responsibility are to be construed as 
conditions that make it fair to adopt the stance of holding people responsible” 
                                                 
2
 R. Jay Wallace interprets Watson’s essay in this way: “Gary Watson has taken 
Strawson to be making the ‘radical claim’ that the reactive attitudes ‘are 
constitutive of moral responsibility; to regard oneself or another as responsible 
just is the proneness to react to them in these kinds of ways under certain 
conditions’…Construed along these lines, Strawson’s own approach appears to 
have a markedly noncognitivist character” (1994, p. 74), which, Wallace thinks, 
“makes the claim hard to accept” (1994, p. 11). 
 
3
 This point will be elaborated in greater detail later. 
  10 
(Wallace, 1994, p. 15). Holding responsible, in turn, involves either an actual 
susceptibility to the reactive attitudes or belief that such attitudes are warranted.  
 Unlike Watson, Wallace takes Strawsonian theory to be an essentially 
cognitivist enterprise. This is because he sees the reactive attitudes as sharing a 
common propositional object: the belief that the agent has violated a moral 
expectation that one accepts. The reactive attitudes are fair, according to Wallace, 
so long as that expectation has actually been violated.  
 While Wallace’s approach escapes the worries associated with 
noncognitivism, Angela Smith (2007) raises doubts about any account that gives 
conceptual priority to holding responsible over being responsible. She criticizes 
Wallace’s theory because she sees the conditions that warrant holding 
responsible, what she calls active blame, as requiring more than what is intuitively 
thought of as being responsible. That is, she points to cases in which it is intuitive 
that the agent is responsible, and yet it would be inappropriate to actively blame 
her.4 For example, two people may both judge an agent to be blameworthy and 
yet it may be appropriate for one but not the other to actively blame the agent due 
to the relation she stands to the agent (perhaps one is the victim of the harm while 
the other is merely a bystander). Thus, it is a mistake to construe the conditions of 
being responsible as equivalent to the conditions that make active blame 
appropriate. 
                                                 
4
 For Smith, active blame only requires the occurrence of inner attitudes such as 
resentment. See next footnote. 
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 Wallace could respond in a few different ways. First, he could stress that 
his conception of holding responsible entails no overt behavior. Rather, to hold 
responsible involves an actual susceptibility to the reactive attitudes or the belief 
that such a reaction is warranted. The cases that Smith points to rely on the 
inappropriateness of expressing one’s reactive attitudes but they don’t seem to 
show that the presence of the reactive attitude, much less the belief that such an 
attitude would be warranted are themselves inappropriate.5  
 Secondly, Wallace could admit that she has successfully brought up cases 
in which though it is intuitive that the agent is blameworthy it is also intuitive that 
blame would be inappropriate. But he could argue that this doesn’t show his 
normative interpretation to be misguided because inappropriateness doesn’t entail 
unfairness. That is, though it may be inappropriate in a case to engage in overt 
blaming behavior, such behavior would not be unfair. 
 What we should notice though, is that the issue is whether the class of 
cases in which it is fair to hold an agent responsible is coextensive with the class 
of cases in which an agent is responsible. If Wallace construes holding 
responsible to be an active and overt behavior then though the normative 
                                                 
5
 Interestingly, Smith also allows that active blame, in her sense, requires no overt 
behavior: “But on my view one can ‘actively blame’ a person simply by feeling 
resentment, indignation, or anger toward her, without ever expressing these 
emotions in any way” (Smith, 2007, p. 477). As such it is hard for me to imagine 
a case in which an agent is blameworthy and yet it would be inappropriate to feel 
resentment. And it is even harder to imagine a case that falsifies Wallace’s weaker 
disjunctive conception of holding responsible. For that would be a case in which 
though the agent is blameworthy it would be inappropriate to feel resentment or to 
believe resentment is warranted. But it seems that to say that an agent is 
blameworthy simply is to say that blame is warranted. 
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interpretation is interesting and original, it seems vulnerable to the cases Smith 
raises. If, however, Wallace’s account is to be intuitively adequate then he must 
have a weaker conception of holding responsible which begins to undermine 
interest in the normative interpretation. For as Smith puts it, “Presumably, what 
would be ‘fair’ would be to judge people to be culpable when they are in fact 
culpable, and that would be determined by asking whether they have transgressed 
any moral norms or requirements” (2007, p. 472). Put in a different way, 
Wallace’s normative interpretation (what has here been characterized as WCR) 
has bite only if fairly holding responsible is a narrower class than what we 
intuitively think of as being responsible. But this will seem to be an implausible 
account of being responsible for the reasons that Smith raises. However if fairly 
holding responsible is understood in a broader way that matches up with the 
intuitive idea of being responsible, then it is hard to see what kind of priority 
holding responsible is supposed to have. For rather than thinking an agent 
responsible because it would be fair to hold her responsible, it would seem to be 
fair to hold an agent responsible because she is responsible. Given these 
considerations, we should move towards the idea that holding responsible has 
epistemic, but not necessarily conceptual, priority over being responsible.6 
  
 
 
                                                 
6
 Wallace’s own account works best along these lines, though given the emphasis 
he places on the normative interpretation he does seem to be conceiving the 
priority to be conceptual. 
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Interpreting Strawson to be Making the Epistemic Claim 
Michael McKenna (2005) offers a different reading of Strawson. He (tentatively) 
believes that Strawson should be read as denying both of the conceptual 
interpretations of the priority of holding responsible over being responsible: 
    So, by the light of Strawson’s own essay, theorizing about moral responsibility  
    begins by focusing first on the attitudes of agents-on the persons who are held  
    morally responsible, not on those who are holding them morally responsible.  
    For Strawson, the morally reactive attitudes are responses to the quality of will  
    expressed in a person’s conduct. Since the reactive attitudes, as well as the  
    attendant practices and expectations, constitute what it is to hold agents morally  
    responsible, holding morally responsible is to be understood on Strawson’s  
    view as tailored to the moral quality of will indicated in the activities of  
    morally responsible agents. Hence, the explanatory relation between holding  
    and being morally responsible is, at best, mutually supporting. And there is  
    good reason to think that, on Strawson’s own view, if one direction has a place  
    of privilege, it is being morally responsible; being morally responsible explains  
    holding morally responsible”(McKenna, 2005, pp. 171-172). 
  
 For McKenna, when Strawson says “Only by attending to this range of 
attitudes…” (1962, p. 78), the range of attitudes that he is referring to includes the 
attitudes of those held responsible in addition to the attitudes of those holding 
responsible. The reactive attitudes are reactions to the attitudes of the agents who 
are the objects of evaluation; specifically the degree of ill or good will revealed by 
their action. So on McKenna’s reading, agents are responsible insofar as they act 
from good or ill will, and the reactive attitudes that constitute holding responsible 
are a response to the agent’s quality of will.  
I think that McKenna has it right. There is ample evidence that suggests 
that Strawson took the priority of holding responsible over being responsible to be 
epistemic rather than conceptual. In the opening quote of this chapter I take 
Strawson to be making a methodological claim; that by focusing on the reactive 
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attitudes we will be in a better position to understand what responsibility is about.  
“The central common place that I want to insist on is the very great importance 
that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings, 
and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or 
involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions” (Strawson, 1962, p. 62). 
The reactive attitudes are intimately linked to beliefs about the quality of an 
agent’s will. This suggests that the noncognitivist reading of Strawson, favored by 
Watson, is not accurate. Contra Watson, the reactive attitudes do have 
propositional content which concern the attitudes and intentions of the agent. 
“What I have called the participant reactive attitudes are essentially natural human 
reactions to the good or ill will or indifference of others towards us, as displayed 
in their attitudes and actions” (Strawson, 1962, p. 67). One might read Strawson 
here, as McKenna does, as stating that an agent is morally responsible for some 
action insofar as that action stemmed from good or ill will or indifference. And 
because the reactive attitudes are reactions to the quality of will of others (or 
ourselves), and being morally responsible is to be understood in terms of the 
quality of will of the agent, then being responsible is conceptually prior to holding 
responsible.  
 
Strawsonian Methodology 
On this reading Strawson has not presented a theory of responsibility so much as 
he has set up an account of how theorizing about responsibility ought to go. In the 
comfort of our armchair we must not lose sight of what responsibility is about. 
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We should begin by vividly reflecting on what it is actually like to hold 
responsible. And notice that we don’t, typically, hold agents merely responsible. 
Rather we blame and praise them, we feel resentment and gratitude. This suggests 
a different kind of conceptual priority. Rather than thinking that holding 
responsible is conceptually prior to being responsible, we should think of 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness as conceptually prior to mere 
responsibility. I think that this is Strawson’s most original insight. 
 Many theories of responsibility begin by surveying intuitions about the 
responsibility of agents doing rather mundane things. For example, Fischer and 
Ravizza ask for our intuitions about whether an agent is responsible for making 
the train go to Syracuse when nothing of moral importance is at stake.7 This, I 
think, can lead to a distorted picture of responsibility. There is a sense in which 
the question is baffling. Am I morally responsible for raising my right hand in the 
privacy of my home? It is hard to know how to make sense of this question. For 
Fischer and Ravizza the question amounts to whether the agent exercised a 
particular type of control. But I am left wondering whether this is really what 
responsibility is about. 
                                                 
7
 “Ralph is the driver of a train whose brakes have failed. We suppose, for the 
sake of the example, that Ralph has been kidnapped and required against his will 
to drive the train. The train is hurtling down the tracks toward a fork in the tracks. 
Ralph knows that, although he can cause the train to take the right fork or the left 
fork, he cannot stop the train. Ralph also knows that both forks lead to Syracuse. 
When Ralph turns the train onto the left fork, he can be held morally responsible 
for the consequence, that the train takes the left fork (rather than the right fork). 
But it just seems obvious that Ralph is not morally responsible for the 
consequence, that the train ends up in Syracuse, given the fact that Ralph is not 
morally responsible for the fact that he is on this stretch of track in the first place” 
(Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 94). 
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 Alternatively we can begin our inquiry by focusing, not on these cases of 
mere responsibility, but on cases that engage our emotions, cases that elicit strong 
feelings of resentment on the one hand, and gratitude on the other. That is, we 
should focus on cases in which we take the agent to be blameworthy or 
praiseworthy. When I focus on my feelings about the callous murderer what I find 
is that my resentment consists, in part, in representing the murderer to be a certain 
way. I am representing him to have cared about the wrong things and to have not 
cared enough about the right things. I am representing his feelings and attitudes 
expressed in his actions to be despicable. I am representing his quality of will to 
be a certain way. When I reflect on the feelings I have about the bystander who 
threw herself in front of the gunman in order to save another I am struck by the 
selfless concern that motivated her. Here too I am representing her quality of will 
to be a certain way, though in this case exceptional. Strawson’s insight is that 
when we pay closer attention to what we are doing when we hold responsible we 
can see what responsibility is about. It is about quality of will. 
Smith, I think rightly, has pointed out that holding responsible in an active 
and overt way requires more justification than that the agent is in fact responsible. 
But she takes this to suggest “that these concerns about the fairness or 
appropriateness of blaming responses should not themselves play a role in our 
theorizing about the conditions under which a person can be said to be responsible 
or culpable for her actions and attitudes” (Smith, 2007, p. 483). But granting that 
the conditions that justify active blame require more than blameworthiness, there 
is still reason to look towards our practice of holding responsible in order to 
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understand being responsible. This is because when we are engaged in our most 
active forms of holding responsible the representation of the agent as responsible 
is made most vividly. It is in such circumstances that we can best see what 
responsibility is about. Insofar as the reactive attitudes have propositional content, 
then the conditions of being responsible simply are the truth conditions of those 
propositions. But it is from the stance of actively holding responsible that we are 
in the best epistemic position to see what that content is.  
Strawson saw that our practice of holding responsible is emotionally 
charged. And when we look to these emotions what we find is a representation of 
the quality of will of the agent. Resentment involves the representation of a 
criticizable quality of will and gratitude involves the representation of an 
exceptional quality of will. The reactive attitudes are warranted to the extent that 
their constitutive representations are accurate. To be blameworthy for an action 
simply is to have acted with a criticizable quality of will and to be praiseworthy 
for an action simply is to have acted with an exceptional quality of will. Since the 
reactive attitudes represent blameworthiness and praiseworthiness these notions 
are conceptually prior to responsibility itself. The notion of moral responsibility is 
parasitic upon these concepts which are constituents of the reactive attitudes. To 
say that an agent is morally responsible for an action is to say that it is the sort of 
thing that she could be blameworthy or praiseworthy for were there something 
riding on it. This is the reverse of traditional thinking about responsibility. 
According to this tradition responsibility, conceived as an agential capacity, is 
most fundamental. To see an agent as blameworthy is to first see her as 
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responsible and then to see her as having done something wrong. On this view it 
is easy to see responsibility as a metaphysical issue and to be led into the 
“panicky metaphysics” of which Strawson was so wary. But when we give 
credence to our humanity we find, not that responsibility has metaphysical 
presuppositions, but that it about the degree of good will we express to one 
another.
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          CHAPTER 2 
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND QUALITY OF WILL 
Many theories of moral responsibility give the notion of quality of will a central 
role. Indeed, elements of this idea are near ubiquitous in moral theorizing. Here I 
develop, in broad strokes, a quality of will based theory of responsibility. This 
theory holds that moral responsibility for an act is completely determined by the 
quality of will with which an agent acts. I’ll first give a rough sketch of this 
notion and show the role it has played in the works of some influential 
philosophers. I’ll then begin to articulate a more careful conception of quality of 
will. An agent’s will is, on this account, an action understood internally (what 
might be better described as a willing rather than the will). The quality of an 
agent’s will is determined by the motivations with which an agent acts. An 
agent’s motivations are determined by the reasons in virtue of which she was 
actually moved to act. The reasons we do and do not respond to reveal and are 
determined by what we care about. Our reactions to the quality of will of others, 
exemplified by the reactive attitudes, shows that we care about quality of will. 
The reactive attitudes are therefore second-order cares that are aimed at quality of 
will. This shows that quality of will is what responsibility is about. 
 
1. Historical Conceptions 
It is extremely plausible that an agent’s responsibility for an act depends, in some 
way, on her attitudes and beliefs at the time of action: 
    Persons interpret each other’s movements as manifestations of intention and   
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    choices, and these subjective factors are often more important to their social  
    relations than the movements by which they are manifested or their effects. If  
    one person hits another, the person struck does not think of the other as just a  
    cause of pain to him; for it is of crucial importance to him whether the blow  
    was deliberate or involuntary. If the blow struck was light but deliberate, it has  
    a significance for the person struck quite different from an accidental much  
    heavier blow (H.L.A. Hart, 1968, pp. 182-183).8 
 
 What matters for responsibility is not merely the effects of one’s action 
but, at least as much, her motivations in acting as she did. Responsibility takes 
into account what the agent believed herself to be doing and why she did what she 
did. The idea that one’s responsibility is sensitive in some way to one’s subjective 
states is not so much a type of theory but rather a feature of the phenomena for 
which we must account.9  
 Aristotle, for example, devotes a large portion of Book III of 
Nicomachean Ethics to a discussion of acting under ignorance. Some forms of 
ignorance excuse, but others do not: “One might give a man a draught to save 
him, but really kill him” (Aristotle, 1998, p. 52). In such a case the man is 
ignorant of the effects of his action. Insofar as it was reasonable for the man to 
think that the draught would save rather than kill he will escape blame despite the 
harmful effects of his action. But not all ignorance excuses. “We punish a man for 
his very ignorance, if he is thought responsible for the ignorance… through 
carelessness; we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant, since they 
have the power of taking care” (Aristotle, 1998, p. 60).  One can be blameworthy 
                                                 
8
 As quoted by Wallace (1994, p. 124). 
 
9
 I will argue for the stronger claim that an agent’s responsibility is completely 
determined by her subjective states.  
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for doing something out of ignorance if one ought to have not been ignorant. The 
psychological states of the agent matter to her responsibility:  
    Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the  
    products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that  
    they should have a certain character, but the acts that are in accordance with the  
    virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done  
    justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he  
    does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must do  
    them from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle, 1998, p. 34). 
 
Here Aristotle is restricting the qualities of will that can confer virtue. He is 
making the plausible claim that for one to be praiseworthy or virtuous one must 
do the right thing for the right reasons.10 One must be motivated by the good. For 
Aristotle quality of will (henceforth QOW) matters to responsibility.  
 This is in contrast to utilitarian theories of responsibility. These theories 
hold, roughly, that an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy to the extent that 
blaming or praising the agent yields utility. Though some, such as J.C.C. Smart, 
have held this view it is worth noting that Mill explicitly rejected it and endorsed 
something closer to a QOW approach: “The motive has nothing to do with the 
morality of the action though much with the worth of the agent” (Mill, 1979, p. 
18). 
 Some have held that QOW is the only thing that matters at all. For 
example, consider this famous passage from Kant: 
    It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond  
    it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will…A  
    good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes…Even if, by a  
    special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly  
                                                 
10
 Though this claim is plausible it is, I believe, false. This is because one’s action 
may fail to be right through no fault of one’s own. 
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    nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose—if  
    with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will   
    were left-then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has  
    its full worth in itself (Kant, 1998, p. 8). 
 
Kant is claiming that the QOW with which an agent acts is the only thing that is 
relevant to the question of responsibility or moral worth. It does not matter if the 
action turns out to be bad due to some external force as long as the agent had the 
right QOW in acting. 
 In the twentieth century two especially influential thinkers, Peter Strawson 
and Harry Frankfurt, have made the notion of quality of will central to their 
understanding of responsibility.11 Strawson focuses on what he calls the reactive 
attitudes, for example resentment and indignation, which are reactions to the 
quality of will of others: 
    The central commonplace that I want to insist on is the very great importance  
    that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us of other human beings,  
    and the great extent to which our personal feelings and reactions depend upon,  
    or involve, our beliefs about these attitudes and intentions…The reactive  
    attitudes I have so far discussed are essentially reactions to the quality of  
    others’ wills toward us, as manifested in their behaviour: to their good or ill  
    will or indifference or lack of concern (Strawson, 1962, p. 70). 
 
For Strawson, QOW matters to responsibility because our reactive attitudes are 
constitutive of our practices of responsibility and closely linked with the 
conditions of responsibility and these attitudes are directly responsive to QOW. In 
other words, QOW matters to responsibility because responsibility is about QOW. 
                                                 
11
 Strawson (1962) and Frankfurt (e.g. 1969; 1971). See McKenna (2005) for a 
discussion of the insight they share. 
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 Frankfurt, at the end of his essay attacking the principle of alternate 
possibilities hints at the importance of QOW: “A person is not morally 
responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done 
otherwise” (Frankfurt, 1969 p. 10, italics mine). The bare fact that one could not 
have acted otherwise does not get one off the hook. One is off the hook if the sole 
reason that one acted in some untoward way was that one could not have done 
otherwise. What matters is the QOW with which one acted.12 In “Freedom of the 
Will and the Concept of a Person” he gives an account of QOW, and notes the 
ways in which different qualities of will might affect one’s responsibility.  
 Frankfurt distinguishes between first and second-order desires. A first-
order desire is a desire for some object or state of affairs, for example my desire 
for a cup of coffee. At any given time we may have many different and 
conflicting first-order desires. But one of these desires will win out in the sense 
that it actually moves one to act. The first-order desire that moves one to action is 
what Frankfurt calls the will. One may also have second-order desires. A second-
order desire is a desire for some first-order desire. For example, I may desire the 
desire to work hard. Of our second-order desires we may distinguish from those 
that are merely desires for a first-order desire those that are desires that our will 
be a certain way. He calls these our second-order volitions. For him, an agent acts 
                                                 
12
 This is, I believe, the lesson we should take away from Frankfurt’s famous 
paper. His paper points to what matters in responsibility. And this lesson remains 
whether his counterexample really does rule out all alternate possibilities.  
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freely when his will is determined by his second-order volition.13 This is the 
quality of will that responsibility requires on a Frankfurtian account.14 
 For example a drug addict may do something bad on the basis of his 
addiction, say, snatches a purse. The reason that he does this may be because his 
first-order desire for the drug is irresistible; it is inevitable that that desire would 
move him to action. But this desire may be at odds with the rest of his 
commitments. He may have a second-order volition that is contrary to his will. 
But it is also possible that though his desire for the drug is irresistible, he is 
entirely content with this state of affairs and would not have it any other way. He 
may have a second-order volition that he takes the drug. It is intuitive that the 
willing addict is more blameworthy than the unwilling addict in virtue of the 
difference in their QOW.15  
                                                 
13
 Frankfurt is often misread as saying that the mere alignment of one’s will with 
one’s second-order volition is sufficient for freedom, but he explicitly denies this: 
“And it is in the discrepancy between his will and his second-order volitions, or in 
his awareness that their coincidence is not his own doing but only a happy chance, 
that a person who does not have this freedom feels its lack” (20-21). 
 
14
 It’s worth noting that Frankfurt, in “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a 
Person,” never actually endorses this view.  
 
15
 On a Frankfurtian account, the presence of a second-order volition to X would 
enhance responsibility for one’s Xing (though Frankfurt in fact never makes this 
claim). This seems right to me, though I do not believe that the presence of a 
second-order volition is a necessary condition for moral responsibility. There is 
also a tension here with what Frankfurt says earlier. Insofar as the willing addict 
acts on a desire that is irresistible it would seem that his will could not have been 
what it is because of his second-order volition. This is in conflict with his claim 
that an agent act freely, not when there is mere harmony between the will and a 
second-order volition, but when the second-order volition causes the will to be 
what it is. But perhaps Frankfurt is imagining the willing addict’s will to be over 
determined.  
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 In “The Importance of What We Care About,” Frankfurt explores the 
notion of care or concern. When one cares about something that thing matters for 
one or, we might say, one gives a damn about that thing. Frankfurt links this 
notion of caring or giving a damn to that of importance and shows that what we 
care about plays a significant role in our lives, and in part, determines who we are. 
 The account of QOW that I seek to develop is indebted to both Strawson 
and Frankfurt. In my view QOW should be understood by reference to what we 
care about. When we do things, we do things for reasons, and what reasons we 
respond to is determined by what we care about. And what reasons others respond 
to, what motivational structure they have, what their QOW is, matters to us. We 
care about it. In this way, the reactive attitudes are cares about the QOW of 
others; they are cares about cares. That is, our practice of holding others (and 
ourselves) responsible consists in giving a damn about what others (and 
ourselves) care about. 
 
2. Willing 
The notion of the will is one of the most common and most elusive notions in 
philosophy. For some, it is a prime-mover within us; some special causal power. 
For others it is merely the result of deterministic forces. There are conceptions of 
the will that may be difficult to reconcile with a naturalistic world view.16 The 
account of QOW that I want to develop does not depend on any controversial 
metaphysical claims (though it is compatible with those claims). Rather, the will, 
                                                 
16
 I have in mind here agent-causal versions of libertarianism. 
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or what may be more accurately described as a willing, is simply an action 
understood internally.  
 People do things. We vote, we drive over the speed limit, and we hurt each 
other’s feelings. These are actions. Actions should be distinguished from events 
that merely happen to us. Suppose you push me. The pushing is something that 
you do but it is something that merely happens to me. It is not an action of mine 
though it is of yours. Many actions require input from the world. If my filling in a 
circle with ink is to count as voting the world must be a certain way. There must 
be an established convention governing the practice and I must be of a certain age 
and must be at a certain place at a certain time and so on. If a bit of my behavior 
is to be truly described as my speeding then there must be a law establishing the 
speed limit on a particular stretch of road, and I must be in a car traveling above a 
particular speed. If I am to hurt someone’s feelings then her feelings must actually 
be hurt. These are all conditions that are external to me, the agent. But there is a 
component of action that is internal to the agent. This is the component of action 
that does not require any input from the world in the sense I have tried to 
characterize.  
 Suppose that I hurt your feelings by insulting you. My action can be 
described as my hurting of your feelings. Now imagine another case in which 
everything is the same except that your feelings are not hurt; perhaps you have a 
thicker skin than I have supposed. Though my action can no longer be truly 
described as my hurting of your feelings it is importantly similar to my act in the 
first case. This is because the two actions are qualitatively identical from the first-
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person perspective. At the time of action everything was the same from my point 
of view. I had the same beliefs about what I was doing and I had the same 
motivations. We can continue to consider cases in which the action is the same 
from this perspective but the world is increasingly different. For example we can 
imagine a case in which I attempt to hurt your feelings but fail because you are 
not before me, there is merely a hologram of your likeness. And we can imagine a 
case in which though I attempt to hurt your feelings I do not do so because I am a 
brain in a vat. The component of action that is held fixed across this range of 
cases is my will.17 In each case I willed that your feelings should be hurt even 
though I succeeded in only the first case. Though the world is not held fixed in 
these cases my willing is. When I speak of an agent’s quality of will I am 
speaking of the quality of her action understood internally in this way.18 
  
 
 
                                                 
17
 Some may be hesitant to say that a brain in a vat can act at all. Yet surely 
everyone will admit that a brain in a vat can will things to occur. I choose to 
identify actions with willings because I favor a Davidsonian account of action. 
Actions, such as his driving of the car, are simply rediscriptions of willings (See 
Chapter 3). The adoption of a Davidsonian account of action allows my account 
to depart less from ordinary language than it would otherwise. For if one were to 
deny that a brain in a vat acts at all, then my account would imply that agents are 
only responsible for willings and not for actions. But since on a Davidsonian 
account actions are willings under descriptions, we can still hold that agents are 
responsible for actions. 
 
18
 As will become clear later, an action understood internally in this way is not 
equivalent to the self-conscious perception of action. This is because one’s 
motivations are not necessarily transparent to one. 
  28 
3. Qualities 
When people act they do so for reasons. For example, I may have pushed you 
because I think you are a jerk or because you were about to step on a rattlesnake. 
Our motivations in acting matter. I am blameworthy for my action if I pushed you 
because I think you are a jerk but I may be praiseworthy for pushing you if I was 
saving you from a snake bite. When I speak of an agent’s quality of will I am 
speaking of the motivational structure that issued in the willing. 
 QOW is concerned with the reasons that an agent acted as she did; her 
motives in acting. When some agent acts we can give reasons that attempt to 
explain the action, reasons that show what the motivations of the agent were. 
These are one’s explanatory reasons or motivating reasons. It is important to 
distinguish these from one’s normative reasons or practical reasons. Suppose that 
I am at a party and decide to have another drink to ease my anxiety about an 
upcoming presentation. This drink, however, puts me over the edge and I end up 
making a fool of myself. We may say that my motivating reason for having 
another drink was to ease my anxiety. This was why I had the drink. But this is 
not to say that there was good reason for me to have another. Though there was a 
motivating reason for my behavior there may have been no normative reason for 
me to act in that way.  
The QOW that some agent actually has is determined by her motivating 
reasons and these motivating reasons are psychological states of the agent. This is 
not to deny that normative reasons are relevant. Normative reasons concern, 
among other things, what QOW one should have. And assessing responsibility 
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can be thought of as measuring up one’s actual QOW with the QOW that one 
ought to have. 
 Motivating reasons can come into play at a number of different levels. For 
example there can be different motivating reasons as to why some agent has some 
other motivating reason. Suppose that Jack insults a colleague. His motivating 
reason might be that he dislikes the colleague. But, of course, there might be 
different explanations as to why he dislikes the colleague. He might, for instance, 
dislike those who wear sandals. Or he might dislike the colleague because he has 
witnessed his sexist behavior. These differences are differences in the motivating 
reasons for the action and hence are differences in the QOW with which he acted. 
Given the complexity of motivation, QOW and hence responsibility turn out to be 
similarly complex. 
 I am thinking of an agent’s motivations here in a broad way. This is 
because I mean to include not only what the agent intends to do but also what she 
takes the situation to be. I may be motivated to help myself to a second slice of 
cake at a party. But what I take the situation to be will affect the quality of my 
willing. My QOW will be different if, for instance, I reasonably believe that there 
is plenty of cake to go around than it would be if I believed that not everyone has 
yet had a piece.  
 People can be motivated in subtle ways. And we can be and often are 
mistaken about our own motivations. An agent may have a desire to do something 
while believing that she has no such desire. I may, for instance, believe that I have 
pursued philosophy due to my selfless pursuit of truth. But it may be that I am 
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actually motivated primarily by narcissism and my association of philosophy with 
prestige.  As such, agents can be mistaken about the QOW that they have. Given 
the difficulty, in many cases, of accurately judging agents’ motivations, QOW is 
similarly difficult to judge accurately. As David Shoemaker has rightly pointed 
out, “human beings are messy and difficult” (2003, p. 117) and our theory of 
responsibility should reflect this feature. This is also, I think, what Aristotle had in 
mind when he said that ethics does not admit of the exactness of mathematics.  
  
4. Caring 
One’s QOW in a given situation is typically determined by what one cares most 
about regarding that situation. Caring about some thing involves being disposed in 
certain ways towards that thing. In particular, caring involves cognitive, affective, 
and volitional dispositions. When one cares about some thing, one is disposed to 
notice features of the situation that are relevant to the fortunes of that thing. One 
is cognitively sensitive to factors that can diminish or promote that which one 
cares about. Similarly, to care about something is to be disposed to certain 
affective states with respect to the object of one’s care. If what one cares about is 
diminished or harmed, one will typically feel some form of negative affect, and 
when the object of one’s care is promoted in some way one will typically feel 
positive affect. And finally, we are not passive bystanders with respect to what we 
care about. If one is in a situation in which one’s actions can affect the prospects 
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of what one cares about, one will be disposed to act so as to promote the 
enhancement and oppose the diminishment of what one cares about.19 
 If I care about a friend then I will have these dispositions. If I care about 
my friend then I will typically be sensitive to features of the situation that are 
relevant to the well-being of my friend. I will be on guard, so to speak, towards 
things that could harm or help her. If my friend has a tendency to become 
uncomfortable in social situations, then I will typically be especially sensitive to 
features of the situation that may cause anxiety in her. I will be looking for clues 
on her face that she is not comfortable, and be on the look out for uncomfortable 
situations, say, the boorish acquaintance walking into the party. These cognitive 
dispositions will be closely intertwined with the affective and volitional ones as 
well. My noticing features of the situation that have relevance to my friend, will 
be accompanied by affective responses to the perceived relevant features. My 
noticing the boorish acquaintance walking up to my friend and the uncomfortable 
look on her face, will induce in me an uncomfortable feeling. And I will be 
disposed to act so as to reduce this in both of us. I may, for instance, intercede and 
ask if she wants to leave the party. Or I may not do anything because I think that 
it is important for my friend to learn how to deal with situations of this sort 
because I care about her.  
 Furthermore, when one cares about some thing this thing is necessarily 
important to one. This is because one is directly vulnerable to the prospects of the 
object of one’s care. If I care a lot about a sports team, then I am devastated when 
                                                 
19
 Frankfurt (1982), Arpaly (2003), and Shoemaker (2003), have made this point. 
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they lose and elated when they win. In other words, what happens to the object of 
my care matters to me because I myself become vulnerable to the fortunes of what 
I care about. It is in this sense that we identify with the objects of our cares.  
 One’s QOW is typically determined by what one cares most about in a 
given situation. “If we consider that a person’s will is that by which he moves 
himself, then what he cares about is far more germane to the character of his will 
than the decisions or choices he makes. The latter may pertain to what he intends 
to be his will, but not necessarily to what his will truly is” (Frankfurt, 1982, p. 
84). There is an intimate connection between what one does and what one cares 
about. The connection here is tighter than that between what we decide or intend 
and what we do. I may intend to act in a particular way but fail because, when 
push came to shove, it turned out that I cared more about something else.  
 Shoemaker claims that “what we typically, upon reflection, are motivated 
to do, in any given situation, depends ultimately on what we care most about, with 
respect to that situation” (2003, p. 90). Suppose that I am deciding whether to take 
a job in another part of the country. There are considerations in favor of both 
taking the job and in staying where I am. I consider the salary, the location, the 
effect it will have on my loved ones and so on. In trying to decide what to do I am 
trying to discover which features of the situation I care about most. Do I care 
more about professional advancement than I do about living in a desirable 
location? Do I care more about my partner’s career than I do my own? This 
process of reflection will, when successful, reveal what I care most about. And 
notice that when this revelation is made, so too is my choice. In this way my 
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decision is an importantly passive process. But since it is based on what I care 
most about it is a reflection of my true self. Thus, the process is both necessitating 
and liberating. 
 Frankfurt makes this point with respect to volitional necessity. Sometimes, 
one cares so strongly about some thing that one simply cannot act so as to betray 
that thing. Martin Luther declaring, “Here I stand, I can do no other,” was 
expressing that he cared so much about remaining true to his deepest convictions 
that he simply could not will himself to recant. Shoemaker expands the scope of 
this claim to situations in which we reflect on what is important to us. But he 
believes  
    that it is simply false that all my motivated actions depend on things I care  
    about. We all do a variety of things each day that seem to bear no dependence  
    relation at all to our cares; for example, we get out of bed, we scratch itches, we  
    reach for the milk, we change the TV channels, and so on. These are all  
    intentional, motivated actions, explained (rendered intelligible) by reference to  
    certain of our desires, one might say, without any necessary reference to things  
    we regard as important, things whose changing fortunes would tug on our  
    emotional tethers. These are instances in which we act as wantons, then, as  
    unreflective humans who simply do not care what our wills are to be. In such  
    cases we are moved by various impulses, with no real reflection on whether  
    these are the impulses we want to move us, or on whether these impulses flow  
    from what we care about, and the reason is usually that the situation just  
    doesn’t warrant that kind of reflection—the situation just doesn’t matter  
    (Shoemaker, 2003, p.97). 
 
 For Shoemaker what we do in a situation we regard as important is 
determined by what we care most about. But it is not true that all action is 
determined by what we care most about. This is because what we do in situations 
we do not regard as important is not determined by what we care most about. I am 
somewhat skeptical of these claims. First, note the emphasis on reflection. 
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Shoemaker seems to be associating caring about something with some kind of 
reflection or self-awareness with respect to one’s cares. This rings false to my 
ears. Indeed there seem to be many cases in which we simply discover, on the 
basis of our actions, what it is that we care about. If this is true then whether we 
reflect on the will we want to have, whether we are Frankfurtian persons or 
wantons, is a separate issue from whether we care about something. Someone 
who had no second-order volitions could still care about things it is just that this 
being (I need to avoid saying person!) is unreflective about her cares. 
 Not only this, but there is a sense in which the more one cares about 
something the less refection is necessary or even appropriate. If I care a lot about 
something, say a loved one, then when I am faced with a choice in which my 
loved one could be harmed or helped I need not reflect on what I ought to do. 
Rather, I am simply moved to promote the object of my care. If my loved one is 
about to be harmed in some way and I am in a position to intervene, then I do. I 
don’t need to stop to reflect on what I care about. This would be, as Bernard 
Williams has put it, “one thought too many” (1981, p. 18).  
 Secondly, the way we act in situations we regard as unimportant can be 
plausibly understood to be determined by what we care most about. What we need 
to notice is that the object of our care can be something quite particular (e.g. an 
individual) or quite general (e.g. being happy). The fact that an act of mine is not 
determined by a sharply aimed care does not mean that there is no general care at 
work. I am sitting on the couch deciding what to watch on TV. I don’t regard the 
situation as especially important, there is no particular program that I want to 
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watch, I am just channel surfing and I end up on the food network. This is the 
kind of case in which Shoemaker would be inclined to say that my watching the 
food network is not determined by what I care about. Now it may be that there is a 
specific care that has determined this. I may, for instance, have become more and 
more interested in cooking as of late but I am unreflective about this. This would 
explain why I find myself, yet again, watching a cooking show. This is a case in 
which I discover that I care about cooking. But this is probably not what 
Shoemaker has in mind. Rather I take it that he is imagining cases in which the 
fact that I land on the food network is more random. There is no care that 
determined that I land on this channel rather than another. But actions like these 
can be understood to be determined by what we care most about. In this case, 
however, it is not that I care more about cooking than I do about, say, watching a 
history program. My concern may not push me in one direction or the other. But I 
do care about being able to watch TV when I have no other pressing 
commitments. I do care about being able to relax on a Sunday afternoon. I do care 
about having the opportunity to sometimes sit on the couch and unreflectively 
channel surf. The frustration of these opportunities would tug on my emotional 
tether. These examples of unreflective action are simply cases in which I don’t 
particularly care much about how my more general care is satisfied. What we do 
in situations we regard as unimportant is usually determined by what we care 
about in the same way that what we do in situations that matter is determined by 
our cares. One’s QOW is typically determined by what one cares most about. 
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Caring About the Will 
Strawson’s insight, in “Freedom and Resentment,” was that by paying attention to 
what we are doing when we hold others and ourselves responsible we can get a 
better grasp on what responsibility is about. “The central commonplace that I 
want to insist on is the very great importance that we attach to the attitudes and 
intentions towards us of other human beings, and the great extent to which our 
personal feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these 
attitudes and intentions” (Strawson 1962, p. 62). When we resent another we are 
reacting to the QOW with which he acted. And when we feel gratitude towards 
someone who has done something good we are also reacting to the QOW with 
which she acted. For Strawson, our reactions to the QOW of others and ourselves 
are constituents of both the practice of and the conditions of responsibility.  
 What I wish to focus on here is the way in which Frankfurt and Strawson 
come together through the insight that QOW is what matters for responsibility.20 
In the previous section I argued that one’s QOW is typically determined by what 
one cares about. Strawson’s insight was that our own feelings and attitudes, 
specifically the reactive attitudes of which the practice of responsibility consists, 
depend upon the QOW expressed towards us by others. My reaction to someone 
who has deliberately stepped on my toes will be much different from my reaction 
to someone who has stepped on my toes because he was pushed. In the first, but 
not the second, case I believe the person to have had a criticizable QOW in acting. 
                                                 
20
 McKenna (2005) argues that the quality of will thesis is the central insight of 
both Strawson and Frankfurt. 
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And the fact that my reaction greatly depends on what I take the person’s QOW to 
be shows that QOW matters to me. In other words, I care about it.  
 The reactive attitudes are themselves expressions of caring; caring about 
QOW. And since QOW is typically determined by cares21, the reactive attitudes 
are second-order cares. To resent another is to care in a particular way about what 
that other person cared and did not care about. It is to care that the other failed to 
care more in some way or to care that he cared about the wrong things.  For 
example, if my friend betrays me for financial gain and I resent him for it, then I 
am caring that my friend cared too much about money and not enough about our 
friendship. Similarly, when I feel gratitude at the good deed of another, I am 
caring that that person cared in some admirable or extraordinary way.  
 Frankfurt saw the importance to responsibility that caring about one’s own 
QOW can make. To be a person is, for Frankfurt, to be the sort of entity that can 
care about his own will. Strawson saw that we care about the QOW of those with 
which we interact. Strawson was pointing out that we have, as it were, second-
order volitions that are aimed, not at our own wills, but the wills of others. The 
reactive attitudes are backward-looking reactions to whether that second-order 
volition has been frustrated, met, or exceeded. The moral obligations we hold 
others to are forward-looking second-order volitions in this sense.22 
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 And can always be redescribed in terms of what we did not care about. 
 
22
 I use the term second-order volition with some reluctance, since for Frankfurt 
these were a type of desire but I mean to refer to types of cares. 
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 Responsibility is about QOW. Holding responsible involves caring about 
QOW. It consists in holding someone to an expectation that her QOW be a certain 
way or fall within a certain range. That is, we expect people to care about 
morality to some degree. We expect, for example, that in most circumstances 
persons are to care more about the well being of others than they are the 
satisfaction of their spontaneous desire to hit another in the face. Persons we think 
blameworthy are persons we think failed to care enough about acting responsibly. 
Persons are blameworthy to the extent that they failed to care as they ought to 
have. 
 Our practice of responsibility consists in expectations that are directed at 
QOW. It is important to distinguish this sense of expectation from the epistemic 
sense of expectation. There is a sense of expectation that means something like 
“believes it more likely”. For example, I may expect some of my students to cheat 
on the test in the sense that I think that at least one of them will actually cheat. If I 
were to place a bet I would wager that at least one of my students would cheat. 
But this is distinct from what we might call the normative sense of expectation. 
This is the sense in which we hold others to an expectation. Despite the fact that I 
believe that at least one of my students will cheat, I expect them all to not cheat. 
That is, I hold my students to this expectation. Were one of them to violate this 
expectation this would warrant some negative response on my part, such as 
resentment or indignation.23 
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 Wallace (1994) develops this sense of expectation. 
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 We care about the relation between an agent’s QOW and our moral 
expectations. This is what the reactive attitudes are about. When we resent 
another we are caring that her QOW failed to meet our expectations or demands. 
The reason that resentment and indignation are attitudes with negative affect is 
because they involve the frustration of a care. When we feel gratitude we are 
caring that the person exceeded our expectations. And it is this fact that our care 
has been promoted that explains why gratitude is an attitude with positive affect. 
And the large, but often ignored, class of actions which meet our expectations but 
do not go beyond them are characterized by the typical lack of any reactive 
attitude. This is because what I care about hasn’t been harmed or promoted but 
remains at the status quo. When I see a driver stop at a red light I am not moved to 
any reactive emotion. The driver did what I expect of her, no more and no less. 
Her QOW was ordinary, not extraordinary.    
 There are many paths to the idea that QOW is what responsibility is about. 
One way is by reflecting on the phenomena of excuses. Excuses, which serve to 
diminish blameworthiness, are aimed at QOW. They aim to express that one’s 
QOW was not as criticizable as it may appear. Consider some common excuses: 
“It was an accident”, “I didn’t realize that I was doing that”, or “It was the result 
of an epileptic fit”.24 All these excuses attempt to modify the beliefs we have 
concerning the motivations of the agent. They attempt to show that the agent’s 
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 This last plea might not be best thought of as an excuse. Excuses, it might 
seem, are only excuses for doing something and the epileptic might not have acted 
at all in moving as a result of the fit. However it does seem that the plea “but I 
didn’t do anything at all” is as good an excuse as any. 
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action did not express the lack of concern normally associated with an action of 
that type. A taxonomy of excuses would offer a taxonomy of the different 
qualities of will that one may have.25 Similar remarks apply to terms of 
aggravations or, what Michael J. Zimmerman has called, accuses26 such as: “It 
was intentional”, “he knew full well what he was doing”, or “she did it because 
she is a sadist”. These also function, like excuses, by modifying our beliefs about 
the QOW of the agent, though they do so by making things worse, so to speak. 
They attempt to express that the agent’s QOW was more criticizable than might 
initially be thought. They attempt to show that the agent cared in the wrong way.  
 Another path to the idea that QOW is what responsibility is about is from 
reflection on moral luck. For many, it is strongly intuitive that factors that are 
external to the agent are irrelevant to responsibility. If the only reason that my 
attempted murder failed is that a bird flew into the path of the bullet then I am just 
as blameworthy as I would have been had the attempt been successful. This is 
because whether the attempt was successful or not was a matter wholly external to 
me. Whether or not the target is killed I act for bad reasons, I had a criticizable 
QOW.  
 For those who reject resultant moral luck, it would be unreasonable to 
think that one’s responsibility can be affected by factors external to one’s QOW. 
One has no choice about factors external to one’s QOW and it would be unfair to 
allow those factors to matter. But, one might think, one also has no choice about 
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 See Wallace (1994). 
 
26
 Zimmerman (1997). 
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one’s QOW. It would be unfair to allow responsibility to be directly sensitive to 
QOW because one has no choice about that. Some people are born with sunny 
dispositions while others have the misfortune of being born with stormy ones. It 
would be unfair to hold one responsible for what one does as a result of one’s bad 
character because one was not responsible for having that character, the objection 
goes. 
 One response to this concern is to simply admit that it would be unfair to 
hold agents responsible for their QOW if they had no choice about it, but to deny 
that this is so. This is the strategy taken by libertarians. For libertarians, what 
gives a willing moral content is that it resulted from an indeterministic process 
(whether this involves agent-causation or ordinary event-causation). This brings 
up the important point that holding a QOW theory of responsibility does not 
commit one to compatibilism or incompatibilism, rather it cuts across that debate. 
Both compatibilists and incompatibilists should be QOW theorists.27 
 For the compatibilist, however, this objection begs the question. QOW 
theories hold that QOW is the stuff of responsibility; it is in what responsibility 
consists. To object to such a theory by claiming that responsibility is not 
determined by QOW because one is not typically responsible for having the QOW 
one has is simply a failure to entertain the hypothesis. QOW theories hold, for 
example, that to be blameworthy is to have a criticizable QOW. To object then, 
                                                 
27
 Though if the common “tracing” strategy is misguided, as I argue that it is in 
Chapter 5, then on common libertarian approaches we are responsible for much 
less than we commonly suppose. This may be taken to support a compatibilist 
approach.  
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that one’s criticizable QOW is not blameworthy because one is not blameworthy 
for it is a contradiction on the QOW theory. This is because it amounts to the 
claim that one’s blameworthiness is not blameworthy which is absurd. The 
objection can make sense only if one assumes that QOW theories are false.28 The 
question then becomes whether the claim that one’s bad QOW is blameworthy 
only if one is blameworthy for having that QOW is more intuitive than the QOW 
theory. 
 I believe that it is not because it rests on a questionable metaphysics of 
persons. If it is true, as I believe that it is, that the self consists in some collection 
of psychological states then to claim that one is responsible for one’s 
psychological states only if one is responsible for choosing to have those 
psychological states amounts to claiming that one is responsible for what one does 
only if one is responsible for choosing who to be. As Arpaly notes, “this raises the 
question of who exactly would be doing the choosing in such a case” (2003, p. 
127). This form of self-authorship is, at best, logically puzzling and, at worst, 
incoherent.29 
 The fact that QOW is what matters for responsibility shows why we 
should reject resultant moral luck. But it also shows why, for the compatibilists 
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 Zimmerman (2008, 175-176) makes this objection. This objection should not be 
confused with a related one which holds that one’s QOW is not criticizable 
precisely because it is not in one’s control or because determinism is true. This 
objection rests on a controversial understanding of ‘criticizable’. The sense of 
‘criticizable’ that I am concerned with is not controversial. It is merely the sense 
in which some people are citicizable because they care, for example, too much 
about themselves and too little about others. 
 
29
 See Arpaly (2006, pp. 126-127). 
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among us, we should accept constitutive moral luck (and for similar reasons, 
circumstantial luck). This is because luck can play a role in the QOW that one 
has. This will seem unfair to convinced incompatibilists, but it should be 
unobjectionable to compatibilists since our place in the causal web is not up to 
us.30 
Why do we care as much about QOW as we do? The answer, I think, has 
to do with our social nature and I imagine that there is some evolutionary story to 
be told here. Caring as we do about QOW allows us to, among other things, 
socially navigate the world. It is a mechanism by which we decide who to be 
around and who to avoid. Furthermore, we care about QOW and the cares of 
others because we care about who people are. This brings up a further point about 
cares. It is plausible to suppose that the psychological facts about what one cares 
about are one of the building blocks of personal identity.31 When we are trying to 
explain what kind of person someone is we will make reference to her deepest 
values and commitments. There may be other constituents of personal identity, 
but it is this one that we seem to care most about. 
To summarize: Questions of responsibility are to be settled exclusively by 
appeal to the QOW with which an agent acted. QOW concerns the quality of an 
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 Though QOW theorists are, for the most part, compatibilists, this is not 
essential. Indeed, the argument against resultant luck should push both 
compatibilists and incompatibilists toward a QOW theory. The disagreement then 
becomes one about the conditions under which a will can have moral content. The 
incompatibilist claims that the truth of determinism rules out the possibility that a 
will can have moral content while the compatibilist rejects this. 
 
31
 Or at least what matters in personal identity. 
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agent’s action understood internally. This quality is typically determined by what 
one does and does not care about. What one cares about is necessarily important 
to one and it is a fact about humanity that the cares of others matter to us as 
evidenced by the reactive attitudes. These attitudes are, essentially, second-order 
volitions. An agent’s responsibility for an action is determined by comparing her 
actual QOW in acting to the QOW she ought to have. I have not provided an 
account of the QOW that acting responsibly requires. Rather I have tried to move 
closer to what responsibility is about. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT WE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
It is a commonplace that agents can be morally responsible for such things as, for 
example, the death of the victim and for giving away the surprise.32 The primary 
task of a theory of responsibility, it is thought, is to specify the appropriate 
relationship one must stand to such things in order to be responsible for them. 
This is commonly taken to include a control condition and an epistemic condition. 
Thus, if one is to be responsible for the occurrence of some harm then one must 
have been in control of the harm and must have known that the harm would result 
from one’s action. I argue that this approach is problematic due to the fact that it 
attempts to explain the way in which an agent can be responsible for something 
that is external in a particular sense. Since everything that matters for 
responsibility is internal, the conditions of responsibility that emerge from this 
approach are either false or they fail to capture anything of importance. 
 The problem with this common approach to responsibility is that it 
attempts to explain how an agent can be responsible for something external to her 
mind or what I will call an externality. By this, I mean something that does not 
make reference to the agent’s actual mental states in acting. For example, the 
consequence that the dog is run over is external in this sense since it does not 
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 To forestall any possible confusion, I am thinking of moral responsibility to be 
a continuum upon which blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are poles. Thus, 
being blameworthy for something entails being responsible for that thing, but 
responsibility for something does not necessarily entail being blameworthy for 
that thing. This sense of responsibility should be distinguished from the mere 
causal sense with which I will not be concerned.  
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refer to the agent’s motivations in acting. Its occurrence does not necessitate 
anything about the state of mind of the agent who caused it. Consequences, as 
typically understood, are external in this sense. Whether actions are external 
depends on how we understand action.  
 We can distinguish between act-types and act-tokens.33 An act-type may 
or may not be external in this sense. The act-type stepping on a spider is external. 
This is because the occurrence of this act-type does not entail anything about the 
particular mental states of the agent who did the stepping. While it may, insofar as 
it entails action, entail intention it does not entail the content of the intention. But 
the act-type intentionally stepping on a spider is not external because its 
occurrence does entail something about the mental states of the agent. Rather, it is 
internal to the agent’s mind or what I will call an internality. Act-tokens, on a 
common view, are internal in this sense. This is because the act-token his stepping 
on a spider picks out a single event with a unique location in space and time. And 
the occurrence of that event does entail something about the mental states of the 
agent, it entails the mental states that the agent actually had in acting. It entails the 
internal willing that is a constituent of that event. Act-tokens on this view, while 
not themselves external, can be under external descriptions. His crossing of the 
street is an act-token under an external description. This is because the description 
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 See, for example, Goldman (1970). 
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itself does not make reference to the mental states of the agent in acting. But what 
is picked out by that description does have an essential mental component.34 
Any proposed condition of responsibility should meet the following two 
constraints: (a) The condition should be such that when we compare a case in 
which it holds to another in which it does not while holding all other factors fixed 
there should be a difference in responsibility, and (b) this difference should 
matter.35 If the condition fails to meet (a) then it does not capture anything about 
responsibility and thus it cannot be a condition of responsibility. If the condition 
fails to meet (b) then though it may capture something about responsibility it fails 
to capture anything of importance. All accounts of the conditions under which an 
agent is responsible for some externality fail either (a) or (b). This is significant 
since it is commonly thought that the very nature of the project of developing a 
theory of responsibility consists in developing conditions under which an agent 
may be responsible for externalities. 
 The issue is straightforward. Any externality is such that its occurrence or 
nonoccurrence does not necessitate anything about the state of mind of the agent. 
And since this is so, for any externality we can imagine cases in which we alter 
whether it occurs while holding fixed the internal states of the agent. And in such 
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 The view I am appealing to here is that of such unifying act theorists as 
Anscombe (1963) and Davidson (1980) and as opposed to such multipliers as 
Goldman (1970) and Thomson (1971). But nothing of substance depends on this. 
The claim I wish to defend only depends on the distinction between internalities 
and externalities and it will apply whether we adopt a unifier or a multiplier 
approach to act-individuation. In what follows I will use unifier language but I 
will note how to rephrase the claims on a multiplier view. 
 
35
 In other words, the difference should itself make a difference. 
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cases there will be no change in responsibility or at least no change in 
responsibility that matters. This is because everything that matters for 
responsibility is internal to the agent. Thus, any account of responsibility for 
externalities will either be false or it will fail to capture anything of importance. It 
will be false if we think that what one is responsible for matters. But if we think it 
is true then we must admit that what we are responsible for does not matter, and 
thus the proposed conditions will not capture anything of importance. I will 
further argue that what we are responsible for is important and thus we can only 
be responsible for internalities. 
  
The Control Condition 
It is widely held that agents can be responsible for an externality if they exercise 
the appropriate form of control over it. Consider John Martin Fisher and Mark 
Ravizza’s account of control. For them, responsibility requires that one exercised 
guidance control over one’s act, omission, or consequence. Guidance control 
requires the operation of a mechanism that both is the agent’s own and is 
moderately reasons-responsive. The details of the notions of ownership and of 
moderate reasons-responsiveness are not important for the present purposes. What 
is important is the fact that the mechanism itself, when the agent’s own and 
moderately reasons-responsive, is internal to the agent. This is because the 
mechanism is “the process that leads to the action, or the ‘way the action comes 
about’” (Fischer and Ravizza, 1998, p. 38). In cases of responsible agency the 
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mechanism is “the normal faculty of practical reasoning” (Fischer and Ravizza, 
1998, p. 38), and this will include beliefs, desires and other mental phenomena.  
 For Fischer and Ravizza one is responsible for some externality if it 
resulted from the agent’s own, moderately reasons-responsive mechanism. Given 
that the relation between the mechanism, which is internal, and any externality is 
contingent there are pairs of cases in which we hold fixed the operation of the 
mechanism but alter whether the externality occurs. This implies, on Fischer and 
Ravizza’s account, that the agent is responsible for the externality in one case but 
not in the other. This is problematic because everything that matters for 
responsibility is internal to the agent’s mind. And this implies either that the 
account is false or that it fails to capture anything of importance for responsibility.  
 Suppose that Lee is an assassin and that he aims his rifle at the victim. He 
pulls the trigger and the victim is shot and killed. There were no responsibility 
undermining factors; the mechanism that led to the action was the agent’s own 
and was moderately reasons-responsive. Lee is clearly blameworthy and on 
Fischer and Ravizza’s account he is responsible for such externalities as killing 
and the death of the man. He had control, he knew what he was doing and the 
victim died. Compare Lee to Harvey who is also an assassin. Harvey aims his rifle 
at the victim and pulls the trigger. There were no responsibility undermining 
factors; the mechanism that led to the action was the agent’s own and was 
moderately reasons-responsive. But after the trigger is pulled a bird flies into the 
path of the bullet. Harvey does not have guidance control over killing or the death 
of the man because there was no killing and no man died. Insofar as everything in 
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the two cases is the same at and before the pulling of the trigger, Lee and Harvey 
are blameworthy in exactly the same way.36 I take this as strongly intuitive. Given 
that everything is the same from the first-person perspective of the agents there is 
no difference that matters for responsibility. They are both blameworthy to the 
exact same degree and they are both blameworthy for the exact same reasons.37 
Fischer and Ravizza’s account implies that Lee is responsible for killing and for 
the death of the man while Harvey is not responsible for the killing or for the 
death of the man. This implies that either the account is false or that it fails to 
capture anything that matters. That is, if we allow that Lee is responsible for 
killing while Harvey is not then we must admit that what one is responsible for 
does not matter for responsibility. But if we think that what one is responsible for 
does matter then we must admit that the account is false. 38 
 The point generalizes to any account of the control one must have in order 
to be responsible for an externality. Any account of this sort will be either false or 
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 One will likely recognize this as a classic case of moral luck (see Nagel [1982] 
and Williams [1981]). Indeed, the points made here are simply implications of the 
denial of resultant moral luck.  
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 Note that this does not necessarily imply that they should be punished or 
otherwise treated in the same way. It just implies that if there is a difference in the 
punishment that should be given or a difference in how we or they ought to act in 
light of the action, that difference is not explained by a difference in 
responsibility. See Zimmerman (2002, p. 562). 
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 Construing the account as a view of responsibility for externalities. This is not 
to say that the notion of guidance control is not relevant to responsibility for it 
may be that one can be responsible for an internality only if one expressed 
guidance control over it. The point here is that the notion of control that is 
relevant to responsibility cannot extend to externalities. 
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irrelevant to responsibility. This is because one can fail to have control over the 
externality without this making any difference that matters for responsibility. 
Everything that matters for responsibility is internal to the agent. 
 
The Epistemic Condition 
Similar remarks apply to the epistemic condition on responsibility. It is commonly 
held that for one to be responsible for some externality one must stand in a 
particular epistemic relation to it. 39 Consider John Martin Fischer and Neal 
Tognazzini: 
    [If] Kevin’s friends are planning a surprise party for him but they neglect to tell  
    Dan that it’s a surprise and Dan subsequently talks openly with Kevin about the  
    party, Dan’s ignorance plausibly excuses his behavior. Since he didn’t know  
    (and, we suppose, could not have been expected to know) that the party was a  
    surprise, he didn’t know that talking openly with Kevin about the party would  
    amount to ruining the surprise. His ruining the surprise is excused because of  
    his impoverished epistemic position. So, it looks like some sort of “epistemic  
    condition” will be a necessary component of any plausible theory of moral  
    responsibility, as well (Fischer and  Tognazzini, 2009, pp. 531-532). 
 
For Fischer and Tognazzini, Dan is not blameworthy for his ruining the surprise 
because he did not stand in the right epistemic relation to it. But suppose that Dan 
knows that Kevin becomes extremely anxious in social situations. Suppose further 
that the reason that Dan told Kevin about the party (which he did not know was a 
surprise) was because he wanted to make Kevin anxious because he doesn’t like 
him. In this case Dan’s impoverished epistemic position fails to excuse. In this 
case, Dan is clearly blameworthy for his behavior.  
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 This idea has its origins in Book III of Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. 
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 One is likely to respond to such a case by claiming that though Dan is not 
responsible for his ruining the surprise, he is responsible for his making Kevin 
anxious because he knew that telling Kevin about the party would have this 
effect.40 But this can be shown to be false when one considers cases where one’s 
belief fails to amount to knowledge. Suppose that Dan believes that telling Kevin 
about the party will make him anxious and he does this for vicious reasons, yet 
Dan has no justification for this belief. As it happens his unjustified belief is true. 
In such a case Dan is blameworthy in exactly the same way as he is in the case 
where his belief amounts to knowledge. This has led some, like Gideon Rosen, to 
the view that what matters for the epistemic condition for responsibility is not 
knowledge but true belief: “Whenever we start with a case in which the agent 
knows the wrong-making features of his act and then consider related cases in 
which the agent truly believes that his act has these features but fails to know that 
they do (either because his belief is not justified or because it lacks some other 
knowledge-relevant feature), the agent will be every bit as blameworthy as he was 
in the original case” (Rosen, 2008, p. 597). For Rosen, responsibility requires, not 
that one know of the wrong-making features of one’s action, but simply that one 
has true beliefs regarding those properties. But true belief is vulnerable to the 
same considerations that knowledge is. When we start with a case in which the 
agent truly believes his act to have particular wrong-making features and then 
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 Note that this strategy precludes one from holding a unifier account of act-
individuation, unless one holds that agents are responsible, not for acts, but for 
act-descriptions. This is because on a unifier account his ruining the surprise and 
his making Kevin anxious are simply different descriptions of the very same 
event.  
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consider a related case in which the agent falsely believes his act to have those 
features, the agent will be every bit as blameworthy as he was in the original case. 
We can imagine a case in which Dan believes that telling Kevin about the party 
will make him anxious and he does so, but Kevin never becomes anxious because 
he has recently started taking anti-anxiety medication. In this case Dan is still 
blameworthy in exactly the same way as he is in the other cases. This suggests 
that what matters for the epistemic condition for responsibility is not knowledge, 
or true belief, but simply what the agent believes or ought to believe. And note 
that once we make this shift, we are no longer providing an account of the 
epistemic relationship between an agent and some externality since what an agent 
believes or ought to believe are internal to her mind.41  
 Any account of the epistemic relation one must stand to some externality 
in order to be responsible for it will either be false or will fail to capture anything 
of importance to responsibility. The epistemic requirement on responsibility that 
matters does not consist in some epistemic relationship an agent must stand to 
some externality. It is a condition that is wholly internal to the agent. 
 
What We Are Responsible For 
The lesson of the above discussion is that what matters for responsibility is 
internal to the agent. I also believe that what we are responsible for matters. Thus, 
I believe that what we are responsible for must be internal.  
                                                 
41
 This is not to say that there is no sense of “ought to believe” that is external. 
But the sense of “ought to believe” that is tied to responsibility is necessarily 
internal. 
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 This is in contrast to Michael J. Zimmerman. Zimmerman does believe 
that what matters for responsibility is internal to the agent because he rejects 
resultant moral luck. He believes, for example, that the successful and 
unsuccessful assassins in the above case are blameworthy to the exact same 
degree. But he believes that they differ in the scope of their blameworthiness. One 
is blameworthy for the death of the victim while the other is not. It is this that 
leads him to say that “degree of responsibility counts for everything, scope for 
nothing” (Zimmerman, 2002, p. 568). 
 I’ve argued that it is inconsistent to think both that agents can be 
responsible for externalities and that what one is responsible for matters. 
Zimmerman, who also recognizes this inconsistency, resolves it by accepting the 
former and rejecting the latter. I, however, reject the former and accept the latter. I 
do this because it is more plausible to think that what one is responsible for is 
relevant to one’s responsibility than it is to think that one can be responsible for 
externalities. The heart of this disagreement concerns the following principle:  
 The only things for which one can be responsible are those things in virtue 
 of which one is responsible. 
I find this principle extremely plausible.42 To claim that S is blameworthy for X is 
not, contra Zimmerman, to make an uninformative claim that is irrelevant to 
anything that matters for responsibility. It is to claim that X explains S’s 
blameworthiness; X is the reason that S is blameworthy. And these reasons are 
internal.  
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 David Copp (1997) also defends this claim. 
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  If we accept these claims, then we cannot be responsible for externalities. 
Thus, we cannot be responsible for the consequences of our actions since they are 
external.43 This is because consequences are distinct events from the actions that 
caused them. In order for a given consequence to result from some action the 
world must cooperate in some way and this is a matter external to the agent. 
Though we cannot be responsible for the consequences of our acts we can be 
responsible for our acts understood as act-tokens.44 This is because act-tokens are 
individuated finely. They are events with essential internal properties. An act-
token is internal though it may be under an external description (e.g. his killing of 
the dog). But it is important to note that the external description is not the 
responsibility relevant one. The descriptions that are responsibility relevant are 
the internal descriptions. We can also be responsible for act-types though only 
those that are internal. The act-types that we can be responsible for are those 
picked out by the internal descriptions of the act-token that are responsibility 
relevant. For example, suppose a man shoots a child for malicious reasons. The 
consequence that the child is killed is not something for which the man is 
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 This should not lead one to think that cases of negligence are problematic on 
this account. One might think that in cases of negligence we hold the agent 
responsible for the consequence but that there is no associated internality of the 
kind I find relevant to ground responsibility. But there is a relevant internality that 
will ground responsibility, specifically, the internality her acting negligently. 
Acting negligently typically involves not taking due care in acting, and taking 
care is an internal notion. 
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 On a unifier account act-tokens are necessarily internal. But on a multiplier 
account some act-tokens are internal and some are external. The external act-
tokens on a multiplier account are the internal act-tokens under an external 
description on a unifier account.  
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responsible. This is because whether that consequence occurs is an external fact. 
Similarly, the man is not responsible for the act-type killing a child since this is 
also external. He is responsible, however, for the act-token his killing of a child. 
But the description his killing of a child is not the responsibility relevant one. 
Rather it is the description his trying to kill a child for malicious reasons that is 
relevant. Both descriptions pick out the same event but it is the latter that, in an 
important sense, explains his responsibility; it is this description that describes the 
features of the act that make it blameworthy. 
 
Conclusion 
The traditional approach to theorizing about responsibility leads to a distorted 
picture. Insofar as the traditional approach attempts to explain how an agent must 
be connected to an externality in order to be responsible, it implies that if the 
connection is severed so too is responsibility. But this is clearly false. We’ve 
considered cases in which an agent fails to have control over some externality but 
this failure fails to excuse. And we’ve considered cases in which an agent fails to 
be epistemically connected to some externality but this failure also fails to 
mitigate. The traditional approach to responsibility leads us to prematurely cut off 
our inquiry into the responsibility of agents. Even if we know that some agent 
failed to have control over or failed to know about some externality she could, for 
all we know, be fully responsible. She may be just as responsible as she would 
have been had she freely and knowingly brought about the externality. What we 
need to know in order to know her responsibility is not her relation to some 
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externality. Rather we need to look inward. We need to look at her motivations 
and her beliefs about what she was doing and the care she took in so doing. We 
need to know about her quality of will.  
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CHAPTER 4 
BLAMEWORTHINESS AND WRONGNESS 
Many have held that agents can be blameworthy only for morally wrong acts. 
This chapter argues that if one holds this claim, and makes a plausible assumption 
about rightness and wrongness, one is forced to accept an implausible view about 
moral responsibility. Instead, this claim should be rejected. Agents can be 
blameworthy for acts that are not morally wrong. The chapter is divided in the 
following way: Section 1 puts the point in terms of three initially appealing, but 
jointly inconsistent propositions. Section 2 motivates the significance of noting 
this inconsistency by pointing out a number of theorists who have held, or at least 
flirted with, all three propositions. Section 3 argues that the best way to resolve 
the inconsistency is to reject the claim that blameworthiness requires wrongdoing. 
Section 4 considers and rejects a natural alternative to the first proposition. 
Section 5 suggests a further replacement for the first proposition, one that garners 
more intuitive support than either of the previous two considered. 
 
1. 
The following three propositions are jointly inconsistent: 
 (1) One is blameworthy for some action only if that action is wrong. 
 (2) Factors external to one’s mental states at the time of the action can   
      affect whether one’s action is wrong. 
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 (3) Factors external to one’s mental states at the time of the action cannot     
      affect whether one is blameworthy for the action.45 
If (1) and (2) are true then it is possible that some external factor that affects 
whether one’s act is wrong can affect whether one is blameworthy making (3) 
false. If (1) and (3) are true then there is no possible external factor that can affect 
whether one did wrong making (2) false. And if, as it will be argued, (2) and (3) 
are true then the connection between blameworthiness and wrongness can’t be as 
direct as (1) suggests. 
(1) does seem rather intuitive. It is appealing to think that what explains 
the blameworthiness of an agent is the fact that she did wrong. There seems to be 
a very close relationship between the notion of blameworthiness and the notion of 
wrongness and (1) seems to be a plausible candidate for that relationship.  
The sense of externality appealed to in (2) and (3) can be thought of in 
terms of supervenience. A is external to B just in case there can be a change in A 
without a change in B. That is, A is external to B if and only if A does not 
supervene on B. With this consideration in mind, (2) says that some factor that 
does not affect the agent’s mental states at the time of the action could affect the 
moral status of the action. This is plausible, and in fact, most theories of right and 
wrong have this feature.  The clearest example of a theory of right and wrong, 
what I will call a normative theory, that accepts (2) is consequentialism. For 
example, according to a utilitarian version of consequentialism, overall utility 
                                                 
45
 Note that (1)-(3) could be put in terms of praiseworthiness and rightness as 
well.  
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determines whether some action is morally right or morally wrong. Overall utility 
is a factor that is external to the agent’s mental states, in the sense that there could 
be a change in overall utility while holding fixed the mental states of the agent. 
One could have the purist intentions but cause a catastrophe, and for that reason 
one would have done wrong, according to this normative theory. 
Action-based deontological normative theories also have a commitment to 
(2). For example, a deontological theory that holds that it is morally wrong to kill 
an innocent will be committed to the claim that factors external to the agent’s 
mental states can affect rightness and wrongness. This is because whether, in fact, 
an innocent is killed is a matter external to the mental states of the agent in acting. 
We can easily imagine cases in which we hold the mental states of the agent fixed 
but alter whether a death occurs. Insofar as these theories hold that whether an 
actual death occurs can affect whether one has done wrong, then they will be 
committed to (2).  
Virtue based normative theories also suggest a commitment to (2). It is 
plausible to think that insofar as the notions of rightness and wrongness play a 
role in the virtue ethicists thinking, it is something along the following lines: The 
right action, in a given circumstance, is the action that would be chosen by the 
virtuous person in the circumstance. And, perhaps, the wrong action in some 
circumstance is that action which would be avoided by the virtuous person in the 
circumstance. If this is in the right ballpark, then it does seem that virtue based 
normative theories are committed to (2), for the rightness or wrongness of some 
  61 
action is determined by a kind of idealization test that does not appeal to the 
actual mental states of the agent in acting.  
(3) makes the plausible claim that it is some aspect of an agent’s mental 
life that determines responsibility such as her intentions, desires, or beliefs. It says 
that factors that are external to one’s mental states at the time of action cannot 
affect whether and to what degree one is blameworthy for the action. For 
example, if the reason that one’s attempted murder is unsuccessful is that a bird 
flew into the path of the bullet then one is just as blameworthy as one would have 
been had there been no bird present. (3) denies the possibility of resultant moral 
luck or luck in how things turn out.46 It says that the degree to which one is 
blameworthy for some action depends upon one’s mental states at the time of the 
action. The truth of (3), however, is consistent with the possibility of other forms 
of moral luck. (3) says that one’s mental states are what matter for responsibility. 
If luck plays a role in determining the quality of one’s mental states, say, those of 
a sinner or a saint, then that luck can play a role in the degree to which one is 
responsible.47  
(3) is the insight shared by so-called quality of will theories of 
responsibility. These theories all hold that what matters for responsibility are 
particular psychological states of the agent. These theories do often differ about 
which mental states they hold to be central. Strawson (1962), for example, held 
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 See Nagel (1982). 
 
47
 For a discussion of quality of will and constitutive moral luck see Arpaly (2003, 
Chapter 5). 
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that it was the attitudes expressive of good or ill will toward ourselves or others. 
For some what matters is that one’s second order volition aligns with one’s will 
(Frankfurt, 1971), for others it is a choice (Wallace, 1994), or one’s evaluative 
commitments (A. Smith, 2005), or one’s concern (Arpaly, 2003; 2006). But 
though these theories may disagree about which mental states are central to 
responsibility, they all hold that responsibility is determined by one’s mental 
states at the time of the action. Putting this idea in slogan form, we might say, 
“responsibility just is in the head.” 
 
2. 
Despite the appeal of each of the three propositions (1)-(3), they cannot all be 
true. But despite this inconsistency a number of theorists have held that they are 
all true, or that it is possible that they are all true. Many theories of moral 
responsibility do not purport to answer the question of which acts are right and 
which acts are wrong. That is, they attempt to remain neutral concerning which 
normative theory is correct. Presumably, these theorists want their accounts to be 
consistent with most normative theories such as those mentioned above. But some 
of these theorists clearly hold (1) and (3) and so would be forced to deny (2) and 
thus their accounts of responsibility would only be compatible with a minority of 
normative theories. 
For example, H. Smith proposes the following account of blameworthiness: 
    S is blameworthy for performing act A if, and only if: 
    1. Act A is objectively wrong, 
    2. S had a reprehensible configuration of desires and aversions, 
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    And 
    3. This configuration gave rise to the performance of A (Smith, 1983, p. 556). 
 
The first condition, it should be obvious, entails (1). It says that a necessary 
condition of blameworthiness is that the action must be wrong. The second and 
third conditions express a mental states based approach to blameworthiness: “To 
blame someone is to criticize that person for some, perhaps short-lived, 
psychological state insofar as it manifests itself in action” (Smith, 1983, p. 556). 
Presumably to blame another involves believing that the other is blameworthy and 
so blameworthiness, on Smith’s account, would seem to involve criticizable 
psychological states.  
 While Smith does not explicitly endorse a claim such as (3), she does 
indicate sympathies toward such a view. She distinguishes between a broad and 
narrow view of the factors that can affect blameworthiness. “On the narrow view 
only psychic factors contribute [to an agent’s blameworthiness]; on the broad 
view consequences of one’s actions contribute as well” (Smith, 1983, p. 568). 
And later she says, “Personally, I suspect no framework will be found to support 
the broad view” (p. 570). I take it that Smith would accept (3) on these grounds. 
Since she accepts (1) and (3) her account of blameworthiness is incompatible with 
any normative theory that entails (2). 
 Another example can be found in the work of Arpaly: “I take it as an 
intuition that in order for me to be blameworthy for an action, it has to be the case 
that the action is wrong” (2006, p. 91). So she accepts (1), that a necessary 
condition for blameworthiness is that one has done wrong. But she is also a self-
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described quality of will theorist: “A person is praiseworthy for taking a morally 
right course of action out of good will and blameworthy for taking a morally 
wrong course of action out of lack of good will or out of ill will” (Arpaly, 2006, 
p.15). Whether an agent acts from good or ill will is determined by whether the 
agent was motivated by moral concern. Arpaly “take[s] concern to be a form of 
desire” (2003, p. 84). And since an agent’s desires are clearly internal to her 
mental states, so too must be her moral concern. Given this it is plausible to think 
that she would accept (3).48 For her what matters for responsibility is the quality 
of will with which an agent acts and an agent’s quality of will is internal to her 
mental states. 
 She does not give or defend an account of the right-making and wrong-
making features of action and seems to think that her account does not stand or 
fall with any particular normative theory. She says: 
    Which reasons exactly are moral reasons is not a question I can deal with here,  
    as the moral reasons to perform an action are the same reasons that make the  
    action right, and what exactly makes an action right is a question that Kantians,  
    utilitarians, Aristotelians, and others are still debating (Arpaly, 2003, p. 72). 
 
                                                 
48
 I believe she would also be moved to accept (3) based on considerations of 
resultant moral luck. Given her lengthy discussion attempting to assuage worries 
that a quality of will account such as hers will be committed to constitutive moral 
luck (2003, Chapter 5), I take it she would readily deny resultant moral luck 
(which is, I believe, more intuitively unpalatable than constitutive luck). And 
denying resultant luck seems to bring a commitment to (3). 
  65 
Arpaly’s account of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness includes (1) and (3). 
And so she cannot accept any normative theory that entails the truth of (2), such 
as those mentioned in the passage.49 
Perhaps the most striking example can be found in Kant, who is often 
taken as the paradigm example of a theorist who thinks that morality is immune to 
luck. Though the interpretive issues here can be difficult, my point is that on a 
natural and plausible reading Kant can be seen to hold (1)-(3). Kant allows for the 
possibility that one does the right thing for the wrong reasons. Indeed, in stressing 
the importance of acting from duty, he focuses on cases in which agents acts 
dutifully but not from the motive of duty. For example, he considers shopkeepers 
who price fairly from different motives. One prices fairly because it is what duty 
calls for, and for this reason his action has moral worth. Another prices fairly but 
does so because it will increase profits. Since this second shopkeeper does the 
dutiful thing, but not from a motive of duty, his action does not have moral worth. 
                                                 
49
 Another way to see the tension in Arpaly’s account is by considering examples 
in which we hold the mental states of the agent fixed but alter the moral status of 
the action. Suppose that in one scenario an agent successfully murders his victim. 
The action is morally wrong. But suppose that in a second scenario we hold the 
mental states of the agent fixed but alter the moral status of the action. Suppose, 
for example, that the gun misfires and no one is killed and the action is not wrong 
according to the utility calculus. Given this Arpaly must say that the second agent 
is not blameworthy since his action was not wrong. But I take it she would not 
want to say this since it is plausible to think that because the two agents had the 
same mental states at the time of the action that they acted with the same quality 
of will and hence that they must be equal with respect to responsibility. The only 
options she has are to either deny that the actions have a different moral status 
(that is, to deny (2) and take a stand on which normative theory is correct), or to 
hold that the agents did act with different qualities of will (that is to deny (3), and 
to hold that quality of will is external to one’s mental states). Neither option 
seems desirable.  
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This suggests that the normative theory that Kant has in mind is 
committed to (2). The shopkeeper examples show that the criteria by which we 
judge whether an act was dutiful is external to the agent’s mental states. Since the 
shopkeeper examples are examples in which the fact that the action was dutiful is 
held fixed but the mental states of the agents are altered (whether the agent acted 
from a motive of duty or prudence), then whether an action is dutiful or not is not 
determined by the mental states of the agent in acting.  So Kant appears to be 
committed to (2).50 
And as Herman notes, he also holds (1): “And when we say that an action 
has moral worth, we mean to indicate (at the very least) that the agent acted 
dutifully from an interest in the rightness of his action: an interest that therefore 
makes its being a right action the nonaccidental effect of the agent’s concern” 
(Herman, 1993, p. 6). Here Herman is (correctly) attributing to Kant (and 
endorsing) (1).51 She is saying that a necessary condition for an action to have 
moral worth (or perhaps for an action to be praiseworthy or for an agent to be 
praiseworthy in light of her action) is that it must be in accordance with duty (i.e. 
it must be morally right). So Kant accepts (1). Herman’s quote also provides more 
evidence that Kant is committed to (2), for the requirement that the rightness of 
                                                 
50
 Assuming that we can think of the dutiful action as the right action. This the 
reading favored by Arpaly: “Recall Kant’s Prudent Grocer, who prices his 
merchandise fairly because a reputation for honesty tends to increase his profits. 
Despite the Prudent Grocer’s unimpressive motive, Kant never denies that the 
grocer does the right thing or that he performs the action required of him by duty. 
In this sense, Kantians clearly care about results” (70). 
  
51
 Strictly speaking it is (1)’s corollary which says that only right acts can be 
praiseworthy. 
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one’s action is the “nonaccidental effect of the agent’s concern” seems to imply 
the possibility that the rightness of one’s action could be accidental. This is the 
case with the prudent shopkeeper. The fact that he gets it right is an accident since 
he is motivated by a concern for profit.  And if this is true, then the criteria by 
which we judge rightness must be external to one’s mental states. So Kant accepts 
(1) and (2). And, of course, he famously accepts (3): 
    A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes…Even if,  
    by a special disfavor of fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly  
    nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry out its purpose—if  
    with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will  
    were left-then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has  
    its full worth in itself (Kant, 1998, p. 8). 
 
 
3. 
Inconsistency could, of course, be resolved by giving up any one of the three 
propositions. Williams (1981) and Nagel (1982), for example, would be inclined 
to give up (3). Slote (1996) would give up (2).52 The best solution, however, is to 
give up (1). 
 In support of (3) consider two scenarios: In the first scenario an assassin 
carefully aims his gun at his target and pulls the trigger. The victim is killed. In 
the second scenario the assassin carefully aims his gun and pulls the trigger. But a 
bird flies into the path of the bullet before it reaches the intended victim. We can 
imagine that the two scenarios are indistinguishable from the assassins’ point of 
                                                 
52
 On Slote’s agent-based view, whether an act is right or wrong is determined by 
the mental states of the agent: “An agent-based approach to virtue ethics treats the 
moral or ethical status of acts as entirely derivative from independent and 
fundamental areatic (as opposed to deontic) ethical characterizations of motives, 
character traits, or individuals” (Slote 1996, 83). 
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view up until the bullet has left the barrel. Given this, it seems that their 
blameworthiness is the same in virtue of the similarity of their mental states at the 
time the trigger is pulled.53 The presence or absence of the bird is a matter of luck 
external to mental states of the agents, and so it seems irrelevant to 
blameworthiness. 
 Suppose that the target in both cases was a Mother Teresa type figure who 
helps those in need and does a great deal of good for the world. In the first case, 
where the assassination is successful, the world suffers a great loss and utility is 
certainly not maximized. For this reason, the action would be wrong on utilitarian 
grounds. But in the second case, there was no assassination and so the action 
cannot be wrong for the same reasons. Furthermore, we might suppose that the 
bird that flew into the path of the bullet was actually carrying a new and 
extremely contagious and dangerous strain of bird flu. Had the bird avoided the 
bullet, suppose, it would have infected other birds which in turn would have 
infected humans and caused a global pandemic. Given this, it would seem that we 
might judge the action as right on utilitarian grounds. Utility was maximized by 
shooting the bird. It seems, then, that we have some reason to accept (2). 
Accepting (2) does not require that we hold that consequences are everything, but 
only to admit that they can make a difference. To deny (2) is to disallow the 
                                                 
53
 This is consistent with the claim that the assassins are blameworthy for 
different things. One is blameworthy for his killing, while the other is 
blameworthy for his unsuccessful attempt. (3) makes a claim about whether and 
to what degree one is blameworthy, not that for which one is blameworthy. 
Though in Chapter 3 I do argue for the claim that that for which one is 
blameworthy is internal to one’s mental states. 
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possibility that actual consequences external to the agent’s mental states can 
matter at all to the question of right and wrong. 
 Furthermore, to deny (2) and to hold that the factors that determine 
rightness and wrongness are facts about one’s mental states threatens to dissolve 
the distinction between rightness and wrongness, and praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness. If the moral status of one’s action is determined by facts about 
one’s mental states, such as the reasons that one did what one did, then it would 
not seem possible to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. This is because the 
factors that determine whether one did the right thing would be facts about the 
reasons for which one acted. But it also seems that whether one is blameworthy or 
praiseworthy is determined by facts about the reasons for which one acted. 
Denying (2), then, might make it impossible to do the right thing for the wrong 
reasons (or to do the wrong thing for the right reasons) and for this reason, it 
might conflate rightness and wrongness with praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness. 54   
  (2) and (3), then, are more plausible than (1) and so (1) should be 
rejected. Others have rejected (1), though for different reasons.55 
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 One might hold a view in which rightness and wrongness are determined by 
some set of mental states of the agent at the time of the action, and that 
blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are determined by some other distinct set 
of mental states of the agent at the time of the action. Such a view might escape 
the proposed objection but I find a view like this to be implausible. 
 
55
 See Haji (1998), Zimmerman (1997), and Scanlon (2008). For a related 
discussion see Parfit (forthcoming). Parfit seems to be one of the few theorists 
who has recognized that holding (1) might bring a commitment to moral luck. 
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4. 
The first proposition, that blameworthiness requires wrongdoing, seems patently 
false when one considers cases in which an agent tries to do wrong but accidently 
gets it right. It seems, in such cases, that the agent is blameworthy despite a 
failure to do wrong. Consider a case in which a nefarious doctor wants to kill his 
patient and injects the patient with what he has every reason to believe is a deadly 
poison in the belief that he is committing a moral wrong. But, as it turns out, the 
substance is not a poison but a medication that in fact saves the patient’s life. 
Surely the doctor is blameworthy, but on many normative theories his action is 
not wrong.56 Examples like this cast doubt on (1). They also show the need to 
include an epistemic element into the account of the relationship between 
blameworthiness and wrongness. Some have suggested that what is required for 
blameworthiness is not that one actually does wrong, but that one believes that 
one is doing wrong. Consider: 
(1a) One is blameworthy for some action only if one believes the action to  
 be wrong.57 
 This is consistent with (2) and (3) since, plausibly, the beliefs one has 
about what one is doing necessarily affect the mental states that one has. It also 
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 One might object that the doctor’s unsuccessful attempt was morally wrong. It 
can plausibly be replied that this is to confuse wrongness with blameworthiness. 
 
57
 This view has been advocated by Haji (1998, Chapter 8). Zimmerman and 
Parfit advocate a similar view which holds, roughly, that freely acting in the belief 
that one is doing wrong is sufficient for blameworthiness. This seems doubtful in 
virtue of Huck Finn type cases in which one can’t help but do the right thing 
despite one’s grossly mistaken beliefs about the demands of morality. 
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seems to account for our intuitive judgment concerning the above example. One 
of the reasons that the doctor is blameworthy for injecting his patient with a life 
saving medication is that he thought that he was actually killing the patient. He 
acted in the belief that he was doing wrong and this seems to explain, in part, the 
judgment that he is blameworthy. Yet (1a) fails for it lets too many agents off the 
hook. History is rife with examples in which people do the wrong thing in the 
belief that they are doing right. It is plausible to suppose that a good number of 
those people are in fact blameworthy. Suppose that historians announce that they 
have conclusive proof that Hitler believed he was doing the right thing in waging 
genocide. Should such a discovery call into question the blameworthiness of 
Hitler? This seems implausible.58 The problem with linking blameworthiness 
directly to belief, as (1a) does, is that sometimes peoples’ beliefs about what is 
right and wrong are entirely unreasonable. Ignorance is not categorically 
exculpating. 
 
5. 
Is there another candidate that does better than (1) or (1a)? One of the problems 
with (1) was that it lacked an epistemic dimension. It did not take into account the 
beliefs of the agent. But though (1a) did take into account epistemic 
considerations it failed too for it lacked a normative dimension. An account of the 
                                                 
58
 For a discussion of why some mistaken beliefs speak ill of an agent see Arpaly 
(2003, Chapter 3). 
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relationship between blameworthiness and wrongness needs to take into account 
both epistemic and normative considerations. Consider the following: 
 (1b) One is blameworthy for some action only if one ought to believe the   
 action to be wrong. 
This is also consistent with (2) and (3) since, as is argued below, what one ought 
to believe, in the relevant sense, is a fact about how the world seems from the 
agent’s point of view and this is surely a fact about the agent’s mental states. 
Unlike either (1) or (1a), (1b) seems to get the right results in all of the cases 
discussed. In each of the cases in which the agent is blameworthy it is also the 
case that the agent ought to have believed the action to be wrong. One reason that 
the doctor is blameworthy for injecting his patient with the medication is that he 
ought to have thought that he was doing wrong. Indeed, in this case, he actually 
did believe what he ought to have believed. But even if he lacked the belief that 
he was doing wrong he would still be blameworthy as long as it is the case that he 
ought to have thought he was doing wrong and there were no other responsibility 
inhibiting factors. And Hitler is blameworthy for similar reasons. Even if he 
lacked the belief that he was doing wrong, he ought not to have. He ought to have 
believed that mass extermination is morally wrong. This is, in part, why he is 
blameworthy. And finally, reconsider the example involving the two assassins. 
Though the presence or absence of a bird turned out to affect the moral status of 
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the actions, it could not have affected what the agents ought to have believed. In 
both cases the assassins ought to have believed that they were doing wrong.59  
 It is important to say a bit more about the sense of ought appealed to in 
(1b). It has been argued that if blameworthiness requires wrongdoing, and 
whether one does wrong can depend on factors external to one’s mental states, 
then whether one is blameworthy can depend on factors external to one’s mental 
states. But this is implausible so we should reject the claim that blameworthiness 
requires wrongdoing. The same problem would arise if the sense of ought 
appealed to in (1b) could depend on factors external to the agent’s mental states. 
But this must be denied. The factors that determine what an agent ought to, in this 
sense, believe supervene on the agent’s mental states. That is, there could be no 
change in what an agent ought to, in this sense, believe without a change in the 
agent’s mental states. This is because what one ought to believe depends on one’s 
actual beliefs and one’s evidence and these are facts about one’s mental states.60 
 One might object that (1b) cannot be correct in light of the following kind 
of example. Suppose some doctor is faced with the choice of administering a 
substance to a patient. The doctor has decisive evidence for the belief, (φ), that 
the substance is medicine. But the doctor comes to have the irrational belief, (ψ), 
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 Assuming, of course, that there was no evidence of the presence of the bird at 
the time the trigger was pulled. 
 
60
 This is not to say that there is no sense of “ought to believe” or evidence that 
can depend on factors external to one’s mental states. But this sense, so long as it 
is external, cannot be the sense that is tied to responsibility. That is, the ought that 
is tied to responsibility, must be determined by factors internal to the agent’s 
mental states (this is just to say that (3) is true). 
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that the substance is poison. Acting on (ψ), the doctor tries to kill his patient by 
giving her the substance. This might be a case in which the doctor ought to 
believe that his action is right (since (φ) is supported by the evidence) but yet he 
is blameworthy, and hence, it might be thought to show (1b) to be false. 
 The fact that (φ) is supported by the evidence does not make it false that 
the doctor ought to think his action is wrong. This is because there are two 
different considerations that can affect what one ought to think regarding the 
normative status of one’s action. The first consideration concerns one’s actual 
beliefs about what one is doing. The second consideration concerns the beliefs 
about what one is doing that one ought to have. Failing to meet at least one of 
these standards is a necessary condition for blameworthiness. “Ought to believe 
wrong”, then, should be understood in terms of a disjunction. Consider: 
(1b*) One is blameworthy only if one ought to believe one’s action is   
wrong in virtue of either (a) one’s actual beliefs about one’s action or (b) 
the beliefs about one’s action that one ought to have. 
(1b*) is an explication of (1b) rather than an alternative to it. (a) concerns the 
content of one’s actual beliefs about one’s action. If one believes that one is now 
stepping on a baby, then one ought to think that one is doing wrong. This is true 
in virtue of the content of one’s actual belief. (b) appeals to the content of the 
beliefs one ought to have. Suppose Jim is babysitting a 5 year old, Alexa. Alexa’s 
mother has told Jim that Alexa is deathly allergic to peanuts and has given Jim a 
note explaining this along with emergency contacts. But Jim’s attention is 
elsewhere. He is thinking about the football game that is about to start. Alexa’s 
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mother leaves and Jim turns on the game. A couple of hours later Alexa wants 
lunch. Jim, preoccupied with the game, throws together a peanut butter and jelly 
sandwich and gives it to Alexa. Alexa dies of an allergic reaction. Even though 
what Jim actually thought he was doing was not wrong, he ought to have thought 
that what he was doing was wrong. This is true in virtue of the content of the 
belief he ought to have had: “I am giving Alexa a PB and J which puts her in 
mortal danger since she is deathly allergic to peanuts.” The fact that Jim gave 
Alexa a PB and J despite the fact that he ought to have thought it to be wrong is a 
fact about his quality of his will (which is a fact about his mental states), and this, 
in part, makes him blameworthy. 
 What is it for it to be the case that one ought to believe that one’s action is 
wrong in virtue of some belief? What features of the belief make it true that one 
ought to think that one is doing wrong? “Ought to believe” can be understood in 
terms of “it is reasonable to expect one to believe.” (1b*), then, can be rewritten 
using the notion of reasonable expectations in place of ‘oughts’: 
(1b**) One is blameworthy only if one ought to believe that one’s action 
is wrong, either because (a) it is reasonable to expect one to infer from 
one’s actual beliefs about one’s action that one’s action is wrong or 
because (b) there are some beliefs about one’s action it is reasonable to 
expect one to have and those beliefs are such that it is reasonable to expect 
one to infer from them that one’s action is wrong. 
If one ought to believe one’s action is wrong in virtue of one’s actual belief about 
the action, then it is reasonable to expect one to infer from the assumption that the 
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belief is true to the conclusion that the act is wrong.61 For example, it is 
reasonable to expect a competent adult to infer from “I am now stepping on a 
baby” to “I am doing wrong”. And thus if one believes that one is now stepping 
on a baby one ought to think that one is doing wrong. If one ought to think that 
one’s action is wrong in virtue of the beliefs about the action it is reasonable to 
expect one to have, then there are some beliefs it is reasonable to expect one to 
have and those beliefs are such that it is reasonable to expect one to infer from the 
assumption that they are true to the conclusion that the act is wrong. Reconsider 
the example of Jim and Alexa. There is some belief about Jim’s action it is 
reasonable to expect him to have: “I am giving Alexa a PB and J which puts her 
in mortal danger since she is deathly allergic to peanuts.” And this belief is such 
that it is reasonable to expect Jim to infer from its truth to the conclusion that 
what he is doing is wrong. In this way, Jim ought to believe that what he is doing 
is wrong. 
 The notion of expectation, as it is used here, is not a purely epistemic 
notion. It is not the sense of expectation that is based on likelihood. I might expect 
one to act in some way that I believe is very unlikely. For example, I may expect 
my students to do their reading, even though I believe that they won’t. And should 
some student fail to do the reading that I expect her to do, this may warrant some 
reaction on my part, for the student, we might say, did not hold up her end of the 
bargain. The sense of expectation used here is conceptually bound to the notion of 
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 For the sake of simplicity I am ignoring complications involving probability. 
To allow for these kinds of cases we would need to replace ‘wrong’ with ‘not 
expectably best’. See Parfit (forthcoming) and Sepielli (2009). 
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response. Holding another to an expectation involves, at least, believing in some 
way or other that a breach of the expectation warrants some response or actually 
being disposed to respond in some way to such a breach. The claim, then, that it is 
reasonable to expect one to believe something, amounts to claiming that were one 
to fail to have that belief certain responses would be warranted. The expectations 
appealed to in (1b**) are of a moral kind and so the reactions that they imply are 
moral reactions. When one fails to meet a reasonable moral expectation this may 
warrant some reaction such as indignation or resentment, or it may impair one’s 
relationship with other moral agents.  
 It has been claimed that one is blameworthy for some action only if one 
ought to believe that the action is wrong. This amounts to the claim that one is 
blameworthy for some action only if it is reasonable to expect one to think one’s 
action is wrong. The conditions under which one is blameworthy for some action 
entail particular conditions concerning the normative standards applicable to 
one’s epistemic situation. 
 It should now be clear how to respond to the putative counterexample to 
(1b) in which the doctor has evidence to which he is unresponsive that his action 
is right. The doctor has an actual belief such that it is reasonable to expect him to 
infer from its truth to the conclusion that the action is wrong. That is, it is 
reasonable to expect him to infer from his actual belief “I am giving this patient 
poison,” to the conclusion “I am doing wrong”. This is what makes it true that he 
ought to think his action is wrong. The fact that he has evidence to which he fails 
to respond for the belief that the substance is medicine does not undermine the 
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above consideration. The fact that he has decisive evidence for the belief that the 
substance is medicine does not make it false that he ought to think his action is 
wrong. 
 Furthermore, note that (1b), understood in this way, is compatible with the 
truth of (2), and (3). This is because the requirement for blameworthiness put 
forth by (1b) is a requirement that is internal to the agent’s mental states in the 
sense that the factors that determine what it is reasonable to expect one to believe 
about one’s action necessarily affect one’s mental states. Jim’s mental states, in 
giving Alexa a PB and J, would have to have been different had it been the case 
that it was unreasonable to expect him to believe that she was allergic to peanuts. 
Suppose Alexa’s mother never mentioned Alexa’s allergy to him. If this were the 
case then his will in giving her a PB and J would not have displayed a negligent 
lack of concern. What is, in fact, reasonable and unreasonable to expect one to 
believe about one’s action necessarily affects one’s mental states in acting. (1b), 
then, is consistent with (3), the claim that blameworthiness is an internal notion, 
and (2), the claim that wrongness is an external notion. 
 This chapter argued that propositions (1)-(3) are jointly inconsistent, and 
that we would do best to give up (1), the claim that blameworthiness requires 
wrongdoing. This should be replaced with (1b), the claim that blameworthiness 
requires that one ought to believe that one is doing wrong. This should not seem 
like a radical suggestion. This relation, between blameworthiness and wrongness, 
is captured by the common response we direct at those who plea ignorance: “You 
should have known better.”
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       CHAPTER 5 
RESPONSIBILITY, TRACING, AND CONSEQUENCES 
Quality of will (henceforth QOW) accounts of moral responsibility hold that an 
agent’s responsibility for an action is completely determined by some aspect of 
the agent’s mental life at the time of the action. Such accounts are often objected 
to in light of “tracing cases.” These are cases in which an agent acts in such a way 
at an earlier time that he is unable to express the appropriate moral agency at 
some later time, and yet he is, intuitively, morally responsible at that later time. If 
such examples succeed they show QOW accounts to be false. My project here is 
twofold. First I will argue that the QOW theorist can respond in a plausible way to 
the tracing cases. The strategy involves holding that the agent is responsible for 
his earlier action, but not the event to which the action led. Secondly, I will argue 
that not only is this a viable option for the QOW theorist, but that it is the only 
option for theorists of moral responsibility in general. This is because the tracing 
approach is a strategy employed in order to account for an agent’s responsibility 
for the consequences of her actions but, I will argue, agents cannot be responsible 
for the consequences of their actions.   
 On QOW accounts of responsibility an agent’s responsibility for some 
action is determined by the agent’s QOW in acting. Different theorists have put 
forth various accounts of the relevant qualities of will. For Peter Strawson (1962), 
it is the attitudes expressive of good and ill will toward ourselves or others. For 
Harry Frankfurt (1971), it is the way in which an agent identifies with his willing 
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by way of a second-order volition.62 For others, it is a choice, or one’s concern, or 
one’s evaluative commitments.63 Though there is disagreement about which 
components of an agent’s mental life determine his responsibility they do all hold 
that responsibility is determined by some aspect of the agent’s mental life at the 
time of action. QOW accounts can be characterized by the slogan “responsibility 
just is in the head.”  
 For example, consider Frankfurt’s (1971) influential account. Frankfurt 
distinguishes between an agent’s first and second-order desires. A first-order 
desire is simply a desire for some object or state of affairs. At any given time we 
may have a host of different and often conflicting first-order desires. But one of 
these desires will be effective in the sense that it will move one to act. For 
Frankfurt, the first-order desire that moves one to action is one’s will. Secondly, 
we often have desires that take as their object another desire, what he calls an 
agent’s second-order desire. I may, for example, desire the desire to work long 
hours. Of an agent’s second-order desires we can distinguish those that are not 
merely the desire to have some desire but the desire that some particular first-
order desire be effective. These he calls second-order volitions; an agent’s desire 
that his will be a certain way. On this view an agent is responsible when there is 
an alignment between the agent’s will and his second-order volition. 
                                                 
62
 McKenna (2005) argues that the central insight from both Frankfurt (1969) and 
Strawson (1962) concerns the Quality of Will Thesis: “Being morally responsible 
and legitimately holding morally responsible are to be settled exclusively in terms 
of the moral quality of the will with which an agent acts” (172). 
 
63
 See Wallace (1994), Arpaly (2003), and Smith (2005) respectively. 
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 According to QOW accounts, such as Frankfurt’s, having the appropriate 
QOW is necessary and sufficient for responsibility. There are, then, two ways in 
which one may object to such an account. On the one hand, one may attempt to 
come up with cases in which an agent expresses the appropriate QOW and yet, 
intuitively, is not responsible thereby showing that QOW is not a sufficient 
condition for responsibility. This is what the common “manipulation cases” 
attempt to establish. Frankfurt’s account, for example, is often objected to since it 
seems that an agent could be manipulated, through hypnosis, brainwashing, or 
direct stimulation of the brain, into having the appropriate alignment of his will 
and his second-order volition. For example, perhaps a team of psychologists have 
implanted in some agent both an effective desire to murder and a second-order 
volition that his desire to murder be his will. But, it is claimed, surely the agent is 
not responsible for his subsequent murder given the manipulation.64 I will not 
attempt to respond to such objections here.65 
 Rather I will focus on objections of the second kind. Those that attempt to 
show that QOW is not a necessary condition of responsibility. These are cases in 
which it is intuitive that the agent is responsible despite lacking the appropriate 
QOW. The drunk-driving case is the stock example used in this context. Consider 
an agent who freely and knowingly becomes inebriated at a party and then 
proceeds to drive home and subsequently runs over a child. The agent, imagine, 
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 See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Haji (1998), Mele (2009),  and 
Pereboom (2001). 
 
65
 Though see McKenna (2008) for a response. 
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was so drunk at the time of the accident that he was not capable of forming 
second-order volitions, yet he is, intuitively, responsible for killing the child. Such 
cases, if they are successful, show that QOW is not a necessary condition of 
responsibility. Instead it is thought that the notion of tracing, which can be traced 
back to Aristotle,66 is an essential component of a theory of responsibility and that 
we must trace back from the untoward event to some previous choice in order to 
ground the agent’s responsibility for the event. For example, John Martin Fischer 
and Neal Tognazzini “do not see how a theory of moral responsibility could 
adequately handle the range of drunk-driving cases, Martin Luther cases, and 
manipulation cases without some sort of tracing component; tracing just seems 
both highly plausible and theoretically indispensable” (2009, p. 553). Manuel 
Vargas has argued that the notion of tracing is significantly more problematic than 
has generally been assumed. He does note that structuralist accounts (such as 
Frankfurt’s, a type of QOW account) need not rely on tracing, though he thinks 
this counts against them: “The absence of any role for tracing in structuralist 
accounts seems at least as problematic as the troubles caused by tracing in non-
structuralist accounts. Pedestrian cases (so to speak) involving drunk drivers, as 
well as a range of somewhat more esoteric manipulation cases, seem deeply 
problematic for structural theories” (Vargas, 2005, p. 287). In what follows I will 
suggest how a QOW account of moral responsibility can adequately handle the 
drunk driving cases without appeal to tracing. 
                                                 
66
 See Nicomachean Ethics, Book III [1113b20-1114a27]. 
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 Responsibility, as I am using it here, is taken to be the extent to which an 
agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy for her action. Thus being blameworthy 
entails being responsible but being responsible does not entail being blameworthy 
(for one may be praiseworthy). I will focus on cases of blameworthiness in the 
remainder of the chapter, yet one could substitute cases of praiseworthiness and 
the point would remain. My argument will apply to responsibility in general so 
long as it is the case that a difference in blameworthiness for some action entails a 
difference in responsibility for that action and that no difference in 
blameworthiness for some action entails no difference in responsibility for that 
action. Because I believe that blameworthiness simply is a form of responsibility I 
find these principles extremely plausible, yet I do admit that there may be other 
ways of thinking about these issues. The sense of moral responsibility appealed to 
here should not be confused with either the legal or the merely causal senses with 
which I will not be concerned.  
 Before continuing I want to say a bit more about the context of the 
dialectic in which this debate occurs. The broader issue at stake is whether 
responsibility is an essentially historical notion.67 A historical notion is one in 
which historical factors play a metaphysical determining role. For example, 
consider the notion of a counterfeit work of art. We can imagine two versions of 
Munch’s “The Scream.” Suppose that one is the original while one is a 
counterfeit. But also imagine that the counterfeit is perfect in that the two are 
indistinguishable on the basis of their physical properties. Despite this it is still the 
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 See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chapter 7). 
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case that one of the two is the original and one is the counterfeit. The features of 
the paintings that make it true that one is the original and the other is a counterfeit 
are features about their respective histories. One of the two has a history that 
involved being painted in the late 19th century, while the other does not. But there 
is no physical property of either that indicates this difference. The difference 
relates solely to their histories. The notion of a counterfeit work of art is a 
genuinely historical notion. 
 Critics of QOW theories generally hold that responsibility is genuinely 
historical. This is because they think that one must invoke historical conditions in 
order to adequately account for the manipulation cases and the tracing cases. A 
key feature of QOW theories, then, is that they are ahistorical or “current time-
slice” accounts. The debate about whether the tracing cases are problematic for 
QOW theories occurs within a broader debate about whether responsibility is 
historical. If, as I hope to show, tracing cases are not problematic for QOW 
accounts, then this undermines part of the motivation to think that responsibility is 
a genuinely historical notion. 
 The chapter is divided in the following way: First, an overview of the 
strategy is presented. This strategy holds that in the tracing cases the agent is 
really blameworthy only for that which occurs at the point to which the tracers 
trace. In the drunk driving case, this is commonly taken to be the choice to 
become drunk. Some worries are briefly raised about the use of the standard 
drunk driving case as the paradigm in which to invoke tracing and a modified 
version is offered. It is then argued that we should not appeal to tracing in order to 
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explain blameworthiness for consequences because, despite appearances, agents 
cannot be blameworthy for the consequences of what they have done. Having 
argued that consequences are not related to blameworthiness in the way that many 
think, I address the way in which they are related. I argue that the consequences 
of one’s actions are only epistemically relevant to blameworthiness. The chapter 
closes by considering and responding to some possible objections. 
 
1. 
Consider the standard drunk driving case: Jack freely and knowingly becomes 
inebriated at a party and chooses to drive home. On his way home he runs over a 
child in the street. Surely Jack is blameworthy for the death of the child. But he 
lacked responsibility grounding agency at the time of the accident, for he was too 
drunk. Responsibility grounding agency (RGA), as it is used here, is a placeholder 
for whatever capacities or other features it is that distinguishes moral agents from 
non-moral agents. This is often taken to be some form of control and may involve 
reasons responsiveness, libertarian free will, alignment of one’s will with one’s 
second-order volition, or some other condition. (RGA therefore includes, but is 
not limited to, the features to which the QOW theorist appeals).   
 The reason Jack is blameworthy for the death of the child, the proponent 
of tracing holds, is that we can trace back from the unfortunate event to his 
decision to get drunk. And at this point he both possessed the relevant agency and 
satisfied an epistemic condition; he could reasonably be expected to believe that 
his action would put others at mortal risk. 
  86 
In the above drunk driving case the tracer holds that Jack is blameworthy 
for the death of the child since we can trace back from that consequence to a time 
at which he expressed RGA and satisfied the relevant epistemic condition. The 
natural place to which to trace is, according to the tracer, to the point at which he 
decided to get drunk.68 Tracing is thought to be especially necessary when we 
compare Jack to Jill, who also ran over a child but who did so only because her 
Shirley Temple was secretly spiked. Intuitively, Jill is not blameworthy despite 
the fact that factors at the time of the consequence are relevantly similar to those 
in Jack’s case. It is thought that tracing is necessary to explain these asymmetrical 
judgments of blameworthiness. Only in Jack’s case can we trace back to a time at 
which he possessed RGA and the consequence was expectable.69 The strategy to 
be explored here involves holding that Jack is really blameworthy only for his 
becoming drunk.70 Since blameworthiness is not ascribed to a point at which 
RGA is lacking we need not invoke tracing.   
 The drunk driving cases and others relevantly like them have the 
following features: 
(a) The agent did not exercise RGA during the consequence C. 
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 See, for example, Fischer and Tognazzini (2009, p. 532). 
 
69
 Jill fails to meet the epistemic condition since we can stipulate that she was 
reasonably unaware of her drunkenness and hence the consequence was not 
expectable. 
 
70
 As will become clear, this assessment of the standard drunk driving case is 
mainly for illustrative purposes. I have concerns about the use of this standard 
example which are addressed in the next section. The more guarded claim is this: 
Insofar as it is unproblematic to apply tracing to the standard drunk driving case, 
the agent is really blameworthy only for that to which the tracers trace. 
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(b) The agent did exercise RGA during the action A. 
And the proponent of tracing holds that since 
(c) A is related to C in the right way and the agent could reasonably be 
 expected to believe that A would result in C,71 
(d) The agent is blameworthy to degree d for the consequence C. 
The strategy advocated here, however, involves denying (d). This may seem 
counterintuitive but it seems less so when it is emphasized that while (d) is false 
the following is true: 
 (d*) The agent is blameworthy to degree d for the action A.72 
Notice, this is a crucial point, that the above strategy involves changing only that 
for which the agent is blameworthy. We need not change whether and to what 
degree the agent is blameworthy. In Jack’s case the pre-theoretical intuition is that 
he is blameworthy for the death of the child to some degree d. We can still hold 
that he is blameworthy to that degree d, we just change that for which he is 
blameworthy. It seems that the feature of the example that is intuitively powerful 
concerns the judgment that the agent is blameworthy to this degree. On the 
strategy suggested here we can retain that judgment. 
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 Or the agent could reasonably be expected to believe that A would make C 
more likely. In what follows I bracket off issues concerning probability. 
 
72
 For some it may not be obvious that blameworthiness comes in degrees. But 
consider that excuses are rarely fully exculpating, but more often mitigating. This 
shows that blameworthiness is a scalar notion.  
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2. 
In the standard drunk driving case it can be quite unclear that the agent lacked 
RGA at the time of the consequence. For, after all, the agent was still able to 
drive. I suspect that in most actual cases of drunk driving there is not a complete 
lack of RGA. Consider two scenarios: The first is the standard tracing case in 
which an agent runs over a child as a result of her freely and knowingly becoming 
inebriated. Contrast this with a second agent who also has become inebriated 
freely and knowingly and runs over a child. But suppose that the second agent 
actually aims at the child in the street. It is plausible to think that the degree of 
control required to aim at a child is guaranteed by the fact that the agent is driving 
at all. Insofar as the second agent aims at the child it seems that the second agent 
is more blameworthy than the first. If this is true, that there is a difference in 
blameworthiness between the first and second agents and we can hold all the pre-
driving factors fixed, then the difference must be explained by some factor at the 
time of the driving. And this factor seems to be a particularly objectionable 
expression of agency on the part of the second agent. If this is true, then the drunk 
driving cases are not ones in which the agent completely lacks RGA at the time of 
the accident, and hence, there is no need to invoke tracing.  
  It can also be unclear in the standard drunk driving case to where we ought 
to trace. We need to trace to a point at which the agent expresses RGA and the 
consequence is expectable. But, in the standard case, there may be an inverse 
relationship between these two conditions. The more plausible it is that the agent 
expresses RGA at some time (e.g. during the choice to have that first drink) the 
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less plausible it becomes that the consequence is expectable at that time. And the 
more plausible it becomes that the consequence is expectable at some time (e.g. 
after the fifth drink) the less plausible it becomes that the agent expresses RGA at 
that time.  
To ensure that these vagaries are not hindering our assessment of tracing 
consider a modified version of the example. Suppose that rather than freely and 
knowingly getting drunk, Ernie freely and knowingly takes a pill that gives him a 
sense of euphoria (without impairing RGA) but will cause him to suddenly fall 
into a deep sleep a couple of hours later. He takes the pill, knowing its effects, has 
a good time at the party and later gets into his car and starts to drive home 
unreasonably thinking that he can make it home before he falls asleep. A bit later 
he falls asleep, slumped over the steering wheel. After a few minutes of the car 
fortuitously staying on the road, it veers into a playground and runs over a child. 
Bert’s case is similar, however, the pill is surreptitiously slipped into his Shirley 
Temple (and suppose that Bert reasonably does not realize that he has been 
drugged, to him it just seems like he is having a good time). He too gets into his 
car and starts driving home. He eventually falls deeply asleep due to the pill, 
slumps over the steering wheel and later the car runs over a child. In these cases, 
as before, it is intuitively clear that Ernie is blameworthy while Bert is not. But it 
is also clear, as it may not have previously been, that at the time of the death 
neither agent expressed any of the relevant agency, for they were both fast asleep. 
And Ernie’s driving of the car before he fell asleep was such that he both 
exercised RGA and the consequence was reasonably expectable. In this variation 
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of the drunk driving case it is clear that at the time of the consequence the agent 
lacks RGA and there is also a clear prior time at which the agent does have RGA 
and, in Ernie’s case, satisfies the epistemic condition. 
 
3. 
The tracing strategy holds that Ernie is blameworthy for the death of the child in 
virtue of the fact that we can trace back, from the point at which the death 
occurred to a point at which he did express the relevant agency and the 
consequence was expectable. In the modified example this would be Ernie’s 
driving of the car before he fell asleep. We cannot do this in Bert’s case, for he 
does not satisfy the epistemic condition, and so Bert is not blameworthy for the 
death of the child.  
The strategy argued for here holds that in the tracing cases, the agent is 
really only blameworthy for that which occurred at the point to which the tracers 
traced. Ernie is blameworthy for his driving of the car but not for the death of the 
child. This is because the death of the child is a consequence of Ernie’s action and 
agents cannot be blameworthy for the consequences of their actions. Consider the 
following argument: 
(1) If some thing is not that in virtue of which one is blameworthy then 
one cannot be blameworthy for that thing.  
(2) The consequences of one’s actions are not that in virtue of which one 
is blameworthy. 
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(3) Therefore, one cannot be blameworthy for the consequences of one’s 
actions. 
The first premise, which has the ring of analyticity, says that the only things that 
one can be blameworthy for are the things that make one blameworthy.73 A denial 
of (1) will be open to the charge that it makes blameworthiness unfair.  
 This can be seen by appeal to the notion of resultant moral luck.74 To 
many, the idea of resultant moral luck is unpalatable. If the only reason that one’s 
attempted murder was unsuccessful is because a bird flew into the path of the 
bullet, it seems that one is just as blameworthy as one would have been had the 
attempt been successful.75 The idea is that blameworthiness ought not to depend 
on factors that are, from the agent’s perspective, a matter of luck. But notice that 
there are two ways in which resultant luck might be claimed to affect 
blameworthiness. One way is that luck might be thought to be capable of affecting 
whether and to what degree one is blameworthy. In this way, luck could affect 
whether one is blameworthy and could also make one more or less blameworthy. I 
believe luck of this kind should be rejected. Another way in which resultant luck 
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 David Copp (1997, p. 453) also makes this claim, though he puts it to a  
different use as part of a defense of the principle of alternate possibilities.  
 
74
 The classics on the topic are Williams (1981) and Nagel (1982). Resultant 
moral luck occurs when external factors that affect how one’s action turns out 
affect one’s responsibility. While Williams and Nagel point out this phenomenon 
it is Zimmerman (1987) who coins the term “resultant moral luck”. 
 
75
 The claim that the successful murderer and unsuccessful murderer are equal 
with respect to blameworthiness is compatible with the claim that they differ with 
respect to legal culpability. It very well may be that moral responsibility is not the 
only relevant factor for determining legal responsibility. 
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might be thought to affect blameworthiness has to do, not with whether and to 
what degree one is blameworthy but with the scope of one’s blameworthiness.76 
That is, resultant luck might be thought to be capable of affecting that for which 
one is blameworthy. I believe both these forms of resultant luck should be 
rejected.77 (1) claims that the scope of one’s blameworthiness is not subject to 
resultant luck. 
 The second premise may be thought to do the heavy lifting, but before 
considering it in more detail some terminological clarification is called for. Here, 
and in what follows, ‘consequence’ will be used somewhat as a term of art. 
‘Consequence’ will be taken to mean an event or state of affairs (causally related 
in the appropriate way to an action of an agent) under a description that makes no 
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 Zimmerman (2002) makes this distinction. He holds that though luck cannot 
affect whether and to what degree one is blameworthy he is committed to the 
view that luck can affect the scope of one’s blameworthiness. For example, he 
holds that though the successful and unsuccessful murderers are blameworthy to 
the same degree, the successful murderer is blameworthy for more things (e.g. the 
death of the victim). 
 
77
 That is, we should take the implications of the denial of resultant luck “to their 
logical conclusion” (Zimmerman 2002; p. 559). Zimmerman takes himself to be 
doing this, but he is not since he still allows for the scope of one’s 
blameworthiness to be subject to luck. In order to make this form of luck seem 
less objectionable Zimmerman claims that scope counts for nothing. On his view, 
then, the claim that S is blameworthy for X counts for nothing. But this is false; 
scope counts. To claim that S is blameworthy for X is not to make an 
uninformative claim, it is to claim that X makes S blameworthy.  
 I will not here provide much of an argument for the claim that resultant 
luck should be rejected. Domsky (2004) argues that we should reject resultant 
luck, in part, because the intuitive pull to accept it is a result of optimistic and 
selfish biases. In other words, we tend to judge negligence that unluckily results 
in harm worse than negligence that luckily does not because we are implicitly 
optimistic that we will be lucky and we selfishly allow the unlucky to shoulder the 
moral burden. According to Domsky, “believing in moral luck is much like 
clucking like a chicken after seeing a hypnotist” (463). 
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reference to the mental states of the agent in acting. For example suppose that one 
flicks a light switch, which causes a prowler to be alerted. One’s flicking of the 
light switch (which can be redescribed in various ways) is one’s action and results 
in the consequence that a prowler is alerted. That a prowler is alerted is a 
consequence, in the relevant sense, since it is an event (appropriately related to 
the action) under a description that makes no reference to the mental states of the 
agent in acting. 78  Note that though this is a more precise and perhaps 
idiosyncratic conception of the notion of a consequence it captures the majority of 
occurrences of our more common and ordinary notion, and it also applies to the 
consequences in the examples of the tracing proponents.79  
Insofar as the description of the consequence includes no reference to the 
mental states of the agent in acting, for any consequence there is some possible 
fully exculpating excuse and some possible fully aggravating accuse. An accuse 
(rhymes with excuse) is Zimmerman’s (1997) term for a consideration that shows 
a bit of putatively non-blameworthy behavior to be blameworthy. Suppose, for 
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 See Davidson (1971). One possible redescription of one’s flicking of the light 
switch is one’s alerting of the prowler. And since, on Davidson’s view, both are 
simply different descriptions of very same event, on my view, the agent can be 
responsible for the action under this description. One, perhaps odd, result of my 
account is that though the agent cannot be responsible for the consequence that a 
prowler is alerted the agent can be responsible for his alerting of the prowler. The 
reason has to do with the truth conditions of these two events. The truth 
conditions of the consequence, that a prowler is alerted, are independent of the 
mental states of the agent. But the truth conditions of the action, the agent’s 
alerting of the prowler, are not independent of the mental states of the agent since 
that action is identical to the agent’s intentional flicking of the light switch which 
does make essential reference to the agent’s mental states. Note that though I do 
favor a Davidsonian conception of action nothing in my argument requires it. 
 
79
 See, for example, Fischer and Ravizza (1998, Chapter 4). 
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example, that Jones saves the life of Smith. Typically this is not the sort of action 
that warrants blame. But suppose we learn that though in fact Smith was saved 
this was just a lucky accident, and that Jones actually intended to kill Smith. 
Given any consequence C there is some possible scenario in which C occurs but 
the agent is not at all blameworthy and some other scenario in which C occurs and 
the agent is maximally blameworthy. There are also cases in which one’s 
blameworthiness is not at all affected by the presence or absence of the 
consequence. To see that this is so imagine cases in which the consequences that 
occur are not, from the agent’s perspective, reasonably expectable. For example 
suppose some agent is related to the world in such a way that each action of the 
agent triggers some bad (or good) event. The case can be imagined such that the 
agent is reasonably unaware of this unfortunate (or fortunate) situation and, from 
her subjective perspective, lives a virtuous (or vicious) life. The idea is that it 
seems that blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are dependent upon the mental 
life of the agent and the relation between this mental life and its consequences is a 
contingent one.  
It may be objected that to assert that for any given consequence there is 
some possible fully exculpating excuse and some possible fully aggravating 
accuse is simply to beg the question with regard to the second premise of the 
above argument. Two points: First, consider an example of the sort described in 
more detail. In Orson Scott Card’s science fiction novel Ender’s Game, the 
protagonist, Ender, is a student at an elite military Battle School. He quickly 
moves to the top of his class after showing many tactical talents and is promoted 
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to attend Command School. For his final exam at Command School he plays a 
video game which simulates a large battle. Ender’s ships are greatly outnumbered 
by the alien fleet orbiting around their alien planet. Displaying his willingness to 
win at all costs he decides to use a special weapon which destroys the planet and 
with it all the alien ships and some of his own. It is later revealed (spoiler alert) 
that the game was not a mere simulation, but that his actions actually controlled 
the movement of troops and that the “simulated” events actually took place 
culminating in alien genocide. This is a case in which the normal correlation 
between expectable consequences and actual consequences is severed. For Ender 
the expectable consequences of his actions just concern the game and the few 
other students that he was playing with (who also believed that they were only 
playing a game). In such a scenario it is clear that Ender’s blameworthiness (if 
any) is completely determined by his subjective states. So long as it is the case 
that he reasonably believed that he was merely playing a game he cannot be 
blameworthy in virtue of the alien genocide. This is compatible with the claim 
that he is blameworthy for some other thing, say, for displaying a certain kind of 
brutality in his game playing. But Ender has a fully exculpating excuse with 
regard to the destruction of the alien species: “I was reasonably unaware that my 
actions would result in genocide or any other harm”. Now consider a twist on 
Ender’s story in which he reasonably believes that the game is real and that his 
actions will lead to genocide. But also suppose that in fact the game is only a 
simulation. In such a scenario Ender is just as blameworthy as he would have 
been had it been the case that the game was real and he knew this to be so. What 
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Ender’s blameworthiness turns on is what he can be reasonably expected to 
believe he is doing (and the reasons for which he is acting), not what his actions 
in fact cause. We would not, for instance, let him off the hook were he to plea that 
luckily no harm was caused. When considering cases like Ender’s it is clear that it 
is the expectability of particular consequences rather than their actual occurrence 
that matters for blameworthiness. Since the relation between the consequences 
that are expectable and those that actually occur is contingent, it will always be 
possible for any actual consequence to imagine a fully exculpating excuse and a 
fully aggravating accuse. This shows that the occurrence of some consequence of 
one’s action is not that in virtue of which one is blameworthy. 
Secondly, though it is possible some will insist that the occurrence of 
some consequence does necessarily affect one’s blameworthiness, those who wish 
to deny the existence of resultant moral luck should accept the points made here. 
This is because whether some consequence results from a given action will 
always be subject to an element of luck since the relation between the 
consequences that are expectable and those that actually occur is contingent. The 
idea, mentioned above, is that what seems to matter for blameworthiness is the 
agent’s perception of what she is doing. This is not to say that good intentions 
always excuse, for one’s perception of what one is doing is subject to normative 
standards. But if one took due care and yet the world failed to cooperate, this does 
not reveal anything criticizable about the agent. And to be blameworthy is to be 
criticizable in a particular way. Insofar as one is uncomfortable with the idea of 
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resultant moral luck one should also be uncomfortable with blameworthiness for 
consequences. 
 The occurrence of some consequence is not that in virtue of which one is 
blameworthy. Consequences with some particular property are neither required 
nor sufficient for blameworthiness. For any consequence C and any agent’s 
blameworthiness B we can imagine cases in which we hold C fixed and alter B, 
and also cases in which we hold B fixed and alter C. This shows that one’s 
blameworthiness is independent of the consequences of what one has done, in the 
sense that the occurrence of some consequence is never that in virtue of which 
one is blameworthy. Now if one can only be blameworthy for that in virtue of 
which one is blameworthy, then one cannot be blameworthy for the consequences 
of one’s actions.  
 
4. 
Agents cannot be blameworthy for the consequences of their actions. In what 
way, then, are actual consequences relevant to blameworthiness? Consequences 
are relevant to blameworthiness only insofar as they provide evidence concerning 
the mental life of the agent but it is aspects of this mental life for which agents are 
blameworthy. The consequences of one’s actions are only epistemically relevant 
to blameworthiness. Some thing is only epistemically relevant to blameworthiness 
when it can provide evidence about an agent’s blameworthiness but is not 
constitutive of it. In the tracing cases, the event that spurs the tracing (a 
consequence) is only epistemically relevant. In these cases the agent is really 
  98 
blameworthy only for that which occurred at the point to which the tracers traced. 
In the modified version of the drunk driving example Ernie is really blameworthy 
only for his driving of the car (an action) before he fell asleep and the child was 
hit. And since, in Bert’s case, he was reasonably ignorant of the fact that he had 
been slipped the drug, this explains why we don’t find him blameworthy. 
Blameworthiness is not ascribed to a point in which RGA is lacking, and hence, 
we need not invoke tracing. 
 Suppose Greg shoots his pistol at the ceiling to celebrate at a wedding. 
The bullet ricochets off the ceiling and hits and kills the bride. A consequence of 
Greg’s action is that the bride is killed. This fact is epistemically relevant to the 
blameworthiness of Greg. This is because the fact that the bride was killed as a 
result of his shooting of the pistol provides evidence that he was negligent, a fact 
about his mental states. The fact that the bride was killed provides evidence that 
Greg failed to be appropriately moved by the fact that, from his perspective, it 
was reasonably expectable that his shooting of the gun would risk harm. When it 
is thought that Greg is blameworthy for killing the bride it is inferred from the 
occurrence of that consequence that his willing (the pulling of the trigger) had 
certain qualities.80 It is thought that his willing displayed a willingness to put 
                                                 
80
 So long as the reader will permit me to do a bit of psychological speculation. 
The ultimate point though, is that this is what people ought to think whether or not 
they actually do so.  Furthermore, this is not mere speculation. There is a strong 
empirical case to be made for the claim that the tendency to judge negligence that 
results in harm more harshly than equal negligence that does not result in harm is 
explained by an implicit judgment that the negligence in the harm case is worse 
(what has been called hindsight bias). For a discussion of moral luck and 
epistemic bias see Royzman and Kumar (2004) and Domsky (2004). 
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others in danger. It is this in virtue of which he is blameworthy. Notice, too, that 
this willingness is independent of the occurrence of the consequence. In an 
alternate scenario in which the bullet ricochets in a different direction and hits 
someone else or even does not hit anyone Greg is just as blameworthy because he 
had the same mental states at the time of action; his willing had the same 
qualities.81  
           But suppose Greg pleads the following excuse: “I was given this gun, 
which I was told was loaded with blanks by the usher and was instructed to fire it 
at the end of the ceremony to celebrate.” Insofar as we believe that he is telling 
the truth we may think that he is actually not blameworthy at all.82 Successful 
excuses modify our beliefs about the mental states of the agent at the time of the 
action. Sometimes excuses do appeal to the consequences of what one has done. 
But the success of these excuses turns on what can be inferred about the mental 
states of the agent from the given consequence. The relationship between the 
occurrence of some consequence and the blameworthiness of an agent is not one 
of necessity.  
 Returning now to the case of Ernie, the consequence that the child is killed 
is only epistemically relevant to the question of his blameworthiness. Often, when 
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 One might wonder in what sense the occurrence of the consequence provides 
evidence of blameworthiness since the view defended here holds that Greg is 
blameworthy to the same degree and for the same thing whether or not the 
consequence occurs. The answer is that the occurrence of a bad consequence 
provides evidence of blameworthiness proportionate to the degree to which 
consequences of that type are typically expectable.  
 
82
 Assuming we don’t think that he ought to have been more certain that the gun 
only contained blanks before firing away. 
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such a consequence obtains there is a blameworthy agent behind it, someone who 
did not appropriately respond to the relevant considerations. But this only occurs 
in the case of Ernie and not in the case of Bert. It is this that explains why Ernie 
and not Bert is blameworthy. Since what Ernie is actually blameworthy for was 
his driving (in which he had RGA) after freely and knowingly taking the drug we 
need not invoke tracing to explain the asymmetrical judgments of 
blameworthiness. 
 The tendency to think that agents are blameworthy for the consequences 
of their actions is based on a confusion between epistemic and metaphysical 
considerations. Some consequence-types are such that there is a high correlation 
between their occurrence and an agent with particular criticizable mental states 
that ground blameworthiness; fatalities resulting from drunk driving, for example. 
But this correlation is explained by the fact that the consequence is typically 
expectable in these kinds of cases. And it is the expectability of the consequence, 
rather than the occurrence that explains the agent’s blameworthiness.  
 The tracer suggests that what explains the agent’s blameworthiness for the 
consequence is that there is some prior time at which 
(a) The agent expressed the relevant agency and 
(b) The agent could reasonably be expected to believe that that expression 
of agency would bring about the consequence. 
But notice that once it is clear that (a) and (b) are satisfied, the question of 
blameworthiness is settled. All of our reasonable moral criticisms of the agent 
will concern what the agent has done at that prior time. It may be that the 
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occurrence of some consequence motivates us to investigate questions concerning 
(a) and (b). And it may be that had the consequence not occurred, it would not 
have occurred to us to ask these questions. But, of course, (a) and (b) can occur in 
cases in which the consequence does not. We do often make certain inferences 
about the quality of the agent’s willing from the occurrence of some consequence 
but it is mistake to see the relevance of the occurrence of the consequence as 
metaphysical rather than epistemic. 
 Let me reiterate that the claim is that the occurrence of some consequence 
is not directly relevant to blameworthiness. This is not to say that no 
considerations involving consequences are directly relevant. For it is surely the 
case, as stated above, that the expectability of consequences is directly relevant.83 
The claim here is that with respect to blameworthiness the occurrence of a 
consequence can, at best, provide evidence that the agent did not appropriately 
respond to the fact that, from her perspective, the consequence was expectable. 
The consequences of an agent’s action are epistemically relevant in that they can 
provide a window into her mental life at the time of the action. 
 
5. 
Here two objections are considered to the claim that agents cannot be 
blameworthy for the consequences of what they have done. First, one might 
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 One might think of the difference between a theory of the right and a theory of 
responsibility is the differing roles they give to consequences. A theory of the 
right is often concerned with the occurrence of consequences, while a theory of 
responsibility ought to be more concerned with the expectability of consequences.  
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attempt to save the possibility of blameworthiness for consequences in the 
following way: One might grant that when the consequence of one’s action that 
actually occurs is not expectable one cannot be blameworthy for the consequence 
(for, of course, one has a good excuse). But one might hold that when the 
consequence that occurs is expectable this allows for blameworthiness for the 
consequence (for one lacks such an excuse). In reply, such a move strikes me as 
ad hoc. The only motivation for this response is that it saves the pre-theoretical 
intuition that agents can be blameworthy for the consequences of what they have 
done. But in scenarios in which actual consequences and expectable consequences 
do line up, it is the fact that the consequence is expectable that makes it the case 
that the agent is blameworthy, not the occurrence of the consequence. And that 
for which one can be blameworthy is limited to that which makes one 
blameworthy: willing with particular qualities. 
Secondly, one might object to some of the points made here on the 
following grounds: An agent who unluckily causes harm surely has reason to act 
and to feel differently than an agent who luckily does not. And what justifies the 
differing attitudes and behavior that is warranted is a difference in 
blameworthiness. So, for example, an agent that has negligently run over a child 
has reason to feel worse than an agent who was just as negligent but was lucky 
that no child was in the street when he careened by. 
 One can reply that the difference is explained by our epistemic limitations. 
In the case of the agent who kills the child we can be sure about the degree of 
negligence and carelessness. He was negligent enough to actually kill a child. 
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However, in the case of the agent whose negligence does not cause a death, we 
can still doubt the claim that he would have killed the child if she were present. 
Perhaps, we might think, the agent would have swerved if there had been a child 
in the street. That is, the tendency to think that the agents may differ with respect 
to blameworthiness can be explained by a difference in implicit judgments about 
the mental states of the respective agents.84 But if one had complete information 
and was certain that the relevant mental states of the agents were similar, then one 
would not feel that the agents differ in blameworthiness.  
 Additionally, holding that agents in these kinds of cases are equal in terms 
of blameworthiness does not commit one to the claim that we should respond to 
them in the same way, legally or otherwise, or that the agents ought to feel the 
same.85 One is just committed to denying that any difference in blameworthiness 
explains these other differences. Two golfers might make qualitatively identical 
swings, but due to a gust of wind after the ball is hit the shots might turn out very 
differently. And how the shots actually turn out can affect what the golfer ought 
to do next. But this is not a difference in how well the golf swing was executed 
(assuming that the gust of wind was not expectable). Similarly the fact that one 
negligent driver actually killed someone might give him reason to act differently 
than the agent who did not. But this is not explained by a difference in 
blameworthiness. 
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 Royzman and Kumar (2004) defend this claim on empirical grounds. 
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 See Zimmerman (2002, 562). 
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6. 
This chapter presented an account of blameworthiness in drunk driving cases 
which does not appeal to the notion of tracing. This casts doubt on the claim that 
tracing is indispensable. This account also fits naturally with quality of will based 
accounts of responsibility. These accounts all hold that blameworthiness in 
particular and responsibility in general are solely determined by the mental states 
of the agent at the time of the action. And since agents can only be blameworthy 
for that in virtue of which they are blameworthy, agents can only be blameworthy 
for these mental states and hence not for the consequences of those mental states. 
These accounts, which do not rely on tracing, are often criticized precisely 
because they lack a tracing element and are thought to be unable to handle the 
drunk driving cases. This chapter has shown how these accounts should respond 
to this class of offered counterexamples. There are other putative 
counterexamples that these accounts must address, such as the brain manipulation 
cases, but those will have to be dealt with elsewhere. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SYNCHRONIC AND DIACHRONIC RESPONSIBILITY 
There are at least two different ways in which we can ascribe responsibility for an 
action. The first, and most commonly recognized, concerns an agent’s 
responsibility for an action at the time of the action. The second concerns an 
agent’s responsibility for an action at some later time. Most theorists have simply 
assumed that one is responsible for some past act as long as one is the same 
person as the author of the act. That is, that the relation that grounds responsibility 
through time is personal identity. I argue instead that this relation is psychological 
connectedness.86 This has a number of important implications stemming from the 
fact that unlike personal identity this relation is scalar. In what follows I motivate 
and develop this distinction. I explore the way in which this distinction is relevant 
to the concepts of forgiveness, apology, and punishment. I then use this 
distinction to defend quality of will accounts of responsibility against the common 
manipulation cases. I argue that since the manipulations affect, by their very 
nature, the conditions that ground responsibility through time they do not 
unproblematically shed light on the conditions of responsibility at the time of the 
action.  
 Moral responsibility is taken here to be the extent to which an agent is 
blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action. On this conception, responsibility is a 
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 Connectedness should not be confused with continuity. Whereas continuity is 
not scalar and is transitive, connectedness is scalar and is not transitive. This is 
because continuity is the ancestral relation of connectedness; that is, continuity 
consists in overlapping chains of connectedness. 
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continuum upon which blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are poles. Thus, 
blameworthiness entails responsibility but responsibility does not entail 
blameworthiness. This sense of responsibility should be distinguished from mere 
causal responsibility (e.g. “carbon emissions are responsible for global warming”) 
and from legal responsibility (e.g. “he was found responsible for misconduct”). 
 
1. The Distinction between Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility 
    Suppose that Sebastian gets drunk and drives his car on to Quincy’s property.  
    Sebastian had no intention of damaging Quincy’s property. After regaining  
    sobriety and learning of his misadventures, Sebastian, who is not yet an  
    alcoholic, subsequently and quite deliberately returns to the local pub and  
    proceeds to get himself roaring drunk. Though we would have excused him  
    from moral responsibility for the damage he did on the first spree had he  
    subsequently modified his behaviour, he did not do so and he is making the  
    crucial past behaviour, not an out-of-character happenstance, but very much in  
    character and hence something for which, as Aristotle would say, he may be  
    held morally accountable (French, 1984, p.499). 
 
French’s example suggests that one’s reaction to one’s past act can affect one’s 
responsibility for that act. We can imagine another version of the above story in 
which Sebastian, after destroying Quincy’s property, promptly enrolls in a twelve 
step program and embarks on the road to sobriety. French’s point, I take it, is that 
Sebastian is more blameworthy for his reckless driving in the original story than 
he is in the modified story. And this difference in blameworthiness is explained 
by Sebastian’s behavior after the reckless driving occurs. There is something to 
this. 
 But one might resist. One might grant that Sebastian in the original story is 
a more blameworthy person than he is in the modified story. He might be 
  107 
blameworthy for his subsequent behavior in the original version but not in the 
second. Yet, Sebastian’s blameworthiness for the reckless driving does not vary 
across the two scenarios since the factors at the time of the action were relevantly 
similar; one can’t undue the past. There is also something to this. 
 This suggests that there are two different ways in which we can ascribe 
responsibility. The first concerns responsibility for some action at the time of its 
occurrence. The second concerns responsibility for some action at some later 
time. I will call the former ascriptions of synchronic responsibility (SR) since they 
concern responsibility at the time of the action. Call the latter ascriptions of 
diachronic responsibility (DR) since they concern the transfer of responsibility for 
some action, through time, to some later time. SR concerns some agent S’s 
responsibility at time t for some act X that occurs at t. DR concerns some agent 
S’s responsibility at some time t+n for some act X that occurs at t. Consider Jane 
who, at t, cruelly insults her brother. In the first scenario she comes to feel a great 
deal of remorse about her remark and begins a program of self-improvement. At 
t+1, one year later, she is very different than she was when she issued the insult. 
She is no longer mean spirited, but is kind and compassionate. At this later time 
she cannot even consider hurting her brother’s feelings to be a live option, and she 
offers him a sincere and heartfelt apology. In the second scenario she does not 
feel any remorse after the insult and does not change her ways. She does not 
apologize at t+1 because she is not sorry. Jane’s blameworthiness at t for 
insulting her brother is the same in the first and second scenarios. This is because 
her motivational structure at t was the same; she had the same quality of will. But 
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her blameworthiness at t+1 for insulting her brother does vary across the two 
scenarios because an important change occurred in Jane in the first scenario and 
did not in the second. Her relation to that past quality of will differs in the two 
scenarios. In the first she distances herself from the motivations that gave rise to 
the insult. In the second, that motivational structure persists unchanged. Jane’s 
blameworthiness at t+1 for insulting her brother is mitigated in the first scenario 
and it is not in the second in virtue of what she is like at that later time. Jane’s 
blameworthiness at t for the insult is the same in both scenarios, but her 
blameworthiness at t+1 for the insult is less in the first scenario than it is in the 
second. The two cases are equal with respect to synchronic blameworthiness but 
they differ with respect to diachronic blameworthiness.87 
 One might object that the difference across the two scenarios is a 
difference, not in blameworthiness, but in the appropriateness of blame. That is, 
one might object that Jane is equally blameworthy at t+1 in both scenarios but 
that it would be less appropriate to blame her in the first case than it would in the 
second. It has been recently argued that the conditions that make it appropriate to 
hold someone responsible are sensitive to a broader range of conditions than those 
that comprise being responsible.88 But note that the cases that are used to support 
this claim focus on the person doing the blaming rather than the blameworthy 
agent. For example, the appropriateness of blame can, in part, depend on whether 
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 For some, a case involving a good act and a subsequent worsening of character 
may have more intuitive appeal.  
 
88
 See, for example, Smith (2007). 
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the one doing the blaming is a victim of the harm, a bystander, or someone who 
has committed similar harms. In other words, whether blame is appropriate can 
depend on whether the evaluator has the standing to blame. In order for this 
objection to succeed, however, the factors that are supposed to explain the 
difference in the appropriateness of blame must be located within the agent since 
the cases can be constructed such that it is only internal features of the agent that 
vary. And it must also be clear that though these internal factors affect the 
appropriateness of blame they do not affect the agent’s blameworthiness. It is 
hard for me to imagine how such a project could succeed. There is also a danger 
that the critic is simply using ‘blameworthy’ to mean ‘synchronically 
blameworthy’ and ‘appropriate to blame’ to mean ‘diachronically blameworthy’. 
If this is the case then this is not an objection to my account but simply an 
objection to my terminology.89 
                                                 
89
 Relatedly, one might appeal to Gary Watson’s (1996) distinction between 
responsibility as attributability and responsibility as accountability in order to 
explain the example. For Watson, attributability concerns whether an action can 
be properly ascribed to an agent. To say that an agent is to blame for an action in 
the attributability sense is simply to say that the agent committed the action and 
that the action has particular faults. Accountability, on the other hand, is 
conceptually tied to the notion of response. It is responsibility as accountability 
that we are concerned with when we are concerned with whether an agent 
deserves to be punished for her action. Appealing to this distinction, one might 
claim that at t the insult is attributable to Jane and that she is accountable for it. 
Later, at t+1, she is accountable only in the second scenario though the insult is 
still attributable to her in both scenarios. As will become evident in the next 
section, my claim is that responsibility as attributability varies across time. 
Though it is true that there is a difference in accountability at t+1 in the two 
scenarios this difference is explained by a difference in attributability. This is 
shown when we consider cases of extreme psychological disconnectedness 
between the time of the act and the time of the responsibility ascription. 
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 The conditions for synchronic and diachronic responsibility are distinct. 
Most of the attention in the literature has been devoted (at least implicitly) to 
giving conditions for synchronic responsibility. Little effort has been spent on 
developing the conditions for diachronic responsibility,90 and indeed, the 
distinction has not (to my knowledge) been explicitly drawn. There has been 
much debate, for example, about whether SR is sensitive to history. Most 
theorists, of both compatibilist and incompatibilist stripes, believe that SR is 
essentially historical.91 Quality of will (QOW) based accounts, such as 
Frankfurt’s, deny this. This is because QOW accounts hold that responsibility is 
completely determined by some psychological features of the agent at the time of 
action.92 Historicists claim that it matters how one came to have those 
psychological features; that they must have an appropriate history. The issue is 
whether the “snap-shot” or “current time-slice” properties93 of an agent at the time 
of the action are sufficient to determine the agent’s responsibility for the action at 
that time. This is a substantive debate. But note that it is trivially true that DR is 
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 Parfit (1984, p. 326) makes some brief but highly suggestive remarks that I 
attempt to develop in what follows. 
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 See, for example, Kane (1998), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Haji (1998), and 
Mele (1995; 2009). Note that though these accounts do take historical 
considerations into account, they are not accounts of diachronic responsibility. 
Instead, they hold that historical considerations are relevant in determining the 
agent’s responsibility for the action at the time of the action; that is, the agent’s 
synchronic responsibility. 
 
92
 See Frankfurt (1971). I also believe Strawson (1962) should be read in this way. 
See McKenna (2005). 
 
93
 This language comes from Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 171). 
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sensitive to history. This is because DR concerns responsibility for something that 
has already happened (i.e. for some event in an agent’s history). One can be 
responsible for some past act only if that past act occurred and this is a historical 
fact. 
 
2. The Nature of Diachronic Responsibility 
While there is much disagreement about the nature of SR, whether it requires 
libertarian free will or reasons responsiveness or alignment of one’s first and 
second order desires, most theorists implicitly assume that DR is simply a matter 
of personal identity.94 This amounts to the claim that responsibility for some 
action transfers through time if and only if one is the same person who committed 
the past act. 
But the mere fact that one is the person who committed some past act does 
not guarantee that responsibility freely transfers. If this were so then there would 
be no difference in Jane’s blameworthiness for the insult at t+1 in the above 
example. But there is. Since it is plausible that Jane at t is the same person as Jane 
at t+1 in both scenarios and there is a difference in blameworthiness at t+1 
between the two scenarios, this shows that DR is not simply a matter of personal 
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 David Shoemaker (unpublished manuscript) offers the following list of theorists 
who have accepted that “moral responsibility presupposes personal identity”: 
Butler (1736, p. 104); DeGrazia (2005, pp. 88-89); Glannon (1998, p. 231); 
Haskar (1980, p. 111); Locke (1694); Madell (1981, p. 116); Parfit (1984, pp. 
323-326; 1986, pp. 837-843); Reid (1785, pp. 116-117); Sider (2001, pp. 4, 143, 
203-204); Schectman (1996, p. 14). I add Haji (1998), and Mele (1995). 
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identity. The fact that personal identity holds is not sufficient for responsibility to 
freely transfer through time. 
Personal identity is also not necessary for responsibility to freely 
transfer.95 This can be seen when one considers cases of fission. Suppose that 
some agent commits some crime and then undergoes fission. His two brain 
hemispheres are transplanted into two distinct bodies. The resulting people will 
both have memories of the crime, they will have the same beliefs and character 
traits as the pre-fission agent. It is plausible that though personal identity does not 
hold between either of the post-fission agents and the pre-fission agent, both post-
fission agents are fully responsible for the crime.96 “[A] malefactor could scarcely 
evade responsibility by contriving his own fission” (Wiggins 1976, p. 146).97 
This suggests that DR is determined, not by personal identity, but by the 
relation between one’s current psychology and the psychology at the time of the 
action. The reason that Jane’s blameworthiness is mitigated in the one scenario 
and not in the other concerns the way her psychology at t+1 relates to her 
psychology at t. And the reason that both post-fission agents are responsible for 
the crime is that their psychologies are relevantly similar to the psychology of the 
                                                 
95
 Shoemaker (unpublished manuscript) convincingly argues that responsibility 
does not presuppose identity.  
 
96
 Admittedly, more would need to be said to establish this claim. I won’t take up 
that task here since what I have to say in what follows depends on the claim that 
personal identity is not a sufficient condition for responsibility to freely transfer 
through time. It can be assumed, if one likes, both that personal identity is a 
necessary condition of responsibility and that it holds in the cases I discuss. 
Nothing hinges on this. 
 
97
 As quoted in Parfit (1984, p. 271). 
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pre-fission agent. DR is thought to be a matter of personal identity, I suspect, 
because it often implies psychological connectedness. Psychological 
connectedness concerns the holding of direct psychological connections across 
time. One example of a direct psychological connection is that between memory 
and experience. A memory is directly connected to some experience if it is a 
memory (caused in the right way) of that very experience. But there are many 
other forms that psychological connectedness might take: “One such connection is 
that which holds between an intention and the later act in which this intention is 
carried out. Other such direct connections are those which hold when a belief, or a 
desire, or any other psychological feature, continues to be had” (Parfit, 1984; p. 
205).98 Two psychological states are connected to the degree that they are similar 
and causally related. 
The transfer of responsibility through time is directly sensitive to 
psychological connectedness. In cases in which an agent commits some act X at 
time t because of some particular psychological structure then the agent’s 
responsibility at some later time t+n is determined by the degree to which and the 
way in which that psychological structure is connected to the agent’s later 
psychology. That is, if the agent is blameworthy for some act X to degree d at 
                                                 
98
 Parfit (1984) claims that identity matters only insofar as it implies 
psychological connectedness and continuity (the ancestral relation of 
connectedness).  I follow Shoemaker (1999) who has argued that what matters is 
primarily connectedness and not continuity, at least in the realm of survival, 
anticipation, and responsibility. 
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time t, then when there is maximal connectedness between time t and some later 
time t+n the agent is blameworthy for X to degree d at t+n.99 
 The relevant psychological connections, as it pertains to DR, will not 
require global psychological connectedness. That is, the psychological 
connections that are relevant to DR do not include all of the agent’s psychological 
properties, but just those that gave rise to the action; those that make up the 
motivational structure that brought about the act (and for that reason, are the basis 
of SR). If the reason Jack was rude to Jill five years ago is because he was a self-
absorbed narcissist then blameworthiness can be transferred to the current time to 
the extent that he is still a self-absorbed narcissist. This would be true even if 
                                                 
99
 It may be that “maximally connected” is a threshold concept with a relatively 
low threshold. We may, for instance, only require a small degree of psychological 
connectedness in order for blameworthiness to fully transfer across time. This 
view is defended in Glannon (1998). He also holds that “diminished 
psychological connectedness does not imply diminished responsibility” (231), so 
long as the threshold is met. This, it seems to me, is mistaken. The mistake is to 
think that, with respect to some past act, an agent is either responsible for that act 
or not. That is, that DR is not scalar. One can be led to this view when one fails to 
distinguish between SR and DR. Glannon focuses on SR and it is this that leads 
him to deny that diminished connectedness implies diminished responsibility: 
“What makes a person partly or fully responsible for his behavior is not so much 
the strength or weakness of the connections between his earlier and later mental 
states, but more so his intention and his beliefs about foreseeable consequences at 
the time of action” (232). Were Glannon discussing the nature of SR he would be 
exactly right. The problem with his view is that it implies that an insignificant 
change in connectedness, from the threshold to just below, could be the difference 
between being responsible and not being responsible. The better threshold view 
holds that when the connectedness threshold is met DR is equal to SR, but that 
when the threshold is not met DR is diminished rather than eliminated. Though I 
leave it open here whether a threshold understanding of connectedness with 
respect to responsibility is best, I’m inclined to think that though we may employ 
a threshold understanding in practice, this is merely the best we can do given our 
epistemic limitations but that in fact, DR is sensitive to subtle changes in 
connectedness. 
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there is a lack of psychological connectedness in regards to something else. Jack 
might, for instance have cared very much about politics at the time of the insult. 
But he may have become disillusioned and is no longer concerned with politics at 
all. Psychological dissimilarity in the political realm would not, it seems, diminish 
his current blameworthiness for the past insult. Psychological connectedness, 
when judging responsibility for some past act, concerns the psychological features 
that led to the act. In other words, what matters for SR is the quality of will with 
which one acted and what matters for DR is the persistence of those qualities of 
will. 
 It is natural to think that the upper limit on one’s DR for some act is set by 
one’s SR for that act. That is, that at best DR is equal to SR because there is 
maximal connectedness. Yet there are cases that seem to suggest that one’s DR 
for an act can be enhanced. Consider a case of a halfhearted insult.  Suppose that 
Jane insults her brother at t. The insult was a slip of the tongue and surprised Jane. 
At the time she felt, to some extent, bad about it but also couldn’t help feeling 
some joy and excitement at the jab. The insult was halfhearted. Time goes by and 
she no longer feels bad about it all, but is very pleased with the insult, and if she 
had it to do over again would have offered a crueler remark. She now, at t+n, 
wholeheartedly endorses her halfhearted insult. 
 When we compare this case to one in which Jane’s endorsement of her 
insult remains halfhearted at t+n I suspect that most will have the intuition that 
Jane in the former case is more blameworthy for the insult at t+n than she is in the 
latter case. Why is this? At t Jane was motivated by particular considerations. She 
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was motivated to action by the prospect of hurting her brother’s feelings. But she 
was also motivated, to some extent, to spare him harm. In the first scenario this 
second motivation has dissipated at t+n leaving only the first. Since it was the fact 
that she cared about hurting her brother’s feelings that explained her synchronic 
blameworthiness for the insult, and this care has only grown in strength she is, at 
t+n, more blameworthy for the insult than she was at t. She more closely 
identifies with the bad making features of her action and is psychologically 
disconnected from the motivations that opposed it. 
 Enhancement cases, such as these, suggest that the valence of 
psychological changes matter for DR. With respect to some past motivational 
structure, that structure can persist as it was, it can be diminished, or it can be 
enhanced. When it persists one’s DR remains equal to one’s SR, when it is 
diminished one’s DR becomes less than one’s SR, and when it is enhanced one’s 
DR becomes greater than one’s SR.  
 
3. Forgiveness, Apology, and Punishment 
Assessments of responsibility are much more straightforward when DR more or 
less lines up with SR. This may explain the lack of attention paid to the 
distinction. In such scenarios it is only necessary to look at the agent’s psychology 
at the time of the action. Since there has been no drastic change in psychology 
after the action responsibility can freely transfer.  
 But cases in which DR comes apart from SR are both common and 
troubling. They illicit in us conflict and tension. This is because it can be hard to 
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reconcile the differing evaluations. We seem to want and need an “all-things-
considered” assessment of responsibility. But, as I have argued, DR is distinct 
from SR; they are different forms of evaluation.  
 Consider the character Ellis Boyd ‘Red’ Redding, played by Morgan 
Freeman, from the film The Shawshank Redemption. Red has been in the 
Shawshank Penitentiary since he committed an act of murder as a teenager. But 
the film takes place much later when Red is an aging man. His character strikes us 
as one of the few positive lights in the hard, violent, and often hopeless world of 
incarceration. He is kind and caring and the deep friendship he develops with 
Andy Dufresne, played by Tim Robbins, is touching. He seems like a thoroughly 
good person, much better than the warden, the guards, or most of the other 
characters in the film. But he is a murderer. He committed a horrible act. When up 
for a parole hearing he is asked by the committee if he feels he has been 
rehabilitated: 
    Man #1: Your file says you’ve served forty years of a life sentence. You feel   
    you’ve been rehabilitated? 
 
    Red doesn’t answer. Just stares off. Seconds tick by. The parole board   
    exchanges glances. Somebody clears his throat. 
 
    Man #1: Shall I repeat the question? 
 
    Red: I heard you. Rehabilitated. Let’s see now. You know, come to think of it, I  
    have no idea what that means. 
 
    Man #2: Well, it means you’re ready to rejoin society as a— 
 
    Red: I know what you think it means. Me, I think it’s a made-up word,  
    politician’s word. A word so young fellas like you can wear a suit and tie and  
    have a job. What do you really want to know? Am I sorry for what I did? 
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    Man #2: Well…are you? 
 
    Red: Not a day goes by I don’t feel regret, and not because I’m in here or  
    because you think I should. I look back on myself the way I was…stupid kid  
    who did that terrible crime…wish I could talk sense to him. Tell him how  
    things are. But I can’t. That kid’s long gone, this old man is all that’s left, and I  
    have to live with that. 
 
    “Rehabilitated?” That’s a bullshit word, so you just go on ahead and stamp that  
    form there, sonny, and stop wasting my damn time. Truth is, I don’t give a shit  
    (Darabont,1994, pp. 111-112). 
 
The scene is powerful. Watching it, we can feel the frustration that Red feels 
being psychologically continuous but not connected with the “stupid kid who did 
that terrible crime.” When thinking about characters like Red we can focus on the 
crime that occurred, the agent’s SR. In many cases the agent’s synchronic 
blameworthiness may be quite high and our emotional reactions reflect this 
judgment. The crime was severe, we cannot forgive, and we cannot forget. But we 
can, at the same time, focus on the current person before us. This person may bear 
little resemblance to the criminal who did the bad act. When we do this 
compassion comes more easily. From this perspective we can forgive and we can 
move on. But the fact that things look so much different from these two 
perspectives is difficult to reconcile. 
 Should people like Red be forgiven for what they have done? It is 
plausible that the degree to which an agent deserves to be forgiven is sensitive to 
the degree to which she is diachronically responsible for the prior act.100 We can 
imagine cases in which an agent is so psychologically disconnected from her prior 
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 Compare Murphy: “If the wrongdoer is unrepentant, he generally does not (in 
my view) merit forgiveness.” (2003, p. 70).  
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self that though there may be psychological continuity, there is no preservation of 
psychological content. For example, consider a case in which at time t1 the agent 
is very bad and has committed some horrible act. But at some later time t2 she is a 
psychological twin of, say, Mother Teresa. There are overlapping chains of 
psychological connectedness between t1 and t2 and thus there is psychological 
continuity between t1 and t2. Yet imagine that there are no direct psychological 
connections between t1 and t2; there is no preservation of psychological content 
between t1 and t2. In such cases it seems absurd to continue resenting the agent for 
her past acts.  
 DR is relevant to apology as well. It seems that to apologize for some past 
act is, in many cases at least, to express that one is psychologically disconnected 
from the mechanism that led to the action. When one apologizes for some past act 
one is expressing a normative stance towards that act; one is renouncing it. One is 
also often expressing that one is no longer disposed to act in that way. These are 
ways in which one represents oneself to be psychologically disconnected from the 
motivational structure that led to the action. Apology, then, often involves an 
expression of the relevant psychological distancing. Being sorry involves actually 
being relevantly psychologically disconnected. This explains why, when one is 
sorry and expresses this through apology, forgiveness is in order. 
 The distinction between SR and DR also provides a conceptual framework 
with which to think about the notion of punishment. Traditional retributivist 
approaches to punishment take the agent’s SR as the central justificatory feature. 
That is, the extent to which an agent should be punished is determined by her 
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responsibility for the crime at the time of the crime; the punishment should be 
proportional to the crime. This approach has the advantage that it preserves the 
presumed “backward-looking” feature of our punishment related practices in that 
they are essentially reactive. One problem with such a strict retributivist 
approach, though, is illustrated by people like Red. He did commit a terrible 
crime, but he is so psychologically disconnected from the motivational structure 
that issued the crime that it can seem pointless and cruel to punish him any longer. 
A retributive theory that focuses on SR is open to the charge that it is blind to the 
way things are now. An alternative approach is to take, not the agent’s SR as 
central, but rather what might be called her psychological flexibility. Can the 
criminal be rehabilitated by some mode of punishment? On this approach, the role 
of punishment is to encourage psychological distancing from the mechanism that 
issued the action. This approach is often criticized because it is exclusively 
“forward-looking”; it fails to account for the way in which punishment is a matter 
of desert. It also allows for the possibility that the rehabilitation itself is much 
more severe than the crime. A third approach is essentially retributivist but takes 
not SR but DR as central. On this view punishment is a matter of desert but the 
desert is determined by what the agent is like now, not what she was like at the 
time of the crime. This middle ground captures the attractive features of both the 
traditional retributive approach and the rehabilitation approach. It explains why it 
is pointless to punish a completely rehabilitated criminal, but it is also able to treat  
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punishment as essentially a matter of desert. 101 It may also explain the differing 
sentences we give to crimes of passion compared to crimes that were 
premeditated. Insofar as crimes of passion are ones in which the agents are in an 
abnormal psychological state of mind, it seems that the agents will be more likely 
to be relevantly disconnected from that state of mind after the act occurs. Crimes 
that are premeditated and “done with a cool head” seem to be ones in which the 
relevant psychological features are more likely to persist. This may be why we 
typically think harsher punishments are warranted in cases of the latter kind.102 
Obviously, more would need to be said to develop a retributivist account based on 
DR , but this suggests another avenue along which the distinction has relevance.  
 
4. Manipulation Cases 
Let us now turn to the common manipulation cases. Manipulation cases are often 
used to show that QOW accounts of responsibility are inadequate. That is, 
manipulation cases are thought to show that SR is necessarily historical and thus 
that QOW accounts, which are ahistorical accounts of SR, are false. Here I 
explore a strategy that the defender of a QOW account can employ in responding 
to the manipulation cases. The strategy is to argue that the intuition that the agent 
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 Consider Parfit: “Suppose that a man aged ninety, one of the few rightful 
holders of the Nobel Peace Prize, confesses that it was he who, at the age of 
twenty, injured a policeman in a drunken brawl. Though this was a serious crime, 
this man may not now deserve to be punished” (1984, 326). 
 
102
 This may also explain the Aristotelian view that virtuous action must proceed 
from a firm and unchanging character as well as the related Humean claim that a 
bad action provides reason to blame the agent only if it was the result of an 
enduring character trait.   
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is not responsible in a manipulation case is explained by appeal to DR.103 And 
given that we can explain the intuitive data by appeal to DR we need not hold that 
the manipulation cases reveal anything about the nature of SR. Consider Mele: 
    Brainwashed Beth When Beth crawled into bed last night she was an  
    exceptionally sweet person, as she always had been. Beth’s character was such  
    that intentionally doing anyone serious bodily harm definitely was not an  
    option for her: her character—or collection of values—left no place for a desire  
    to do such a thing to take root. Moreover, she was morally responsible, at least  
    to a significant extent, for having the character she had. But Beth awakes with a  
    desire to stalk and kill a neighbor, George. Although she had always found  
    George unpleasant, she is very surprised by this desire. What happened is that,  
    while Beth slept, a team of psychologists that had discovered the system of  
    values that make Chuck [a vicious killer] tick implanted those values in Beth  
    after erasing hers. They did this while leaving her memory intact, which helps  
    account for her surprise. Beth reflects on her new desire. Among other things,  
    she judges, rightly, that it is utterly in line with her system of values. She also  
    judges that she finally sees the light about morality—that it is a system  
    designed for and by weaklings. Upon reflection, Beth “has no reservations  
    about” her desire to kill George and is “wholeheartedly behind it” (Frankfurt,  
    2002, p. 27). Furthermore, the desire is “well integrated into [her] general  
    psychic condition” (Frankfurt, 2002, p. 27). Seeing absolutely no reason not to  
    stalk and kill George, provided that she can get away with it, Beth devises a  
    plan for killing him, and she executes it—and him—that afternoon…Beth is not  
    morally responsible for killing George…Some readers may be inclined to  
    believe that Beth is morally responsible for killing George. I ask such readers to  
    add the following detail to Beth’s story and to ask themselves whether it makes  
    a difference: right after she kills George, the brainwashing is reversed (Mele  
    2009, pp. 464-465). 
 
So goes one version of the manipulation case. Manipulation cases are often used 
as test cases for theories of responsibility. QOW theories, in particular, have often 
been thought to be vulnerable to these kinds of cases. These theories hold that 
responsibility is completely determined by some psychological features of the 
agent at the time of the action. The manipulation cases are then deployed as 
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 In rough slogan form: manipulations are identity undermining rather than 
responsibility undermining. However this can be misleading since, as I have 
argued, DR is not a matter of personal identity but a more subtle matter of 
psychological connectedness. 
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counterexamples to these theories. For the psychological features to which the 
QOW theorist appeals (note the quotes from Frankfurt in the above passage) can, 
it seems, be induced by artificial means. In such cases, it is thought to be 
intuitively clear that the agent is not responsible for the actions that result from 
the manipulation.104 And this is despite the fact that the agent had the 
psychological features the QOW theorist holds to be sufficient for responsibility. 
Thus, it is claimed, the QOW account must be mistaken.  
 There is, undeniably, some pull to say that the agents in these cases are not 
responsible. The wielders of the manipulation cases claim that it is the fact that 
the agent has been manipulated that explains this intuition. They hold that there is 
an essentially historical condition on responsibility; in order for one to be 
responsible for an action that action must have an appropriate history (in 
particular, a history devoid of manipulation). But this is not the only explanation 
for the not-responsible intuition. There is an explanation of this intuition that is 
compatible with an ahistorical QOW approach to responsibility. 
 What is the source of the not-responsible intuition? There are two details 
of the story that seem to be doing a lot of the work. The first is that before the 
manipulation Beth was a nice and morally decent person. Her “character was such 
that intentionally doing anyone serious bodily harm definitely was not an option 
for her.” And she was responsible for having this character. Pre-manipulation 
Beth was morally innocuous. 
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 The following are just a few examples of theorists who have made this claim: 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998), Haji (1998), Mele (2009), Pereboom (2001). 
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 The second detail is that right after the killing the manipulation is 
reversed. Clearly Mele adds this feature in order to make it seem less plausible 
that Beth is responsible for killing.105 So two powerful sources of the not-
responsible intuition concern the moral innocuousness of Beth’s psychology 
before and after the manipulation.106 I suspect that the pull to say that Beth is not 
responsible for the killing derives from this judgment of the moral innocuousness 
of Beth before and after the killing, along with the judgment that she is the same 
person the whole time. But note that even if personal identity is held fixed across 
the manipulation this does not imply that the conditions of DR are also held fixed. 
Indeed, since DR consists in psychological connectedness it is evident that DR 
does not remain stable across the manipulation, since the manipulation (and its 
reversal) clearly involves the severing of certain psychological connections. 
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 Mele also tells “readers who are still inclined to believe that Beth is morally 
responsible for the killing are encouraged to replace Beth in my story with the 
sweetest person they know” (465). It is quite plausible that this request to replace 
the manipulated agent with someone we know and presumably care a great deal 
about (he mentions his grandmother) merely introduces bias due to special 
relationships. The fact that a parent finds it difficult to blame her child does not 
shed much light on the blameworthiness of the child. It is merely a reflection of 
the special relationship that the parent stands to the child. See Scanlon (2008, pp. 
171-173). 
 
106
 A third possible source of the not-responsible intuition concerns the intuition 
that the manipulators are responsible. This is obviously true, but there is plenty of 
blame to go around. The fact that one is not solely responsible for some bad act 
does not entail that one is not fully responsible for it (Frankfurt 1971, p. 25. fn. 
10). 
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The manipulation itself undermines DR.107 Pre-manipulation Beth can be 
thought of as Agent1, who is morally innocuous. The manipulation then creates 
Agent2. Agent2 kills George and is thus is morally nocuous. She is then, through 
the brainwashing reversal, turned into Agent3 (who is relevantly similar to Agent1 
and is morally innocuous). If DR were simply a matter of personal identity, and if 
personal identity were held fixed across the manipulations, then the moral 
innocuousness of Agent1 and Agent3 might be relevant in assessing Agent2’s 
responsibility. But DR is not a matter of personal identity and its conditions are 
not held fixed across the manipulation. In the case of an extreme manipulation DR 
would be totally blocked. In a minor manipulation DR would be less inhibited but 
this would entail that there are fewer relevant psychological differences across the 
manipulation. And this would mean that an agent who is manipulated to kill could 
not have been morally innocuous before and after the manipulation: the source of 
the not-responsible intuition. 
Suppose that in another case the manipulation is minor. The pre-
manipulated agent is already disposed to kill her neighbor and the manipulation 
just pushes her past, what we might call, the volitional threshold; it just barely tips 
the scales toward killing rather than not killing. In such a case DR would be less 
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 Some theorists have noted the related claim that manipulations themselves 
undermine personal identity. Arpaly (2003) discusses this possibility: “But 
perhaps much of our tendency to look at HP (Hapless Patient, a manipulated 
agent) as exempt from blame comes from our response to a third kind of scenario: 
HP is changed into a murderer, and then changed back…I take it that a case 
involving puzzles about personal identity should not be used as a test case for 
theories about moral responsibility” (168). Other theorists who have considered 
this possibility include Fischer and Ravizza (1998, p. 235 fn. 30); Haji (1998, pp. 
6-7); Mele (1995, p. 175 fn. 22); Talbert (2009), and Vargas (2006, p. 359). 
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inhibited across the manipulation since there are fewer relevant psychological 
disconnections. But I suspect that the not-responsible intuition in this case will be 
significantly weaker than in Mele’s case in virtue of the fact that the pre-
manipulated agent was already a crummy person who was disposed to kill. 
Consider another story. Curt, like Beth, has killed his neighbor. And he 
has done so because he was, like Beth, manipulated by a team of psychologists. 
Many would hold that Curt is not blameworthy for killing. But suppose we learn 
that this psychological manipulation occurred 50 years ago, while the murder 
occurred today. Does the addition of this detail make an intuitive difference? It 
seems that when the manipulation is permanent and occurred long ago, we are 
less inclined to let the agent off the hook in virtue of the manipulation. Examples 
like these disallow the implicit assumption that guilty Agent2 is turned into 
innocent Agent3, and this explains the reluctance to excuse. In these cases we 
cannot ignore, as it is easy to do in cases in which the manipulation is reversed, 
the fact that blameworthy Agent2 exists.108  
 This example also supports the claim that what matters for SR is current 
time-slice psychology. The intuition that the manipulated agent is not 
blameworthy seems to be lessened when we can rule out the possibility that the 
manipulation is only temporary (and for that reason that there will be an 
undermining of DR). That is, our intuitions might be tracking, not whether a 
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 Because I hold that manipulations can result in responsible agency this is what 
McKenna (2008) has called a “hard-line” reply. Indeed, all QOW theorists and, I 
think, all compatibilists must take a hard-line reply towards the relevant 
manipulation cases. This simply follows from the claim that responsible agency 
can arise from deterministic causal chains. 
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manipulation occurred, but our judgments concerning the persistence of the 
psychological mechanism that brought about the action.109 
 Before closing, let me sum up some of my claims regarding the 
manipulation cases. Responsibility needs to be indexed to time. So when thinking 
about responsibility in the context of a manipulation case, we need to be clear 
about the point at which we are assessing responsibility. The question “Is the 
agent responsible?” is ambiguous. It could mean any of the following: 
 (a) Is the pre-manipulation agent (Agent1) responsible? 
 (b) Is the manipulated agent (Agent2) responsible? 
 (c) Is the post-manipulation reversal agent (Agent3) responsible? 
All parties to the debate can agree that (a) and (c) should be answered negatively. 
It is question (b) that is at issue in the debate between historicists and quality of 
will theorists. 
The wielders of the manipulation cases often implicitly appeal to the intuitiveness 
of negative answers to (a) and (c) in order to generate intuitive support the claim 
that “the agent is not responsible”. They will often draw attention to the moral 
innocuousness of the psychology of Agent1 and Agent3. Note that in order for it to 
be plausible both that Agent2 does something bad and that the pre and post-
manipulation psychology is innocuous the manipulation will have to be severe. 
                                                 
109And there do seem to be actual cases in which the manipulation lasts long 
enough that we are inclined to hold the agent responsible (cases in which we can’t 
downplay the existence of the blameworthy manipulated agent). This seemed to 
occur when Patty Hearst was convicted for her role in a bank heist. And it seemed 
that she was willing to be a part of the robbery only because she was brainwashed 
by her kidnappers. She was, of course, later pardoned. But this seems to be 
explained by the “deprogramming” that apparently occurred. 
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That is, if Agent1 is morally unobjectionable, then since Agent2 does something 
seriously wrong (murder, say) then it must be the case that Agent2 is relevantly 
psychologically disconnected from Agent1. Similarly for the relation between 
Agent3 and Agent2. In this way, the wielders of the manipulation cases exploit 
disruptions in psychological connectedness across the manipulations in order to 
make negative answers to (a) and (c) intuitive. But this is irrelevant since negative 
answers to (a) and (c) are compatible with an affirmative answer to (b), the 
question at issue in the debate between QOW theorists and historicists. Once we 
notice this, the manipulation objection is stripped of much of its intuitive clout. 
The question at issue is (b) and it is not clear that a negative answer to this 
question has any intuitive claim over a positive one. 
  When using thought experiments to test whether some factor F is relevant 
to some concept C, we will often compare cases in which F is changed and see if 
it amounts to a change in C. But we need to be sure that in these comparative 
cases we hold all other factors that might be able to affect C fixed. Otherwise we 
cannot be sure a change in our judgment of C is due to F. Cases involving 
psychological manipulation are often used as test cases for theories of  SR. They 
are also often used to provide ground level intuitions for theory building.110 If we 
are going to use examples like these to develop and evaluate theories of SR we 
need to be sure that these manipulations don’t surreptitiously alter the conditions 
of DR which is then reflected in our intuitive reactions to the cases. If this is the 
case, then the intuitive data is contaminated. In order to legitimately draw the 
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 Fischer and Ravizza (1994), Mele (1995), and Haji (1998) for example. 
  129 
conclusions that these philosophers want from these examples, we must be certain 
that the source of the not-responsible intuition does not concern the conditions of 
DR. But it is the very nature of the manipulations that they necessarily affect the 
conditions of DR. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Ascribing responsibility synchronically and diachronically are distinct forms of 
evaluation. While there are many accounts of synchronic responsibility on the 
table, most theorists assume that diachronic responsibility is a straightforward 
matter of personal identity. But this is false. Diachronic responsibility is a matter 
of the degree to which and the way in which one’s psychology is connected to the 
psychology that led to the action. Manipulation cases are commonly used to raise 
doubts about QOW based accounts of synchronic responsibility. I’ve suggested 
that the intuitive reactions to such cases can be explained by appeal to the 
conditions of diachronic, rather than synchronic, responsibility. If this is right, 
then manipulation cases do not tell us anything interesting about synchronic 
responsibility and hence, cannot be used to raise problems for QOW accounts of 
synchronic responsibility. I’ve also suggested some ways in which this distinction 
bears on the concepts of forgiveness, apology, and punishment. It is surprising 
that this distinction has received so little attention given the wide scope of its 
relevance. Indeed, this distinction will be relevant to any area in which 
responsibility for something in the past is relevant.  
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CHAPTER 7 
TYPES OF COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY 
The term collective responsibility is used in a variety of ways and it can refer to a 
number of different relations an agent, whether a collective or an individual, may 
bear to an action. My aim here is to distinguish these relations that fall under the 
sphere of collective responsibility. More specifically, I am interested in the way in 
which responsibility can transfer across the dimensions of space and time. I shall 
argue that the transfer of responsibility across these dimensions is governed by the 
relation of psychological connectedness.111 
 There has been a healthy (for some, decidedly unhealthy) amount of 
skepticism about collective responsibility. One dominant source of this skepticism 
concerns the fairness of collective responsibility. This has led some to go so far as 
to claim that “collective responsibility is barbarous” (Lewis, 1948, p.6). That is, 
these critics claim, it would be morally repugnant to hold individual members of a 
group responsible for the actions of the group solely in virtue of their group 
membership. One could be a member of the group yet be morally innocent, and in 
such a case it would be unfair to hold one responsible for the action of the group. 
But it is important to notice what this skepticism is about. It is about a principle of 
collective responsibility that says that a member of a collective is responsible for 
the actions of the collective solely in virtue of his membership. One can be 
skeptical about this principle without rejecting collective responsibility outright.  
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 As I am understanding it, an agent’s moral responsibility for an act is the 
extent to which the agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy for the act.  
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 We should therefore distinguish between collective responsibility (CR) 
and individual-collective responsibility (ICR). CR concerns the extent to which a 
collective is responsible for an action. ICR concerns the extent to which an 
individual member of a collective is responsible for an action of the collective. 
CR and ICR are distinguished by the subject to which a responsibility ascription 
is made though both are concerned with the acts of collectives. CR is concerned 
with the responsibility a collective bears for a collective act while ICR is 
concerned with the responsibility an individual member of a collective bears for a 
collective act. ICR distributes collective responsibility, to use a metaphor, 
spatially, from the collective to the individual. It is important to note that CR is 
conceptually prior to ICR. An account of ICR for some action must make 
reference to CR for that action but an account of CR for some action need not 
make reference to ICR for that action.112 The concern about the fairness of 
collective responsibility, mentioned above, is a concern about a particular account 
of ICR. And the unfairness of one particular account of ICR does not entail either 
that all accounts of ICR or all accounts of CR violate principles of fairness. 
 Skepticism about collective responsibility might arise from concerns about 
fairness, but in a slightly different way. One might, for example, look at present 
day Germany and fail to find any vice that could justify holding this nation 
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 This is true even if collective responsibility is reducible to individual 
responsibility. This is because ICR makes essential reference to responsibility for 
a collective act. Whether or not a proper analysis of that collective act reduces to 
an analysis of individual acts, ICR must, insofar as it is concerned with collective 
acts, make reference to more than the individual under evaluation. It must, on a 
reductive approach, refer to the acts of other individuals as well. 
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responsible for the atrocities of the Holocaust. One might be skeptical about 
collective responsibility because it may seem to be insensitive to the passage of 
time. After all, one might ask, how could it make sense to hold a current 
collective responsible for some action in the past, when none of the current 
members were even alive at the time of action? 
 We should therefore distinguish between synchronic responsibility (SR) 
and diachronic responsibility (DR). SR concerns the extent to which an agent 
(whether it be an individual or a collective) is responsible at time t for some 
action that occurs at t. DR concerns the extent to which an agent (whether it be an 
individual or a collective) is responsible at some later time t+n for some act that 
occurs at t. It is important to note that SR is conceptually prior to DR. That is, an 
account of an agent’s DR for some act X must make reference to her SR for X, 
but the reverse does not hold. My interests here primarily concern the way in 
which responsibility can transfer across space (from collective to individual) and 
time (from past to present). As such, I will not put forth an account of individual 
synchronic moral responsibility or of collective synchronic moral responsibility. 
My account will therefore be incomplete since these notions are conceptually 
prior to the notions with which I will be concerned. But what the present chapter 
lacks in comprehensiveness it makes up for in scope, since what I have to say will 
apply to any account of individual or collective synchronic responsibility.  
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Preliminaries 
When one commits an action one does so for reasons. For example, if I leave my 
office this may be because I intend to go buy a cup of coffee. The same holds true 
for the actions of collectives. The reason that the US elected Barack Obama may 
be because of its frustration with the war in Iraq. When an individual acts she 
does so because of some set of beliefs, desires, intentions, behavioral dispositions, 
cares, and other psychological features. This is what I will call the psychological 
mechanism that issued in the action. This is simply a way of speaking about the 
way in which an action comes about.113 I may have stepped on your toes because I 
think you are a jerk or because there was a Black Widow spider about to bite you. 
Though there is a clear sense in which the action is the same (stepping on your 
toes) it proceeds from a different psychological mechanism in these two cases. In 
the first this will include malevolent feelings while in the second it includes 
concern about your welfare. It is clear that the psychological mechanism that 
issues in an action is extremely relevant to moral responsibility.114 
 The same holds true for collectives. When a collective acts it does so from 
some particular psychological mechanism. One may find this puzzling insofar as 
it may seem to entail an undesirable commitment to the existence of collective 
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 My use of the notion of a psychological mechanism is similar to that of Fischer 
and Ravizza (1998). 
 
114
 Indeed, in my view (which I won’t defend here), it is the sole determiner of 
responsibility. Elsewhere I and others have referred to this as the quality of will 
with which an agent acts. I depart from that language here because ‘psychological 
mechanism’ seems a more natural description when the focus is on psychological 
connectedness. 
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psychologies, and one may find such a notion mysterious. This would be puzzling 
if one thought that having a psychology entailed having a brain made up of grey 
matter. But it only entails the existence of such psychological features as beliefs, 
desires, and plans. And these psychological features can be attributed to 
collectives.115 One should not be skeptical of such things as mission statements 
and policies. Mission statements are expressions of both values and intentions, the 
subject of which is a collective. They express the values to which a collective is 
committed and declare the intention to realize those values. They are statements 
of the cares of the collective. Policies are norms governing the actions of the 
collective and are analogous to the behavioral dispositions of individuals. And we 
can also speak of the beliefs, desires, and other psychological states of a 
collective. This is not to say that in a given case it is easy to discern what, for 
example, the cares of a given collective are. A collective may express a 
commitment to certain ideals, but fail to live up to this commitment in action. It 
may, in a given case, be difficult to say whether the collective really cared about, 
say, saving the environment, or whether it was merely driven to pursue profit. But 
notice that the same is true of individuals as well but this does not give us reason 
to be skeptical of the claim that individuals can care about things.  
 For any action, whether it is that of an individual or of a collective, we can 
speak of the psychological mechanism that issued in the action. This mechanism 
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 See, for example, Bratman (1999), French (1979), Gilbert (1989), Tuomela 
(1989), and Velleman (1997). All that my account requires is that we can attribute 
these attitudes to collectives whether or not a proper account of these collective 
attitudes reduces to an account of the attitudes of the individual members of the 
collective. 
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will consist of beliefs, desires, cares, and other psychological features. These 
psychological features can persist in varying degrees. When I was a child I had 
the desire to become an astronaut. I no longer have this desire. To put it in another 
way, I am no longer psychologically connected to that desire. Psychological 
connectedness involves the holding of direct psychological connections across 
some dimension. One example of a direct psychological connection is that 
between memory and experience. A memory is directly connected to some 
experience if it is a memory (caused in the right way) of that very experience. But 
there are many other forms that psychological connectedness might take: “One 
such connection is that which holds between an intention and the later act in 
which this intention is carried out. Other such direct connections are those which 
hold when a belief, or a desire, or any other psychological feature, continues to be 
had” (Parfit, 1984; p. 205). Two psychological states are connected to the degree 
that they are similar and causally related.116 
 The general idea that I want to argue for here is that the distribution of 
responsibility whether it be from collective to individual, or from time to time, or 
both concerns the extent to which the agent being evaluated is psychologically 
connected to the mechanism that issued in the action.  
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 It should be noted that psychological connectedness is simply a way of 
thinking about the way in which psychological states persist over time. As such, it 
has no ontological commitments about the nature of such states (e.g. that an 
agent’s desire is a concrete entity distinct from the agent). 
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Control 
Before I begin to develop a positive account of the way the various forms of 
collective responsibility transfer across dimensions, I want to respond to a 
common objection. For some, collective responsibility is deeply unfair. This is 
because it amounts to holding one responsible for something that is not in one’s 
control. This could be when an individual member of a collective is held 
responsible for the action of a collective, or when a collective is held responsible 
for some act in its history, or a combination of the two. This objection begins with 
the assumption that control is a necessary condition of responsibility.  
 One version of the objection might be put in the following way: A current 
member of the US is responsible for national acts of slavery in the past only if that 
member had control over those acts, but this is impossible. Just as an individual’s 
responsibility for an individual act requires control, so too does responsibility for 
a collective act.  
 This objection rests on a confusion. The confusion is to think that an 
individual’s synchronic responsibility, which plausibly may require control, is 
relevantly similar to an individual’s responsibility for a collective action (ICR) or 
to a collective’s responsibility for a past act (collective diachronic responsibility 
[CDR]). This is because ICR and CDR are relevantly similar, not to an 
individual’s synchronic responsibility, but to her diachronic responsibility. 
Suppose that Jill insults her brother at time t for malicious reasons. We can 
distinguish between her synchronic responsibility for the insult and her diachronic 
responsibility for the insult. Her synchronic responsibility concerns her 
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responsibility at t for the insult which occurred at t. Her diachronic responsibility 
concerns her responsibility for the insult at some later time t+n. What needs to be 
emphasized is that only individual or collective synchronic responsibility may 
plausibly require control over the action for which one is held responsible.117 That 
is, the fact that Jane is responsible at t for the insult may require that she had 
control over the insult at that time, whether through guidance control or the 
exercise of contra-causal freedom or control of some other kind. But it is 
obviously false that diachronic responsibility for an action requires that one has 
control over the action at that later time. That is, the fact that Jane is responsible 
at t+n for the insult which occurred at t obviously does not imply that Jane has 
control at t+n over the insult. It merely implies that Jane is connected to the insult 
in a particular way.118 
 And because ICR and CDR concern the transfer of responsibility across a 
dimension, they are relevantly similar to an individual’s diachronic responsibility. 
And since diachronic responsibility for an action does not imply control over the 
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 One might object in the following way: Suppose that at t, Jones has control 
over whether he will go on a diet tomorrow. If he forms the intention to go on a 
diet tomorrow he will do so. Suppose he fails to form this intention. It may seem 
that he is responsible at t for failing to go on a diet tomorrow and thus, that 
diachronic responsibility for future acts may require control. In response I would 
argue that such an approach makes use of an implicit tracing principle: that one 
can be responsible for some later event if there is some suitable prior point that is 
relevantly connected to the later event. I would then respond in the way that I 
respond to all tracing cases. See Chapter 5. 
 
118
 It has generally been assumed that this connection consists in personal identity. 
But see my “Synchronic and Diachronic Responsibility” for an argument that an 
individual’s diachronic responsibility consists, not in personal identity, but in 
psychological connectedness. 
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action at that time, the objection to collective responsibility based on control 
breaks down. Control is relevant to collective responsibility in this way only if we 
are considering a collective’s synchronic responsibility.119 When we are 
considering other forms of collective responsibility control over the action is not 
the issue.120 What is at issue is the way that the collective or individual under 
evaluation is connected to the collective act.  
 
From Collective to Individual 
Some have argued that mere membership in a collective is sufficient for inheriting 
the responsibilities of the collective.121 On this view, membership is all on a par. 
Others have argued that members of a collective can escape responsibility for an 
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 We might, for instance, think of a proper account of collective synchronic 
responsibility simply as an account of the sort of control a collective must express 
in action in order to be responsible. French (1979) can be read as giving an 
account of this sort. 
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 Control may be relevant in a different way. For example, a member of a 
collective may be responsible for an act of the collective only if she has control 
over her membership. See for example, Narveson (2002). 
 
121
 See, for example, Jaspers (1947). Arendt (1964) seems to claim that if a 
collective is morally responsible then so are each of its members, and then rejects 
collective responsibility on this basis. Raikka (1997) seems to be committed to 
something close to this view since he argues that a member who opposes the 
harmful acts of his collective is not even usually excused. Jaspers, it should be 
noted, distinguishes between a number of moral relations one may stand to some 
act. He calls the relation that all members of a collective stand to a harm 
committed by the collective solely in virtue of their membership metaphysical 
guilt. This has later gone under the heading “moral taint,” see May (1992, ch. 8) 
and Radzik (2001).    
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action of the collective if they opposed the action.122 On this view, opposition is 
all on a par.  
 But there are problems with each of these general strategies that arise from 
the subtlety and complexity of the phenomena under investigation. Firstly, 
membership is not all on a par. While it is true that there is a sense of membership 
in which for any given individual it is either true or it is false that that individual 
is a member of that collective, this is not the sense that is relevant to ascriptions of 
ICR. Consider the responsibility British Petroleum bears for the disaster in the 
Gulf. It is evident that though both the BP CEO and the oil rig worker are 
members of the BP collective, there is a crucial difference with respect to their 
responsibility for the disaster. The CEO is blameworthy to a higher degree than is 
the roughneck (who is probably not blameworthy at all). The sense of 
membership that is relevant to ICR is not a binary relation, it is scalar. 
 Just as there are responsibility relevant differences in membership, so too 
are there these differences with respect to opposition. There is a crucial difference 
between the man in Nazi Germany who opposes the regime by failing to report 
his Jewish neighbors to the SS, and the man who takes on great personal risk by 
hiding a family of Jews in his own home. While it is true that both of these people 
oppose the regime there is a clear responsibility relevant difference in their 
opposition. The sense of opposition that is relevant to ICR is a scalar relation.  
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 Raikka (1997) attributes this view to Feinberg (1968), French (1998, ch. 2), 
Lucas (1993), and McGray (1986). 
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 There is a single scalar relation that explains the above considerations. 
This concerns the degree to which the individual member of a given collective is 
psychologically connected to the mechanism that issued in the collective action. 
The reason that the BP CEO is more blameworthy for the disaster in the Gulf than 
the roughneck is because he is much more psychologically connected to the 
mechanism that led to the disaster. The reason that the disaster occurred (I 
speculate) has to do with the way in which the BP collective was sensitive to 
particular considerations. In particular BP had institutional mechanisms in place 
that put the pursuit of profit over the avoidance of environmental risks in a 
morally objectionable way. In other words, the reason for the disaster had to do 
with the fact that BP, qua collective, cared too much about money and too little 
about reducing the risk of harm to the environment, the residents of the Gulf  
Coast, and even the welfare of its employees. I take it that the CEO was much 
more psychologically connected to these features than is the roughneck.123 On the 
view I am advocating, it is the fact that the CEO is psychologically connected to 
the beliefs, desires, values, and so on of the collective that led to the disaster that 
explains his responsibility for the disaster.  
 Similarly, when we compare the psychological states of the German who 
refrains from reporting Jews to the SS but does no more to the German who does 
much more, what we find is a difference in the extent to which they were each 
psychologically (dis)connected to the mechanism that led to the Holocaust. Nazi 
                                                 
123
 It is, of course, possible that the roughneck is connected to the same degree as 
is the CEO. If this were true than the roughneck’s excuse “I was only doing my 
job,” would fail to excuse. 
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Germany committed the Holocaust because of a commitment to despicable ideals. 
The German who went to great, and personally risky, lengths to oppose the Nazi 
regime psychologically distances himself from those ideals to a greater extent 
than does the German who did less (other factors being equal). The extent to 
which the responsibility of a collective distributes to its members is determined by 
the extent to which the member is psychologically connected to the mechanism 
that led to the collective action.124 If some collective C is responsible to degree d 
for some act X, then when some member of C, M, is “maximally connected” to 
the mechanism that led to X then M is responsible for X to degree d. 
 It is in this way that this account of ICR respects principles of individual 
fairness and “the separateness of persons.”125 On my account, an individual’s 
responsibility for a collective action is not merely determined by group 
membership, the determiners of which may be an external matter, but by what the 
agent is like. Whether an individual is responsible for some collective harm is 
determined by the degree to which the agent is connected to the collective’s flaw 
that led to the harm. Members who share that flaw will be more blameworthy for 
the harm than those members who do not. 
 It is worth noting that membership can correlate strongly with, and in 
some cases may be sufficient for, the psychological connectedness of the sort that 
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 This is not an entirely new idea. I take it that, for example, Feinberg’s (1968) 
discussion of group solidarity tracks the same phenomena, as does Hill (1979). 
Also see May (1992, ch. 2) and Kutz (2000). What is new is the idea that a single 
relation, psychological connectedness, underlies the transfer of responsibility 
across the dimensions of space and time. 
 
125
 Rawls (1971). 
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grounds ICR. Not all collectives are created equal, and membership in some may 
consist in being connected to the collective in a way that allows for one to be 
responsible for its acts. Being a citizen of the US does not consist in being 
connected to the mechanism that makes foreign policy decisions (one may have 
opposed those decisions). Being a member of the Aryan Nation does consist in 
being connected to the collective in such a way that one shares in the blame for its 
actions.126 
 Though discussions concerning the way in which responsibility can 
transfer between collectives and individuals have mostly focused on the way in 
which responsibility “trickles down” from collective to individual, it can also 
transfer in the reverse direction. That is, a collective may be responsible for the 
individual action of one of its members. Call this collective-individual 
responsibility (CIR). Suppose, for example, that at a rally a volunteer for a 
political campaign stomps on the head of a protester. The collective can be held 
responsible for that action to the extent to which it is psychologically connected to 
the mechanism of the individual that led to the action. Suppose, for example, that 
the individual committed the act from motivations of anger and hostility directed 
toward the group of which the protester is a member. To the extent that the 
collective promotes anger and hostility and uses violent language and rhetoric 
directed at the opposition it is connected to the individual’s act and can be held 
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 Though this is, of course, a matter of degree. Some members may be 
connected to a greater degree than others. The point is that membership in some 
groups consists in being “connected enough” to bear blame. 
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responsible for it.127 This is why when a member of a collective commits some 
harm the collective will often (reflexively) offer a public statement that attempts 
to express that they are psychologically disconnected from the act (e.g. “We do 
not condone these acts of violence”). This is, in effect, an attempt to evade CIR 
for the act. 
 
From Past to Present 
Responsibility can distribute not only across space, as it does between individuals 
and collectives, but also across time, as it does when some agent is currently 
responsible for some past harm. Recall that synchronic responsibility (SR) 
concerns the extent to which an agent is responsible at time t for an act that occurs 
at t. Diachronic responsibility (DR) concerns the extent to which an agent is 
responsible at some later time t+n for some act that occurs at t. In “Synchronic 
and Diachronic Responsibility” I explored the way that an individual agent’s 
responsibility can vary over time. My concern here is with the way that a 
collective agent’s responsibility can vary over time. This is what is at issue when 
we are wondering about the extent to which the US is now responsible for 
slavery.  
 Much of the interest in questions of the responsibility of collectives over 
time stems from such practical concerns as reparations for past injustice. There 
has been considerable effort spent on explaining how to properly identify the 
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 French (1998, Chapter 2) imagines a team of mad scientists who bear 
responsibility for the harm their monstrous creation has wreaked. 
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peoples to whom reparations are owed. Must the people to whom reparations are 
owed in virtue of some harm be the direct victims of that harm? Or does the claim 
extend to their descendants? Or, perhaps, only to those descendants that are 
currently harmed by the injustice? 
These are difficult issues that merit careful attention, but they will not 
concern me presently. For successfully identifying the would-be recipients of 
reparations for some past injustice does not yet establish that reparations are 
owed. We would need to also identify the group that should pay up. The fact that 
some victim has been harmed by some past injustice does not entail that she is 
owed redress for that historical transgression, because there may be no one alive 
now who can be identified as the transgressor. Part of the tragedy of, for example, 
murder-suicides is that the one responsible cannot be held responsible because he 
is dead. This presents an immediate challenge for the case of reparations for many 
of the actual cases of interest involve injustices that were perpetrated by 
individuals who are no longer alive.  
In cases in which the perpetrator of the harm can be identified, it seems 
clear that the responsibility to offer redress lands squarely on his (or their) 
shoulders. However, to set the theoretical groundwork for intergenerational 
reparations, some have turned to the weaker requirement that the one who owes 
reparations need only have benefited from the past injustice.128 For instance, since 
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 See, for example, Boxhill (1972), Miller (2007), and Radzik (2001). Miller 
makes the even weaker claim that one has benefitted from membership in the 
group responsible for the harm, regardless of whether one benefitted from the 
harm itself. 
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white Americans have benefited from the fruits of slavery, they owe black 
Americans reparations. Viewed from this angle, the question of collective 
responsibility for past harm is a question about whose responsibility it is to 
compensate for the harm, and it is often assumed that we must assign this 
responsibility to someone. 
I am interested in what I take to be a more fundamental question 
concerning some current collective’s relation to some past wrong. This is the 
extent to which a collective is morally responsible for some past act, in the sense 
of being praiseworthy or blameworthy for that past act. For some past act for 
which some agent is blameworthy, there will be particular considerations in virtue 
of which the agent is blameworthy. The reason, for example, that the US during 
the Antebellum Era was blameworthy for the occurrence of slavery involves a 
failure to properly respect blacks. The US, as it were, failed to care enough about 
the welfare of all of its people. It did not care enough about not unjustly 
exploiting people. These are the reasons, in virtue of which, the US was 
blameworthy for the institution of slavery. The US, as a collective, is now 
blameworthy for this past wrong to the extent that those blameworthy features 
persist. Does the US still exhibit the racist attitudes or complicitious negligence 
that made slavery possible? When asking whether Germany is now responsible 
for the Holocaust we need to investigate whether the anti-Semitic attitudes 
expressed during the Nazi regime are connected to current day Germany. When 
investigating whether some corporation is now responsible for some past harm we 
need to determine whether the corporation still has the policies that resulted in the 
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past harm.129 Some current collective is responsible for its past act (that is, 
diachronically responsible) to the extent that the collective is currently 
psychologically connected to the mechanism that led to the action. If some 
collective C is responsible to degree d at time t for some act X that occurs at t, 
then when C is “maximally connected” to the mechanism that led to X at some 
later time t+n then C is responsible for X to degree d at t+n. 
Though it is no easy task to determine the extent to which a collective is 
psychologically connected to the mechanism that led to some past harm, this 
approach will, I think, yield the result that fewer collectives are responsible for 
past actions than do other approaches. This is partly because I am focused on 
responsibility in the blameworthy or praiseworthy sense, rather than the weaker 
notion of, for example, remedial responsibility to which David Miller (2007) 
appeals. But in order to establish that reparations are owed we must be able to 
identify a collective that is responsible in the sense that I have been concerned 
with. That is, to establish that reparations are now owed to some individual or 
group in virtue of some past harm, we must be able to identify some agent that is 
now blameworthy for the past harm. And this, in turn, is a question about the 
extent to which the agent is now psychologically connected to the mechanism that 
led to the past harm. Because the requirement that the current collective agent be 
psychologically connected to “the springs of action” of the past harm is stronger 
than the condition that the current collective agent has benefitted from the past 
harm this approach will be more conservative in its assessments of reparations.  
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 See French (1984). 
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Insofar as this approach yields the conclusion that, for example, the US is 
now not (very) blameworthy for slavery or that Germany is not now (very) 
blameworthy for the Holocaust, then it will turn out that issues that are commonly 
conceived of as questions of historical reparative justice are really questions about 
ahistorical distributive justice. If, for example, it is true that the US is not 
psychologically connected to the mechanisms that led to slavery then the US is 
not now blameworthy for slavery. This implies that the US does not owe 
reparations to current black Americans. I am not, however, claiming that the US 
does not owe anything to black Americans, just that it does not owe reparations 
(on the assumption that the current US is not appropriately connected to the acts 
of slavery, and therefore is not blameworthy for those acts of slavery). It is likely 
that black Americans are currently disadvantaged in an unjust way and the US 
likely has an obligation to reduce this disadvantage. But it is important to see that 
the reason that the US has this obligation is because there are people now who are 
unjustly disadvantaged. While the disadvantage has a historical explanation, it is 
the fact that there is current disadvantage, not that there was some past wrong, 
that grounds our duties toward them. 
One may object to this way of thinking about collective responsibility in 
general, and reparations in particular, in the following way. To adapt an example 
of Bernard Boxhill (1972), suppose that C bought a bicycle from B. Though C 
took every reasonable precaution to ensure that the transaction was legal, it turns 
out that B had stolen the bicycle from A. Surely, it is claimed, C has a moral 
obligation to return the bicycle to A despite C’s innocence. Similarly, regardless 
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of the innocence of some current collective, if that collective has benefited from 
some past injustice committed by it or its predecessors, the collective has a duty 
to make reparations for the harm.  
This way of thinking about justice is pervasive. It is at the heart of the idea 
of “the scales of justice” and can be traced back to Aristotle.130 The idea being 
that moral harmony consists in a perfectly balanced metaphorical scale. A wrong 
consists in moving weight from one side to the other. When B steals the bicycle 
from A this unbalances the scale. In order to restore harmony, it is thought, C 
must return the bicycle to A. When this is done the weight is again evenly 
distributed and all is right again. But this leaves out the crucial fact that C, who is, 
by stipulation, innocent has been harmed. This harm has not been made right.131 
And assuming that B has no resources (say, he has burned up the money from C), 
there is no adjustment of the scales that will make up for this harm. The problem 
with this way of thinking about justice is that, so to speak, the first law of 
thermodynamics does not apply to morality.132  
Accounts of reparations that allow that a non-blameworthy collective can 
owe reparations to some other group is bound to combat injustice with more 
injustice. When C returns the bicycle to A all is not right with the universe. C has 
been harmed and this is unaccounted for. And suppose that A is wealthy while C 
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 See Nicomachean Ethics, book 5.  
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 I am not claiming that C has a right to the bicycle and that A does not. I am 
claiming that we must appeal to more than mere historical facts in order to 
determine where the bike ought to go. 
 
132
 I leave it as an open question as to whether the second law does. 
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is poor. If this is so then the harm suffered by C returning the bicycle is much 
greater than the harm to A that is remedied. What this shows is that there is more 
of relevance than simply “righting the scales.” We need to be sensitive, not only 
to the past, but also to the present. 133 
To reiterate: A collective is responsible at t+n for its action that occurred 
at t to the extent that the collective is psychologically connected at t+n to the 
mechanism that led to the action at t. Reparations require the identification of a 
collective that is responsible in this sense. This (probably) implies that less 
reparations are owed than is commonly thought. What we often think of as 
                                                 
 
133
 It is interesting to note that the case for reparations in the absence of 
diachronic responsibility may be strongest on a historical, non-patterned theory of 
distributive justice such as the entitlement theory of Nozick (1974): 
     
    If the world were wholly just, the following inductive definition would  
    exhaustively cover the subject of justice in holdings. 
 1. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of  
 justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding. 
 2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of 
 justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to the holding, is entitled to 
 the holding. 
 3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of 1 
 and 2. 
    The complete principle of distributive justice would say simply that a  
    distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the   
    distribution” (p. 151). 
 
A supporter of reparations in the absence of diachronic responsibility might 
appeal to this entitlement theory. It could be argued that since the current 
distribution violates the second principle (since wealth from, e.g., slavery was 
improperly transferred to whites) it needs to be amended via some “principle of 
rectification” (Nozick 1974, p. 152). But Nozick’s entitlement theory will strike 
many as implausible precisely because it is purely historical and is not patterned 
onto equality, welfare, desert, or anything else. Strong advocates of reparations 
and political libertarians would seem to make strange bedfellows. 
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questions of reparative justice for a historical harm, then, are really questions of 
ahistorical distributive justice. 
 
Conclusion 
There are likely those who, entrenched in liberal individualism, still find the very 
notion of collective responsibility troubling. They may have the inescapable 
feeling that collective responsibility implies that one can be responsible for things 
that one has not done and that this is unfair. For these people, I wish to try to 
make the idea more palatable.  
 Collective responsibility can be thought of, not as an account of the way in 
which some agent can be connected to an action of someone or something else, 
but as an account the ownership of action.134 Individualism has too narrowly 
delineated the actions that can belong to an agent. If S is a member of collective C 
which commits action X, and S is strongly connected to the mechanism of C that 
led to X, then X simply is an action of S. In virtue of the psychological 
connections between S and C, S willed X to occur. This is why X can be 
attributed to S in a way that makes S open to moral appraisal in light of X.  
 It is a mistake to think that our physical bodies impose the limits of our 
agency. We act, not only as individuals, but also as collectives and this too can be 
an appropriate basis for moral appraisal. The extent to which one is connected to 
                                                 
134
 David Silver (2002) makes a similar point. I differ from him though in that I 
do not think that collective responsibility is of a different kind than is individual 
responsibility. The notion of responsibility is the same in both cases, what differs 
is the kind of agent that is involved. 
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the mechanism that led to an action just is the extent to which one owns the 
action.  
 I have distinguished between the responsibility of a collective qua 
collective, and the responsibility of individual members of the collective. I have 
also distinguished between responsibility at the time of action and responsibility 
at some later time. Combining these distinctions allows us to identify a number of 
different relations an agent (whether an individual or a collective) stands to an 
action. At the center of most moral theory is individual synchronic responsibility 
(ISR). This is the extent to which an individual is responsible at t for an act that 
occurs at t. But, as I have argued elsewhere, there is also individual diachronic 
responsibility (IDR). This is the extent to which an agent is responsible at t+n for 
some act that occurs at t. Similarly, this notion can be applied to collectives. 
There is both collective synchronic responsibility (CSR), the extent to which a 
collective is responsible at t for an act that occurs at t, and collective diachronic 
responsibility (CDR), the extent to which a collective is responsible at t+n for 
some act that occurs at t. Combining the synchronic and diachronic distinction 
with the relation between a collective and its members generates other 
responsibility relations. There is individual-collective synchronic responsibility 
(ICSR) and individual-collective diachronic responsibility (ICDR). These 
relations concern the extent to which an individual member of a collective is 
responsible for an action of the collective, though they are distinguished by the 
way that they are indexed to time. ICSR concerns the individual’s responsibility 
at the time of the action, while ICDR concerns the individual’s responsibility at 
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some later time. As mentioned earlier, we can also think of responsibility 
transferring, not from collective to individuals, but from individuals to collectives. 
Thus, there is collective-individual synchronic responsibility (CISR) and 
collective-individual diachronic responsibility (CIDR). These concern the way in 
which a collective can be responsible for the actions of its members. More 
relations can be generated since these relations are recursive, for example, that of 
individual-collective-individual diachronic responsibility (ICIDR). This is the 
extent to which an individual is now responsible for the prior act of another 
individual in virtue of their co-membership in the same collective. These various 
responsibility relations, aside from the conceptually prior notions of ISR and 
CSR, are all governed by the relation of psychological connectedness. An agent’s 
responsibility for some act concerns the extent to which the agent is connected to 
the mechanism that led to the act. Psychological connectedness matters for 
responsibility in this way because it captures the way in which an action can 
belong to an agent that makes the action a proper basis for moral appraisal of the 
agent. 
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CHAPTER 8 
RESPONSIBILITY AND SPEECH ACTS 
P.F. Strawson famously argued that “being responsible” should be understood in 
terms of “holding responsible”.135 In the present chapter I take seriously the 
question of what is it that we are doing in holding another responsible. I explore 
the idea that responsibility should be understood on the model of speech acts.136 
The chapter argues primarily for two claims. First, that holding responsible and 
judging responsible share a common propositional content, the truth conditions of 
which simply are the conditions of being repsonsible. Second, that holding 
responsible involves something like a distinctive illocutionary force.137 The 
various ways in which we hold responsible all involve taking that propositional 
content to have a particular practical significance. 
 
1. 
Sometimes when one says something this simply amounts to doing it. That is, 
sometimes saying it can make it so.138 For example my utterance, “I promise to 
meet you tomorrow,” simply is to promise. Similarly, when I say “I apologize for 
                                                 
135
 Strawson (1962). 
 
136
 J.L. Austin coined the term in his influential How to do things with Words 
(1962). 
 
137
 This idea has been suggested by theorists such as Austin, Searle, Vanderveken, 
and Joyce but has not, to my knowledge, been adequately developed into a theory 
of responsibility. 
 
138
 See Austin (1962). 
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knocking over the vase,” I am not describing an apology but making one. Of 
course, in either case I may be insincere. I may have no intention to meet you 
tomorrow, or I may not really be sorry. But these considerations do not make it 
false either that I promised or that I apologized, they just make these acts 
insincere.  
 In uttering “I promise to meet you tomorrow” I am doing something, 
namely promising. The illocutionary force of this utterance is one of promising. 
Now compare that utterance with “I warn you that I’ll meet you tomorrow”. This 
utterance shares a common propositional content with the former utterance: I meet 
you tomorrow. But despite the fact that they share propositional content they do 
very different things. The former promises while the second warns (or perhaps 
threatens). They have the same propositional content but they have different 
illocutionary forces.139 Speech acts, then, can be characterized by their 
propositional content and their illocutionary force. We can represent this by 
saying that a speech act is some F(p) where F is some illocutionary force and p is 
some propositional content (Searle, 1969).140 
 There are many different illocutions. For example, promising, asserting, 
warning, and apologizing to name a few. These acts are quite diverse but there is 
something that they all do. They all make implications. To promise is to imply 
                                                 
139
 Austin (1962). Also note that the fact that some utterance has propositional 
content does not entail that the utterance has a truth value. 
 
140
 This holds for the most part, but there are speech acts that lack propositional 
content like “Ouch!”. Vanderveken labels the class of speech acts that can be 
understood on the F(p) model elementary speech acts. 
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that one has an intention to do what’s been promised.141 To assert something is to 
imply that one believes it. To warn is to imply danger. To apologize is to imply 
that one is sorry. But note that though all these illocutions make these 
implications, what is implied need not be the case for the illocution to occur. So 
long as I utter “I promise to meet you” and you hear me the promise occurs. This 
is true even if I have no intention of meeting you. A lack of the appropriate 
intention does not entail a lack of a promise, it just entails that my promise is 
insincere. The truth of the implications made by an illocution are part of the 
sincerity conditions of the illocution. These are conditions that must obtain, not 
for the illocution to occur, but for it to occur sincerely.142 
 To understand the nature of some illocution, then, we must understand at 
least three things.143 We must investigate the nature of the propositional content 
of the illocution. We must understand the distinctive force of the illocution. And 
we should have some account of the sincerity conditions of the illocution. Here I 
                                                 
141
 In addition to promising to we promise that. Whereas a promise to carries an 
implication that one has the intention to do what’s been promised, promising that 
can instead be a form of expressing one’s epistemic authority with respect to 
some proposition (e.g. “I promise you that I was at home at the time of the 
shooting”). 
 
142
 Given that illocutionary acts make implications it sounds quite strange to make 
an illocution and then explicitly deny what’s implied. That is, it would be strange 
to say “I promise to meet you but I have no intention of doing so” or “I apologize 
but I’m not really sorry”. Moore may have been the first to notice this point when 
he noted the oddity of saying “It is raining and I do not believe it”. See Moore 
Principia Ethica (1903) and Vanderveken (1990). In Austin’s terms we might say 
that a speech act implies its felicity conditons. 
 
143
 Though my discussion will be limited to investigating these three elements, 
Searle and Vanderveken identify seven elements constitutive of speech acts 
(1990). 
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will attempt to understand the notion of holding responsible on the model of 
speech acts. This will consist in an account of the propositional content, the 
illocutionary force, and the sincerity conditions. I’ll proceed in that order. 
 
2. 
In this section I give an account of the propositional content of responsibility 
illocutions. Consider first:  
 Case 1: Jones is on his way to work. It’s raining and he is running a bit 
 late. As he is driving he notices a motorist on the side of the road 
 attempting to fix a flat tire. Jones, with a smile on his face, swerves to the 
 side in order to plow through a puddle thereby soaking the stranded 
 motorist.  
I take it that most will have the intuition that Jones is clearly blameworthy for 
splashing the motorist. When one believes that Jones is blameworthy what is one 
believing? 
 One is believing that Jones did something that he ought not to have 
done.144 He ought not to have swerved to splash the stranded motorist. He did 
something that, from a moral point of view, we expect him not to do. On my 
favored terminology, he breached a moral expectation. When one believes that 
some agent is blameworthy one is believing that the agent failed to meet a moral 
expectation. 
                                                 
144
 The ‘ought’ appealed to here is that which is discussed in Chapter 4. It is the 
ought that is tied to responsibility, and not the objective ought which does not 
take into account the agent’s actual epistemic situation. 
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 In Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, R.J. Wallace develops an 
account of responsibility that gives this notion of expectation a central role.145 For 
Wallace, an expectation can be thought of as a demand or a practical requirement, 
for example, “don’t kill” or “it is wrong to kill” or “one ought not to kill”. It is 
important to distinguish this sense of expectation from the epistemic sense. There 
is a sense of expectation that means something like “believes it more likely”. For 
example, I may expect some of my students to cheat on the test in the sense that I 
think that at least one of them will actually cheat. If I were to place a bet I would 
wager that at least one of my students would cheat. But this is distinct from what 
we might call the normative sense of expectation. This is the sense in which we 
hold others to an expectation that they behave in some way. Despite the fact that I 
believe that at least one of my students will cheat, I expect them all to not cheat. 
That is, I hold my students to this expectation. Were one of them to violate this 
expectation this would warrant some negative response on my part.  
 Wallace distinguishes three ways in which we may affirm, in a broad 
sense, an expectation. First, we may internalize it. This involves being motivated 
to act in accordance with the expectation. For example, I may internalize an 
expectation concerning how much personal space is due in social situations. That 
is, I will actually be disposed to act in accordance with the expectation, but I may 
lack any evaluative beliefs regarding this expectation (Wallace, 1994, p. 44). To 
internalize an expectation is just to have the behavioral dispositions to act in 
accordance with it. Second, one may accept an expectation. Acceptance entails 
                                                 
145
 Wallace (1994). 
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internalization, according to Wallace, but it also requires a positive evaluative 
judgment concerning the expectation. When one accepts an expectation one is 
motivated to act in conformity with it and one will also believe it to be justified.146 
Thirdly, we may hold others to the expectation. Wallace argues that holding one 
to an expectation is a sui generis stance. It can not be explained by appeal to 
either acceptance or internalization. Rather, to hold another to an expectation is to 
be disposed to particular emotions or to believe those emotions are warranted in 
the event that the expectation is breached. The emotions implicated in holding 
another to an expectation are, for Wallace, the reactive attitudes. These attitudes 
are distinguished by their propositional content which concerns the breach of an 
expectation. Given this constraint, it turns out on Wallace’s account that only 
guilt, resentment, and indignation are properly characterized as reactive attitudes 
for it is only these moral emotions that have this propositional object.147 And 
                                                 
146
 It is not clear why we ought to think that acceptance entails internalization. 
There is the interesting class of cases in which one has some positive evaluative 
belief concerning some expectation, but has no motivation to comply. This seems 
to be the case with Huck Finn. He has some positive evaluative belief concerning 
the expectation “One ought not to help slaves escape because this amounts to 
stealing” in the sense that he believes it is true, yet he is not motivated to comply. 
 
147
 Note that though it is easier to see what the reactive attitudes have in common 
on this narrow construal, it weakens one of Strawson’s arguments for 
compatibilism. For the more narrow one makes the class of reactive attitudes the 
less plausible it becomes to think that it would be “practically inconceivable” to 
forswear them. That is, it does seem that it would be practically inconceivable to 
give up all the attitudes implicated in adult interpersonal relationships. So if one 
identifies the reactive attitudes with these attitudes (as Strawson does) it does 
seem plausible to think that we could not give them up. However if the reactive 
attitudes are understood narrowly, then it does seem conceivable that we could 
give them up. Wallace (1994). 
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holding responsible simply amounts to holding an agent to a moral expectation 
that one accepts. 
 Expectations can be reasonable or unreasonable. To say that an 
expectation is reasonable is to say that one ought to accept it, and to say that an 
expectation is unreasonable is to say that one ought not to accept it. Reasonable, 
as it is used here, should be taken to mean something like “morally justified”. 
There is, of course, another sense of reasonable which means something like 
“epistemically justified”. Given the distinction between the normative and 
epistemic senses of both ‘expectation’ and ‘reasonable’ it is possible that one can 
reasonably expect an agent to do something (in the epistemic sense) that it is 
reasonable to expect her not to do (in the normative sense). This is the case when 
I believe that some of my students will cheat but I hold them to a demand of 
academic integrity. In what follows I’ll be using both ‘reasonable’ and 
‘expectation’ in the normative sense.148  
 While I find Wallace’s account subtle and insightful, it seems that he has 
only explained one side of the coin. By defining the propositional object of the 
reactive attitudes as a belief that an expectation has been breached, he can only 
explain the negative side of responsibility. Consider: 
                                                 
148
 Note that the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists concerns, in 
my terminology, whether any expectations can be reasonable if determinism is 
true. I will not here enter this debate though my sympathies lie with the 
compatibilist. 
  160 
 Case 2: Smith is also running a bit late on her way to work on a rainy day. 
 She sees a motorist on the side of the road attempting to change his tire. 
 She continues on her way. 
 and 
 Case 3: Taylor is also on her daily commute on a rainy day and is running 
 a bit late. She too sees a motorist attempting to change a tire. She decides 
 to stop and help the motorist.  
I take it that most will have the intuition that Smith is neither praiseworthy nor 
blameworthy and that Taylor is praiseworthy. Wallace does consider the question 
of responsibility for, what he calls, morally worthy actions. And he considers how 
one might extend his account to deal with cases of this kind. To hold some agent 
praiseworthy for some action would consist in being disposed to some positive 
moral emotion or to believe such emotions to be warranted in the event that agent 
met or exceeded an expectation one accepts.  
 Wallace rejects this strategy. For one, he believes that there is no moral 
emotion that can do the necessary work. “To hold a person responsible for a 
worthy action, on the other hand, does not seem presumptively connected to any 
positive emotions in particular” (Wallace, 1994, p. 71). He does note that we do 
often feel gratitude when someone does something which benefits us, but he does 
not think that there is a positive analogue to indignation (the third-person version 
of the negative reactive emotions): 
    But gratitude is not called for in all cases where actions exceed the moral  
    obligations we accept: consider the category of supererogatory acts that do not  
    benefit us in any way. More generally, we hold people responsible for morally  
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    worthy acts that do not exceed the moral obligations we accept, but that merely  
    comply with those obligations—acts such as keeping promises, telling the truth,  
    not harming others, and so forth. In these cases it is especially clear that  
    responsibility for worthy acts need not be connected with any distinctive  
    sentiments (Wallace, 1994, pp. 71-72). 
 
I believe that Wallace is wrong here. First, I think that he is simply mistaken that 
there is no third-person version of gratitude. Approbation seems to be a good 
candidate (and note, one that Strawson focused on). People are often moved to 
tears when they hear about the good acts, the self-sacrifice, and the extraordinary 
degree of compassion that some express through their actions to others. Wallace’s 
contention that that there is no positive emotion associated with our responsibility 
practices gains plausibility when considering those who have merely met the 
expectations that we accept (e.g. keeping ordinary promises, obeying traffic laws, 
telling the truth, etc.). But here, he has failed to distinguish two distinct 
categories. It is one thing to meet an expectation, but it is another thing entirely to 
exceed one.   
 Wallace was right in thinking that the reactive attitudes share a common 
propositional object. And he was right to think that this object makes essential 
reference to expectations. But he was wrong to think that it makes essential 
reference to the violation of an expectation. There does not seem to be any reason 
to be this restrictive about the propositional object of the reactive attitudes. The 
correct account of this propositional content does make essential reference to 
expectations but it does not entail that an expectation has been violated. The 
common propositional object of the reactive attitudes and judgments of 
responsibility expresses that some expectation applies to the agent and expresses 
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that agent’s relation to that expectation. But this relation does not need to be one 
of violation; rather it could be one of meeting or exceeding the expectation. 
 In Case 2 Smith simply met our moral expectations.149 We expect people 
to not splash motorists for fun, but we don’t expect them to always stop and 
help.150 Smith’s action met our expectations but did not go beyond them. Taylor, 
on the other hand, exceeded our expectations. Stopping to help a stranded 
motorist is a morally good thing, but we don’t expect that people always do this 
(e.g. we don’t react with resentment to an agent who fails to stop). Generalizing, 
to be blameworthy for some action is for it to be the case that that action violated 
a reasonable moral expectation. To be praiseworthy for some action is for it to be 
the case that that action went beyond or exceeded a reasonable moral expectation. 
And of course, there is the large (but often ignored) class of actions that do meet 
our reasonable moral expectations but do not go beyond them (e.g. obeying the 
traffic laws). This class may be characterized by the lack of any reactive attitude 
associated with them. 
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 When I refer to “our moral expectations” this should be taken to mean “the 
expectations that we, as a community, accept and therefore believe to be 
reasonable”. It is a further question whether these expectations are, in fact, 
reasonable. Furthermore, I am not offering an account of what makes some 
expectation reasonable. A robust moral realist may hold that there are some 
Platonic moral facts that make some expectations reasonable. Various forms of 
anti-realism may hold that an expectation is reasonable insofar as some group or 
individual believes them to be reasonable. I do not want to enter this debate here. 
While I can remain neutral concerning whether some form of moral realism is 
true or not, I am committed to the denial of non-cognitivism since I hold that 
judgments of responsibility have an essential cognitive component (the 
propositional object). 
 
150
 Perhaps we do expect them to sometimes help. In the example I am assuming 
that Taylor is not merely fulfilling an imperfect duty of benevolence. 
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 To be responsible for some action, then, is to have done something to 
which these reasonable expectations apply. And to be a moral agent generally is 
just to be a person who is subject to these expectations. Some theorists use the 
term ‘responsible’ to be synonymous with ‘blameworthiness’. This, it seems to 
me, invites confusion. For it surely seems that if one has done something 
praiseworthy then one is responsible. If one were not responsible for doing that 
praiseworthy action then it would seem that praise would be unwarranted. On my 
view praiseworthiness entails responsibility and blameworthiness entails 
responsibility, but responsibility entails neither praiseworthiness nor 
blameworthiness. The class of actions in which one has met but not exceeded our 
expectations is one we might call mere responsibility. 
 Though I won’t argue the point here, the content of these reasonable 
expectations concerns an agent’s quality of will. That is, what it is that we can 
reasonably expect of agents is not that they bring about this or that consequence, 
but that they act with particular qualities of will.151 In my view, these qualities of 
will consist in acting with a reasonable degree of concern for doing what’s right 
and avoiding what’s wrong.152 
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 See Chapters 3 and 5. 
 
152
 Arpaly (2003) has a similar view. Though I believe her account, as it is 
expressed there, is vulnerable to a serious objection. See Chapter 4. 
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3. 
In the previous section I characterized the propositional object implicated in our 
various responsibility practices. This concerned an agent’s relation to expectations 
in light of her action. This relation can be one of violating, meeting, or exceeding 
the expectation.  
 In this section I explore the question of what we are doing when we hold 
another responsible. Using the model of speech act theory, I will discuss the 
nature of the illocutionary force of holding responsible. In the previous section I 
offered an account of the nature of the propositional content in a speech act of 
holding responsible; the p in F(p). Here I will focus on the illocutionary force; the 
F in F(p). 
 The claim to be established is that holding responsible involves taking the 
agent’s relation to expectations to be practically significant. This is similar to the 
account offered in the recent work by T.M. Scanlon.153 For Scanlon, to be 
blameworthy is to have done something which impairs one’s relationship with 
another. For example, if I reveal some secret about my friend to others in order to 
gain their favor, then this act of betrayal impairs my relationship with my friend. 
It may give my friend reason to be cautious about telling me things in confidence 
in the future, it may give my friend reason to think that I am less loyal than she 
may have originally thought, and in the extreme case it may give my friend reason 
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 Scanlon (2008). 
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to end our friendship. To blame another, for Scanlon, is to revise one’s attitudes 
toward another that the impairment makes appropriate. 154  
 One way in which my account differs from Scanlon’s is that I want to give 
a comprehensive account of holding responsible. I want to capture what we are 
doing both when we blame and when we praise. Scanlon’s account is not 
equipped to properly characterize praise for it is not the case that to be 
praiseworthy is to have done something that impairs one’s relationship. Rather it 
would seem to enhance that relationship, to strengthen it in various ways.155  
 To hold another responsible (whether it be through praise or blame) is to 
adopt a policy towards that other in virtue of her relation to moral expectations. It 
is to give the propositional content (the agent’s relation to expectations) a special 
practical significance or importance. For example, if I have been betrayed in some 
way by a friend then I will take this fact (the fact that the friend fell below a 
reasonable expectation) to be relevant in my dealings with the friend. The ways in 
which I can take this fact to be relevant are diverse and this captures the richness 
of our moral experience. I may hold my friend responsible by avoiding all contact 
with her, or I may simply shoot her a cold stare. Similarly if a friend has gone out 
of his way to help me, say he has given up his own kidney to save my life, then I 
will take this fact (that he has exceeded an expectation) to have a special 
                                                 
154
 Scanlon (2008, p. 128). 
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 Scanlon appears to believe that praise is a positive evaluation and, as such, is 
not the positive corollary to blame as he is understanding it. The positive corollary 
would be something like gratitude. See Scanlon (2008, pp. 151-152). 
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significance. I may give him a gift, express to him how much his act has meant to 
me, or simply be disposed to do whatever I can to return the favor.156 
 For present purposes I do not wish to argue for any particular account of 
the content of the policy to which one commits in holding responsible. This 
policy, for Wallace, would simply be a disposition to the reactive attitudes or a 
belief that those attitudes are warranted. But one may wish, as Scanlon does, to be 
more inclusive about the content of this policy. For Scanlon to hold responsible 
for a breaching of an expectation would just be to act in some way that reflects the 
impairment in the relationship that the breach of the expectation brought about. 
He leaves open the possibility of impairments that do not involve the reactive 
attitudes. 
 One interesting possibility is that we qua humans express the practical 
significance of agents’ relation to expectations qua agents by way of the reactive 
attitudes. But we need not hold, as Wallace does, that there is a conceptual 
connection between holding responsible and the reactive attitudes. On this view, it 
is a contingent fact about human psychology that the practical significance of an 
agent’s relation to expectations is expressed through the reactive attitudes. That is, 
responsibility as we know it essentially involves the reactive attitudes. But 
responsibility simpliciter does not essentially involve the reactive attitudes. We 
may wish to allow for the possibility of agents who lack the reactive attitudes yet 
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 An interesting possibility is that the fact that the friend exceeded an 
expectation generates in me an expectation (or perhaps, an intention or 
commitment) to exceed expectations in my future dealings with the friend. 
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who still hold responsible. Such agents, then, would express the practical 
significance of that propositional content by some other means.157 
 To hold another responsible is to commit oneself to a policy or to act 
because of and in accordance with that policy in light of an agent’s relation to 
expectations. It is to take the agent’s relation to expectations to be practically 
relevant. This account of holding responsible as commitment to a policy makes a 
related account of forgiveness, apology, and other notions possible. To blame, on 
this account, is to take up a policy towards an agent in virtue of that agent’s 
breaching of an expectation. To forgive, then, is to simply to forswear that policy. 
When one forgives one need not revise one’s judgment that the agent is 
responsible, that there was a breaching of an expectation. Rather, one simply 
takes a different stance on the significance of that fact. One no longer takes that 
breaching to be practically relevant in the way that is involved in blame. 
 Taking responsibility is the first-person version of holding responsible. 
When one takes responsibility for some action one is expressing that one’s own 
relation to expectations is practically relevant for oneself and for others. 
Apologizing occurs when one takes responsibility for falling below an 
expectation. Apologizing both expresses acknowledgement that one has fallen 
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 Perhaps, for example, there are intelligent yet non-emotional creatures that 
alter their behavior towards others in light of that other’s relation to expectations. 
We may wish to say that such creatures hold responsible despite a lack of 
emotions.  
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below an expectation and it involves adopting a policy to avoid a similar 
transgression in the future.158 
 Notice that on the account I am defending there is conceptual space for the 
mirror image of both forgiveness and apology. Forgiveness essentially involves 
taking a stance on one’s breaching of an expectation. Specifically, one expresses 
that one no longer takes that breaching to have the practical significance involved 
in blame. But we may make a similar readjustment of our policy in response to 
someone who has exceeded our expectations. To praise, as I am understanding it, 
is the positive version of holding responsible. To praise an agent is to take that 
agent’s exceeding of expectations to be practically relevant. But just as 
forgiveness involves no longer seeing an agent’s breaching of an expectation as 
practically relevant, so too may we readjust our policy regarding an agent who has 
exceeded our expectations. We may think, for instance, that the agent has gotten 
enough credit already for her good deed. We may think that she has “milked it for 
all it’s worth”. And based on these considerations we may think that the agent’s 
exceeding our expectations is no longer of practical importance.  
 Similarly, there may be the positive corollary of apology. Apology is a 
first-person version of holding responsible. To apologize is, in part, to take 
responsibility for breaching an expectation. But one may also take responsibility 
for exceeding expectations. There is no ordinary English word that refers to this 
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phenomenon, so far as I can tell.159 This may be because taking responsibility for 
a good deed would seem too self-congratulatory. And so it may be that taking 
responsibility for a good deed, to express that one’s exceeding of an expectation is 
practically relevant for oneself and others, violates an expectation of humility.   
 To hold responsible, I’ve claimed, is to commit to a policy in virtue of an 
agent’s relation to expectations. It is to make that relation important to oneself. 
Something has importance for one, insofar as one has particular cognitive, 
motivational, and emotional dispositions towards that thing.160 That is, something 
is important to one when one cares about it. Holding responsible, then, essentially 
involves caring, in a particular way, about an agent’s relation to expectations. 
  
4. 
I’ve claimed that to hold an agent responsible is to adopt a policy toward that 
agent in virtue of her relation to an expectation. This, it might be said, is the 
illocutionary force of holding responsible. Speech acts have sincerity conditions. 
To promise is to imply, among other things, that one intends to do what’s been 
promised. But one need not actually have this intention for the promise to occur. 
It is possible to make an insincere promise. This raises a question. If we are 
modeling our account of holding responsible on the notion of speech acts, then it 
would seem that we should allow for cases of insincerely holding responsible. Is 
this a feature of our moral experience? We may distinguish between the strong 
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and moderate analogy with speech acts. On the strong analogy, holding 
responsible is an illocution just as promising is. Just as promising involves 
expression of a commitment to do what’s been promised, holding responsible 
involves an expression of a commitment to a policy in light of an agent’s relation 
to expectations. But it is commonly acknowledged that one can express a 
commitment to do something that one does not intend to do. Given this, the strong 
analogy holds that we should allow for cases in which an agent insincerely holds 
another responsible. The moderate analogy, on the other hand, holds that there is 
something to be learned from modeling our account of holding responsible on 
speech acts but we should not allow for the possibility of insincerely holding 
responsible; this would be to stretch the analogy too far. 
In order to evaluate the strong and moderate analogies, we need to have 
some idea of what insincerely holding responsible would amount to. When one 
promises one makes particular implications. One implies that one has an intention 
to do what’s been promised. A promise is insincere so long as the promiser 
doesn’t actually have the intention that’s been implied in making the illocution. 
On the strong version of the analogy, to insincerely hold responsible would be to 
imply something false. If what I’ve said about holding responsible is roughly 
right, then to hold another responsible is to imply that one takes the other’s 
relation to expectations to have practical significance. It is to adopt a policy 
purportedly in virtue of another’s relation to expectations. To hold responsible, on 
the strong analogy, is to imply that one takes an agent’s relation to expectations to 
be practically relevant. To hold responsible, on the strong version, is to imply or 
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express that one believes the p in F(p), but one need not actually believe p in 
order for the illocution to occur. 
Consider a politician who, wishing to curry favor with the populace, 
publicly condemns a political opponent for taking bribes. Suppose that our 
politician actually accepts bribes as well. Furthermore, he doesn’t actually think 
there is anything inherently wrong with bribe taking, he just thinks that politics is 
a game and he is playing it better than his opponent.  That is, he does not accept 
the expectation that his opponent breached. He does not believe the expectation to 
be reasonable in the normative sense. But despite this, he still expresses that he 
takes his opponent’s actions to have practical significance. He is purporting to 
take his opponent’s relation to expectations to have a special importance. But he 
does not actually think that it does because he does not accept the expectation.  
Such a case is, according to the strong analogy, one in which the politician 
insincerely holds his opponent responsible. He is actually holding the opponent 
responsible since his actions have a particular illocution. He commits himself to a 
policy that he does not believe in. His actions express that he takes the agent’s 
relation to expectations to be practically relevant. But he fails to have particular 
mental states implied by the illocution (the insincere part).161  
But one might think that this misdescribes the example. One might think 
that the politician is only pretending to hold responsible. He is just “going through 
the motions,” one might be inclined to say. But because he does not have the 
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appropriate inner states (i.e. he doesn’t believe p) this can’t count as a case of 
holding responsible.  To hold responsible, one might think, essentially involves a 
commitment to certain ideals (the expectations), a commitment that our politician 
lacks. On the strong analogy holding responsible just involves implying that one 
is committed to a policy, on the moderate analogy holding responsible requires 
actually committing to a policy that one believes in. The issue is whether holding 
responsible requires one to actually take an agent’s relation to expectations as 
practically relevant, or to merely imply this. 
There is some reason to prefer the strong analogy. One reason has to do 
with the reaction of the political opponent who is being blamed. For him, the 
overt condemnation doesn’t feel like “pretend blame”. It “hurts” just as much as it 
would if the politician had the correct inner states. Sometimes, we are more 
concerned with overt behavior than we are with the inner states of the person. But, 
on the other hand, it also seems that one can’t hold responsible unless one takes 
morality seriously, and so there is some reason to prefer the moderate analogy.  
 Consider another case. Suppose there is some failed terrorist attack in 
Times Square. Also suppose that some militant group “takes responsibility” for 
the attack. And let’s stipulate that this group is causally unrelated to the attack. 
There is a pull to say that it is true that the group “takes responsibility”. They say 
that they do and the news reports describe the case in this way. But, one might 
think, the group is only “claiming responsibility”, and hence they cannot actually 
be taking responsibility. Consider this excerpt from an actual news story:  
    In a purported Pakistani Taliban video that surfaced on the internet Sunday, the  
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    group took responsibility for the foiled attack, though Kelly said Sunday  
    afternoon that "we have no evidence to support this claim."…”Another claim of  
    responsibility e-mailed by an individual to a local New York news station is  
    being investigated”, Kelly said.162 
 
According to the story it is true both that the group took responsibility and that 
they claimed responsibility. The story does say though that there is no evidence 
“to support this claim”. What is the claim? It seems that the claim which lacks 
evidence is not the claim that the group took responsibility but the claim that the 
group is responsible. It doesn’t seem that there is any lack of evidence that the 
group took responsibility. Look at the video in which the group takes 
responsibility. What more evidence could one want for it to be true that the group 
takes responsibility? So it does not seem that false claims of responsibility entail 
that it is false that one takes responsibility. Taking responsibility does not entail 
being responsible or believing that one is responsible. This, then, provides more 
reason to adopt the strong analogy. The terrorist group insincerely takes 
responsibility since they lack the appropriate belief (that they were responsible for 
the attack). The propositional content of the illocution concerns the speaker’s 
relation to some expectation. This expectation would, for them, be one that they 
are representing that they met or exceeded and that they presumably take to be 
reasonable (“kill the infidels” or something along these lines), though of course 
we think that this expectation is not reasonable. But they don’t take this 
proposition to be true, though they are implying that they do. This may generalize 
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to other cases of holding responsible in which the speaker does not believe the 
appropriate proposition (some relation to some expectations).163  
 The issue, then, concerning the strong and moderate analogies concerns 
whether one takes the propositional content to be practically relevant. And to take 
the content to be practically relevant, one must believe it. There are at least two 
ways in which one could fail to believe that content. First, as in the case of the 
politician, one may have a belief concerning an agent’s relation to an expectation, 
but one may simply fail to accept that expectation. The politician does believe that 
his opponent took a bribe. He just thinks that the expectation to refrain from 
bribery is not reasonable. The case of the terrorist group, however, is one in which 
the group believes the expectation to be reasonable yet they fail to have the 
appropriate belief concerning an agent’s relation to that expectation. For them, the 
expectation would be, as mentioned above, something like “kill the infidels”. 
They believe this expectation to be reasonable. But they do not believe that they 
were the ones who met or exceeded this expectation.  
 One last possibility that we should consider is that there is an asymmetry 
between breaching an expectation and exceeding an expectation. It may be that 
blame (that is, negatively holding responsible) does not require belief in the 
propositional content, but that praise (positively holding responsible) does require 
belief in the propositional content. Or perhaps the even stronger requirement that 
the propositional object be true. Consider a twist on the terrorist case. Suppose 
that rather than finding an SUV full of explosives, authorities find an SUV full of 
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toys and money with instructions that they are to go to the local orphanage. And 
suppose that some group “takes responsibility” for leaving the SUV there but 
suppose that they are not in fact responsible for the good deed.164 In such a case 
we may be unwilling to say that the group took responsibility so much as we 
would want to say that they tried (unsuccessfully) to take responsibility. Perhaps 
there is some condition of uptake that is part of the success conditions of this 
illocution. We may allow an agent to take responsibility for some bad act by just 
uttering the words “I hereby take responsibility” but not allow an agent to take 
responsibility for some good act by merely making the utterance. 
 What I believe the above discussion shows is that there are two distinct 
phenomena that we may be concerned with in the domain of holding responsible. 
On the one hand, we have the pure speech act which involves some overt 
behavior, for example, the utterance “I hereby apologize.” This utterance implies 
that (a) one believes that one fell below some reasonable expectation and that (b) 
one believes this fact to have practical importance. Yet these implications need 
not be true in order for the apology to occur. On the other hand, we may be 
concerned with the inner states of the individual that make such implications true. 
This is what is involved in actually being sorry. When one is sorry for what one 
has done, one both believes that one has failed to meet a reasonable expectation 
and one takes this to be practically significant.  
 This same distinction between the speech act and the inner states implied 
by the speech act applies to praise and blame as well. Just we can distinguish 
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between apology and sorrow and identify the former with the speech act and the 
latter with the inner states implied by the speech act, we can distinguish between 
condemnation and blame. To condemn involves overt behavior that implies that 
one has particular inner states. To blame is to actually have these inner states. 
Similarly, we can distinguish between commendation and praise. To commend is 
to go through some overt behavior that implies that one believes the expectation 
to have been exceeded along with the implication that this is practically relevant. 
Praising involves actually believing the expectation to have been exceeded and 
actually taking this to be of practical importance.  
 In normal scenarios there is a correlation between the inner states and their 
expression in a speech act. Blame usually gives rise to condemnation and praise to 
commendation. But it important to see that the two phenomena are distinct. When 
we speak of holding responsible we are sometimes more concerned with the inner 
states of the individuals but at other times we are more concerned with their overt 
expression. This is why both the moderate and the strong analogies had appeal.  
But once we clearly distinguish between the speech act and the inner states, we 
can see that our intuitions are not really in conflict. And what is especially 
important is that both the speech act and the inner states have important features 
in common. Both are about the practical importance of an agent’s relation to 
expectations. This is what responsibility is about. 
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5. 
The account of responsibility I have defended consists in two claims. The first is 
that responsibility is essentially about agents’ relation to expectations. This 
relation can be one of violating, meeting, or exceeding expectations. This is the 
propositional content of holding responsible. I have also argued that the various 
ways in which we hold responsible, whether this be through praise, blame, 
apology, forgiveness or other modalities, all involve taking the agent’s relation to 
expectations to be practically important. They are all ways in which we commit to 
a policy in virtue of one’s relation to expectations. Finally, we express this 
commitment through overt speech acts. 
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